The judicial process in commonwealth Africa by Elias, Taslim Olawale
THE
JUDICIALPROCESS
IA
COMMONWEALTH
AFRICA
T 0 ELIAS
THE
JUDICIAL PROCESS 
IN
COMMONWEALTH
AFRICA
T O ELIAS
fo r m e r ly  C h ie f  Ju stice  o f  N igeria
IN S T llv l*
O f
d i v i i o p w n t
*TUP*M
tlftftAAT
UNIVERSITY OF GHANA LEGON 
FEP INTERNATIONAL LTD
VICE-CHANCELLOR S FOREWORD
AGGREY-FRASER-GUGGISBERG  
MEMORIAL LECTURES 1975
Dr Taslim Olawale Elias, who delivered the 1975 series of lectures, 
was born on 11 November 1914 and was educated at Lagos CMS 
G ram m ar School and Igbobi College before he proceeded to the 
University of London for a very brilliant academic career.
One academic honour fter another came easily to him and I may 
only single out the follov, mg: University of London Post-Graduate 
Scholarship, 1946-49; Yarborough-Anderson Scholarship to the 
Inner Temple, 1948-49; the Ph.D. (London), 1949; Simon Research 
Fellowship at the Institute of  Commonwealth Studies and Queen 
Elizabeth House, Oxford, 1954-60; Research Fellowship at Nuffield 
College, Oxford, 1956; and the LL.D. (London), 1962.
Dr Elias' fame quickly spread far and wide. No wonder then that 
he became Constitutional Adviser to the British West Indies, 1959; 
Somaliland, 1960; and Malawi, 1960. He was Chairman of the United 
Nations Constitutional and Legal Experts to draft a Constitution for 
the Congo (Leopoldville), 1961 and 1962. He has been a member 
of the International Law Commission of the United Nations since 
1961 and was Chairman of that body in 1970; Member of  the Inter­
national Law Association, London, 1965, and Associate of the Institute 
de Droit International. He holds six honorary degrees and has been 
Visiting Professor of Political Science at the University of  Delhi. 
1956; Governor of the School of Oriental and African Studies, London 
University, 1957-60; Attorney-General and Minister of Justice of 
the Federal Nigeria Government, 1960-66 (the first Nigerian to h o ld  
this post); and again Attorney-General and Commissioner for Justice 
after October 1966; and from February 1972, the Chief Justice of 
the Federal Republic of Nigeria.
He has argued cases before the Privy Cou il and the International 
Court of Justice. He has also vvritten extensively. Among his books 
are the following:
1. Nigerian Land Law and Custom 1951
2. Groundwork o f  Nigerian Law 1 /54
3. Nature o f  African Customary Law 1956
4. Government and Politics in Africa 1961
5. Nigeria: Development o f  its Laws and Constitution 1967
6. Africa and the Development o f  International Law 1972
7. The Modern Law o f  Treaties 1974
Dr Elias is indeed one of the most ‘learned’ sons of  Africa practising 
the ‘learned’ profession— and he has brought distinction to his 
profession at home as well as on the international s  ^ we.
It is such lustre that Dr T. O. Elias brought to the thirteenth in 
our series of lectures designed to commemorate the three founders 
of Achimota: Dr E. Kwegyir Aggrey, Rev. Alex Fraser and Governor 
Gordon Guggisberg. These lectures were established in 1957 in the 
year of the independence of Ghana by the University of G hana with 
funds provided by the G hana Government.
Dr T. O. Elias chose for his theme ‘The Judicial Process in C om m on­
wealth Africa’ with five subtitles: (i) English Law in African Courts; 
(ii) Judges and Customary Law; (iii) Conflict of Laws; (iv) Judicial 
Interpretation of the Constitution; and (v) Judicial Precedent and 
Legal Development in Africa.
These stimulating lectures, which have now been published, would 
be most educative, particularly for those who were not able to listen 
to Dr Elias and more so for those who listened to him on all five 
occasions.
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L E C T U R E  ON E
ENGLISH LAW IN AFRICAN COURTS
I
The Reception of English Law
The most fundamental question in any consideration of C om m on­
wealth law in African territories is perhaps one of determining how 
English law was introduced into the several countries, and how 
much of it is applicable therein. The extent o f  the application of 
English law may be due to the nature of the administrative policy 
underlying its introduction, or it may be due to the subject matter 
of the litigation, or even to the manner of  its interpretation and 
application in individual cases or a group of cases.
One common feature of  the reception of English law in the C om m on­
wealth African territories is an invariable formula which runs some­
what along these lines:
The com m on law, the doctrines o f equity and statutes o f general application  
in England at a named date shall be applicable in the particular territory 
so far as local circumstances permit and it is not modified by express local 
legislation.
Now, in the case of G h a n a ,1 that is. the former Gold Coast Colony, 
the operative date is July 24, 1874; in the Kenya Colony it is 1897; 
in Nigeria (with the exception of Western and Mid-Western Nigeria),2 
it is January 1, 1900; and in the case of Uganda, it is January 1, 1902.
1 In the former Gold Coast Colony, English law was officially introduced on this 
date, even though it had been at work in one form or another in some parts o f the 
settlement in the Bond o f 1844.
2 In the old Lagos settlement, English law was first officially introduced on March 4, 
1863. not long after the Cession of 1861. The Nigerian formula runs as follows:
S 45 (1) Subject to the provisions o f this section and except in so far as other pro­
vision is made by any Federal law, the com m on law o f England and the doctrines o f  
equity, together with the statutes o f general application that were in force in England 
on the 1st day o f  January, 1900, shall be in force in Lagos and, in so far as they relate 
to any matter within the exclusive legislative competence o f the Federal legislature, 
shall be in force elsewhere in the Federation.
(2) Such Imperial laws shall be in force so far only as the limits o f the local
By the Kenya Judicature Act of  1967 which substantially reproduced 
the provisions contained in the East Africa Protectorate Order-in- 
Council o f  1902 with the 1911 Amendment, the courts of Kenya 
are empowered to administer, subject to any written law. “ the 
substance of the common law, the doctrines of equity and the statutes 
of general application in force in England on the 12th August 1897... 
Provided that the said common law, doctrines of equity and statutes 
of general application shall apply so far only as the circumstances 
of Kenya and its inhabitants permit and subject to such qualifications 
as those circumstances render necessary” . By virtue of  section 74 
of the Courts Act. 1965, and subject to the provisions of the Consti­
tution or any other enactment, the common law. doctrines of equity 
and statutes of general application in England on the first day of 
January 1880. are in force in Sierra Leone. Similarly, section 2(b) 
of the Judicature Act o f  1962 of Uganda stated that, in so far as the 
written law did not apply, the Courts were to exercise jurisdiction “ in 
conformity with the substance of  the common law. doctrines of 
equity and the statutes o f  general application in force in England 
on the 11th of August. 1902” . Although these provisions have not 
been specifically spelt out in section 3(2)(a) o f  the Judicature Act 
of 1967. it must be presumed that the statutes of  general application 
in England remain in force in Uganda. As far as G hana is concerned, 
the basic provision is to be found in the Ghana Courts Ordinance, 
Cap 4 (now repealed), section 83 which provided as follows:
Subject to the terms o f  this or any other Ordinance, the com m on law, the 
doctrines o f  equity and the statutes o f  general application which were in 
force in England on the 24th day o f  July, 1874, shall be in force within the 
jurisdiction o f  the courts.
This position has been retained under the Courts Act. 1971.
It will be noticed that all these omnibus provisions for the reception 
of English law in each territory pose a number of difficult problems. 
As regards common law and doctrines of equity, how arc we to apply
jurisdiction and local circumstances shall permit and subject to any Federal law.
(3) For the purpose o f facilitating the application o f the said Imperial laws 
they shall be read with such formal verbal alterations not affecting the substance as 
to names, localities, courts, officers, persons, moneys, penalties and otherwise as 
may be necessary to render the same applicable to the circumstances. Law (M is­
cellaneous Provisions) Act, 1964, (Cap 89) o f Laws of the Federation o f Nigeria and 
Lagos, 1958 Edition of the Laws, Vol III, Cap 89. All the States in the Federation 
(except Western & Mid-Western States) have adopted January 1, 1900, as the cut-off 
date.
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the limiting date? Is it to apply only to the statutes of general 
application in England at the specified date, or to the common law 
and doctrines of  equity as well at the specified date? Put in another 
way, have the common law and doctrines of equity applicable in 
a territory been affected by the decisions of  the English superior 
courts since the specified date which have modified these branches 
of the law in England? Various answers have been given to these 
questions by a number of  academic lawyers.3 No definite decision 
has been reached.
Both judges and academic writers have rightly complained that 
there is no convenient list attached to the relevant legislation of 
each territory specifying which English statutes among the thousands 
existing at the specified dates can be regarded as of general application 
in England as distinct from Britain or even the United Kingdom. 
Each territory is left to speculate for itself, and the courts have been 
much troubled by the resultant inconvenience and uncertainty. 
Again, assuming that some o f the applicable English statutes that 
are applicable in a given case can be identified, it is not always easy 
for the courts to identify the modifications that are necessary in such 
statutes to make them suit particular local circumstances.
It was this and other problems that led to the interesting experiment 
carried out by Western Nigeria in 1959 in an effort to render it un­
necessary to continue to refer to a given date as that of reception 
of English common law, equity and statutes. Sir Kenneth Roberts 
Ray,4 has described what happened in these words:
In the Western Region o f Nigeria, however, which 1 think it fair to say is 
giving an enterprising lead in law reform and adaptation, they have gone  
one better. By a Law passed in February, 1959, it was provided that, in 
matters within the com petence o f  the Regional Legislature, no English Acts 
should thereafter be in force in the Region unless it applied by virtue o f  
its own terms. This at first sight seems a startling work o f dem olition; but 
looking further back in the statute book, one finds that they had filled the 
void before creating it, by enacting as laws o f  the Region more than, twenty 
Acts o f  (English) Parliament adapted to their own circumstances, in other 
words they have relieved the Courts o f the burden o f  interpreting the phrase 
‘statutes o f  general application'. This admirable piece o f  work involved  
exam ination o f the English statute book from 1267 to the end o f  1899 (the
'See my British Colonial Law, 1962, A N  Allott, Essays in African Law , pp 3111'; 
A E W Park, Sources o f  Nigerian Law, pp 20ff; N A Ollenu; ‘The Changing Law and 
Law Reform in Ghana’, Journal o f  African Law, 1971, vol XV, no 2, p 176.
4 See his essay, ‘The Adaptation of Imported Law in Africa’, Journal o f  African Law,
1960. vol-IV, no 2, p 71.
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date prescribed for the application o f  the English law to N igeria) and close  
study o f about 100 Acts. It is particularly interesting to note that one result 
is that the Western Region is the first African country to have legislation  
based upon the English law o f  property reforms o f 1925.
The latest legislative experiment of the same order has been carried
out recently in Ghana under the Courts Act of 1971. Section 111
contains the following provisions:
(1) Until provision is otherwise made by law, the statutes o f  England 
specified in the First Schedule to this Act shall continue to apply in 
Ghana as statutes o f  general application.
(a) to the extent indicated in the First Schedule to this Act, and not
further or otherwise; and
(b) subject to such verbal amendment not affecting the substance as 
may be necessary to enable them to be conveniently applied in 
Ghana.
(2) the statutes o f  England referred to in subsection (1) o f  this section  
shall be treated as if they formed part o f  the com m on law prevailing 
over any rule thereof other than a rule o f  customary law included in 
the com m on law under any enactment providing for the assim ilation  
o f such rules o f  customary law as are suitable for general application.
It is provided in subsection (5) that the Minister responsible for 
justice may prepare and publish a volume containing the provisions 
of the English statutes applied by both subsections, making all 
necessary modifications as are deemed necessary. The completed 
volume is required to be laid before the National Assembly for its 
approval. The First Schedule to the Act contains a list of English 
statutes beginning with the Statute of Uses, 1635, and ending with 
the Apportionment Act, 1870. Each of the 40 Acts listed indicates 
the sections that are to continue in force in Ghana. It is also interesting 
to note that subsection (3) o f  section 111 incorporates several sections 
of the English Law of Property Act, 1925, which now apply in Ghana, 
subject to such verbal amendment not affecting the substance as 
may be necessary to enable those sections to be conveniently applied 
in Ghana, but not so as to require a conveyance under customary 
law to be made by deed. The Courts Act then goes on to impose 
a limiting factor in section 111(8) which requires that the statutes 
of England shall, subject to the foregoing provisions, cease to apply 
in Ghana, except insofar as they may be applied by any enactment 
for the time being in force and no English statute will be deemed 
to be one of general application other than a statute referred to in 
the section itself.
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The last point just made raises the question as to the introduction 
into each African territory by reference in a local enactment to English 
substantive law or rules o f  procedure. That is to say, that the common 
law, doctrines of equity and statutes of general application in England 
are not directly applied by specific provision to that effect, but so 
much of them as are relevant in certain limited areas of the law may 
be incorporated in the local law of the territory by reference. Here 
is an example from the High Court of Lagos Act (Cap 80), section 
16 of which contains the following provision:
The jurisdiction o f  the High Court in probate, divorce and matrimonial 
causes and proceedings may, subject to the provisions o f  this Act and in 
particular o f section 27 and to rules o f  court, be exercised by the court in 
conform ity with the law and practice for the time being in force in England.
The same problem arose for determination in the recent case of 
Lartey  v Affutu-N artey.5 The question was whether the English Wills 
Act of 1963 applied to G hana  when the testator died. The answer 
given was ‘yes’ and this after the reform of the Courts Act, 1971, 
and also the English Wills Act of 1963 is a post-1874 enactment. 
The learned trial judge had stated in his ruling on July 29, 1970 
thus:
So far as probate matters are concerned they are to be governed by the law 
and practice for the time being in force in England. It is therefore necessary 
that any will which is not a nuncupative will before it is admitted to probate 
must conform  to the W ills Act, 1837.
Now, the law for the time being in force in England when the case 
first came before the court below was not only the Wills Act, 1837 
but also the Wills Act, 1963. This 1963 Act was clearly not a statute 
of general application having been passed after 1874, but it was the 
law relating to probate for the time being in force in England which 
was applicable to Ghana by virtue of paragraph 93(2) o f  the Courts 
Decree, 1966.6 At the date of  the testator’s death, the English Wills 
Act, 1963, was the applicable law and the lower court was held bound 
to consider it. The will had already been proved in the Probate Court 
in Liberia where the testator, who was a Liberian national, was both 
resident and domiciled. It would appear from the proceedings of 
the Liberian Court that the formal validity of the will had been
5 (1972) 2 GLR 488, Court o f Appeal.
6 N LC D  84.
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established. Archer, J A, accordingly held that section 1 of the English 
Wills Act, 1963, applied in Ghana to govern the case.
A somewhat critical note was, however, sounded by Hayfron- 
Benjamin, J A, in Gray v G ray.1 In that case, it was held, inter alia, 
that the laws of England relating to divorce and matrimonial causes 
that were in force in G hana before August 22, 1969, continued as part 
of the existing law by virtue of  Article 126 o f the Constitution of 
1969. It was, however, further held that any provision in the laws 
of Ghana that any subsequent amendment, repeal or enactment of 
the laws operating in England should automatically be in force in 
Ghana was not consistent with the Constitution and the laws must 
be read with the modification and exception provided in Article 
126(5) of the Constitution. The learned justice of appeal then permitted 
himself the following trenchant observation:
I am not prepared to hold that a law passed by the British Parliament in 
the exercise o f  the legislative power o f  Britain can become part o f  the laws 
o f Ghana through the back door. It should be noted that it was Parliament, 
under the 1960 Constitution, which passed the Courts Act, 1960 (A .C .A . 9), 
making the law for the time being in force in England applicable to Ghana. 
Likewise, it was the National Liberation Council, acting in accordance 
with the Proclamation with Decree N .L .C . 84 m aking the law for the time 
being in force in England applicable to G hana. Parliament under the new 
Constitution has passed no such legislation. All we have, therefore, are 
the provisions o f  the Constitution which regard this as part o f  the existing 
law which is to be read with such exceptions and m odifications as may be 
necessary to bring it into conform ity with the Constitution. W ith certain 
reservations I would say that the Parliament under the 1960 Constitution  
and the National Liberation Council under the Proclamation were supreme 
legislative bodies, the same cannot be said o f  the Parliament under the new 
Constitution. Speaking for m yself I would be sceptical in according consti­
tutional validity to any Act o f the present Parliament which in effect em bodied  
the future legislative will o f  the British Parliament in divorce and matrimonial 
causes, and for that matter in respect o f  anything, in the laws o f  Ghana.
Fortunately for all concerned, in this particular type of situation, 
the Nigerian Matrimonial Causes Decree of  1970, as well as the Ghana 
Matrimonial Causes Decree of  1971, has made it no longer necessary 
for our law of divorce and matrimonial causes to be tied to successive 
English statutes on the subject.8
7 (1971) 1 GLR 422.
M It is not clear whether the English law of probate has ceased to apply in both 
countries at the present time.
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Some Implications of the Reception of English Law
Yet another phenomenon of the reception of English law into an 
African country occurs where a rule of the English common law 
has been enacted as part o f  the local law and, thereafter, that rule 
was later amended or repealed in England by legislation. Does the 
local enactment embodying the repealed English common law rule 
still represent the law, or is it itself ipso facto  modified to the same 
extent as the amended law in England? Should the interpretation 
of the enacted provision o f  English law depend upon the subsequent 
changes in the English com m on law? Somewhat divergent answers 
have been returned by some o f our courts. Let us illustrate the point 
by reference to Nigerian law. In the English Law of Evidence, for 
example, there used to be what was known as the Rule in Russell 
v Russell,9 which was to the effect that neither of the two parents 
would be permitted to give evidence which might bastardize a child 
born during the continuance of a valid marriage or within a reasonable 
time thereafter. This Rule was the English common law rule in 1943 
when the new Evidence Act was enacted in Nigeria and it was embodied 
in section 147 of  the Act. The Rule in Russell v Russell was, however, 
subsequently abolished in England in 1949 by the Law Reform 
(Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, which was repealed and re-enacted 
first as section 32 of  the 1950 Matrimonial Causes Act and now 
section 43 of  the 1965 Matrimonial Causes Act. Since any English 
Act passed after 1900 would not apply in Nigeria unless it has been 
locally re-enacted, the English 1949 amendment should not normally 
apply in Nigeria. But, as we have seen, it is so applicable by virtue 
o f  section 16 of  the High Court of Lagos Act. The problem is to 
determine whether this application of  the English Matrimonial 
Causes Acts in Nigeria means that the Rule in Russell v Russell, 
as embodied in the Nigerian Evidence Act. ceases to be the law in 
Nigeria so as to enable a husband or wife to give evidence to 
bastardize their child. In Ohuru v O h u ru f0 and Egurunwoke 
v E g u ru n w o ke f1 the courts allowed such evidence to be given; in 
the former the husband gave evidence that his wife gave birth to 
a baby two calendar years after she had left Nigeria.
In Elumeze v Elumeze & M artins,12 however, Taylor, C J. held
u (1924) AC 687.
10 Unreported Judgment N o 1/173/63.
"  (1966) NM LR 147.
12 H D/41/64 o f March 6, 1967, and April 10, 1967.
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that section 147 of the Nigerian Evidence Act still applied in Nigeria 
in spite of the incorporation by reference of the English Matrimonial 
Causes Act of 1965. The Matrimonial Causes Decree 1970 has now 
solved this problem by providing in section 84 that either spouse 
may now give such evidence.
A similar, though less complicated, problem arose for consideration 
in the Kenyan case of Orude & anor v The Municipal Council 
o f  Kisumu,13 in which the Court of Appeal for East Africa applied 
the English common law as defined by the House of  Lords in Rookes 
v Barnard,14 in respect of the circumstances in which exemplary 
damages might be awarded, overriding certain earlier decisions. 
One of the tests applied by the Court of Appeal for East Africa in 
deciding whether Rookes v Barnard was applicable in Kenya was 
that, as there was no local law with which its application would be 
inconsistent, the English decision should be taken “ as authoritatively 
setting out the law of England as to exemplary damages in tort, 
which law was applied in Kenya by the Judicature Act, 1967” . The 
position may be viewed from two angles: either to regard the common 
law as at the date of its reception in Kenya in 1897, and as later modified 
by local enactment or judicial decision, as part o f  the existing law 
in Kenya, so that English decisions after the date of  reception do 
not bind the local c o u r t ; or to regard the common law which is currently 
in force in England as the applicable law in Kenya. The East African 
Court of Appeal would seem to have based its decision on the 
principle that decisions of  the English superior courts cannot over­
ride or modify local decisions, but in the absence o f  any local rule 
of common law on a given subject matter in dispute, relevant English 
decisions such as Rookes v Barnard should be applied to fill the g a p .15 
This rule of thumb is in some ways similar to the so-called ‘residual 
clauses’, 16 in many a court statute in the African territories providing
13 Civil Appeal N o 37 of 1970. Judgment delivered on November 27, 1970.
14 (1964) AC 1129.
15 Some confusion would have been introduced in Kenyan law if the ruling in Broome 
v Cassell & Co L td  <£ anor (1971) 2 All ER 187 by the Court o f Appeal in England which 
declared Rookes v Barnard to be wrong had stood. Fortunately, the House o f Lords 
itself subsequently overruled the English Court o f Appeal in Cassell & Co L td  v Broom 
& anor (1972) AC 1027.
16 S 126 of the Constitution of 1969 provides:
(2) The com mon law of Ghana shall comprise the rules generally known as 
the common law, the rules generally known as the doctrines o f equity, and the 
rules of customary law including those determined by the Superior Court of 
Judicature.
(3) For the purpose o f this article, the expression 'customary law’ means the 
rules o f law which by custom are applicable to particular communities in Ghana.
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that, if there is no local applicable law, whether enacted law or 
customary law, English law may be applied to the settlement of  any 
dispute before a High Court.
We may now turn to a consideration of the question where it is 
found that both English law and customary law are equally applicable 
to a dispute. This problem is pointed up especially in countries 
like G hana which have a dynamic body of customary law and judicial 
process. Thus, under the Interpretation Act, 1960, “ the common 
law” is defined in section 17, while “ the customary law” is defined 
in section 18, and both sources constitute “ the common law of 
G hana” . 17 All persons are subject to this common law but, in addition, 
any member of a particular community or locality may invoke the 
operation o f  a local customary law which the judges are now em­
powered to declare. The combined effect of the provisions of sections 
83 and 87(1) of the Courts O rdinance18 is thus stated in section 64, 
rule 6 of the Courts D ecree:19
Subject to the foregoing rules, an issue should be determined according 
to the com m on law unless the plaintiff is subject to any system o f custom ary 
law and claims to have the issue determined according to that system, when 
it should be so determined.
It is, of course, an erroneous interpretation of this provision to say 
that the common law of England overrides the customary law in 
all matters even in the fields of land tenure, inheritance and family 
law .which are reserved for these by express legislation. Let us consider 
a few examples in which the courts have grappled with disputes 
subject to the concurrent application of  English and customary 
law. Thus in Dagartey v Ekwamu  c£ a n o r20 Aboagye, J, held that 
the Limitation Act, 1623, as a received statute of general application 
in England, does not apply to govern a transaction between Africans 
unless the parties have previously agreed that the transaction should 
be governed by English law. The claim before the magistrate was 
for a debt o f  N C  130 contracted fourteen years previously, and he 
had dismissed the action as having been statute-barred. The learned 
judge allowed the appeal, holding that the customary law must apply 
to the exclusion of the Limitation Act. The transaction, though 
capable of being dealt with under English law, was held to be one
' More will be said on this subject in the next chapter.
18C ap4, 1951.
19 N LCD 84.
20 (1970) CC 1, HC.
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under customary law in the contemplation of the parties to the 
transaction.21 A more illuminating case, however, is Yanney v 
N yam ekve , where a plaintiff' claimed damages from the defendant 
for the seduction of his niece. As the action for seduction may be 
brought either under the common law or customary law. the plaintiff 
was free to choose which one he would pursue. The tort o f  seduction 
in English law is based on the fiction of the master-and-servant 
relationship whereby the plaintiff lost the services of  the seduced 
girl per quod servitium amissit. Under customary law, however, 
the tort of seduction is innocent o f  such a fiction. The court pointed 
out:
The right to recover damages in this type o f action is available both at com m on  
law and in native custom , and so the plaintiff who is a native is at liberty 
to bring either form o f  action.
In the instant case, the plaintiff chose to sue under the common 
law. It is interesting to note the following remarks of  the court:
Proof o f  these ingredients is essential in an action for seduction at com m on  
law, whereas under custom ary law if a man seduces an unmarried wom an  
o f  the type in this appeal, he is autom atically liable to pay to her or 
her family damages for the wrong he has done to her and the disgrace brought 
on her family. As damages are presumed to have been sustained when­
ever an injury is done to the right o f  a party, the seduction o f  the appellant’s 
relative may be an invasion o f  her legal right giving her the right to recover 
damages without necessarily proving loss o f  service as is required under 
com m on law.
Again in Boateng v A d u n a 22 the plaintiff sued the defendant in 
the local court for damages for the seduction of  his daughter, and was 
awarded £G80 as general damages and £G2 per month for the main­
tenance of the daughter during pregnancy. The defendant was also 
ordered to maintain the daughter’s child when born. He appealed 
against this decision on the ground that where there was no evidence 
of loss o f  service, an action in seduction could not succeed and that, 
in any case, there was no legal ground for the award o f  damages 
and maintenance against him. The appeal was dismissed since the 
customary law does not require any such fiction as does the common
21 But see Aradzie v Yandor (1922) FCt 22, 91 where it was held that the Statute o f  
Limitation applied because ihe parties had employed English methods o f raising the 
loan.
22 (1963) 1 GLR 445.
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law in order to provide a remedy for what is in truth the infringement 
of family or paternal honour. It was also held that the father of 
a child born out of wedlock is liable to pay for the expenses incurred 
during the seduced girl’s confinement and to maintain the child 
during minority.23 J M Sarbah’s Fanti Customary Laws was cited 
with approval as follows:
If a man seduces an unmarried wom an, he is liable to pay to her family
damages for the wrong so done her and the disgrace done on her fam ily.24
In Attiase v Abohbitey ,25 the question of a choice between common 
law and customary law which arose concerned the actionability 
or otherwise of calling a woman a prostitute who carried on pros­
titution in her shop. The local court of first instance gave judgment 
for the plaintiff; but, on appeal to a circuit court, it was reversed 
mainly because according to the English common law, calling a 
woman a prostitute is not actionable per se. On a further appeal, 
the Court of Appeal reversed the circuit court and reaffirmed the 
local court of first instance on the ground that the slander of the 
plaintiff woman was actionable per se under the common law of 
Ghana, since it accused her o f  the offence of keeping a brothel contrary 
to the Criminal Code. The Court of Appeal further held that the 
circuit court was in error in applying the com m on law to the facts 
of this case instead o f  the customary law on the basis of which the 
local court had given its judgment and all the parties had argued 
their case.26 Ollenu, J, in delivering the judgment o f  the Court 
of Appeal, observed that under the customary law of defamation, 
the words complained of are actionable although they may be treated 
as mere vulgar abuse under the English common law. The English 
Slander of  Women Act, 1891 is clearly not applicable in G hana 
since it was enacted in England after the reception o f  English law 
in Ghana in 1874. It is gratifying to note that customary law has 
produced a satisfactory result in the circumstances of  the case.
Sometimes a plaintiff may be put to his election by the court to 
choose between two applicable English statutes according as one 
or the other of them can probably be regarded as a statute of  general 
application in the country concerned. A case in point is Curator
' See Marshall v Dawson (1885) Sar FCL III; Adjei v Ripley (1956) 1 W ALR 62.
24 Ibid, pp 446-47 .
25 (1969) CC 149 CA.
The Courts Decree, para 64(1) makes it obligatory to apply customary law where 
all the parties had adopted it as the basis o f their pleading and argument.
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o f  Intestate Estates v N ’jie  and Betts in which a learner driver, 
N ’jie, drove Betts’ car unaccompanied and negligently killed one 
Tejan Foon. The deceased was survived by his paren ts 'and  a child 
who was en ventre sa mere at the time of his death who was born 
six months after. The Curator of intestate Estates brought an action 
on behalf o f  the deceased as his personal representative against 
N ’jie and Betts under both the Fatal Accidents Act, 1846 and the 
Law of England (Application) Act of the Gambia. This latter Act 
makes the Fatal Accidents Act of of 1846 and the Law Reform 
''Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1934 applicable in the Gambia. 
The court advised the plaintiff to conduct the action under the 1846 
Act rather than under the 1934 Act even though certain paragraphs 
of the statement of claim were also based on the latter. The Supreme 
Court held that the C urator  could not recover any damages under 
the 1846 Act because (a) the deceased’s parents were not his dependants 
within the meaning of  the Fatal Accidents Act, 1846 and had therefore 
suffered no pecuniary loss, and (b) a posthumous child is not en­
titled under the 1934 Act. The court did, however, concede there 
might well be a case for allowing damages under the 1934 Act. This 
unfortunate result was brought about by the Supreme Court putting 
the plaintiff to his election to choose between the 1846 Act and the 
1934 Act instead of leaving it to him to frame his action under either 
or boih enactments. The balance was, however, in the end restored 
when the Gambian Court of Appeal reversed the learned Chief 
Justice of the Supreme Court of the Gambia and upheld the right 
of the plaintiff to bring his action under both English Acts.
An almost identical legal situation fell to be considered in the 
Ghanaian case of Elrouh v H am ili,28 in which counsel cited the English 
Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1934, section 1 of 
which lays down the general rule that all causes o f  action subsisting 
against or vested in a person shall survive, upon his death, against or 
iOi ihe benefit of, his estate, except in certain cases. He accordingly 
argued that the common law rule of actio personalis moritur cum 
personae ceased to exist in England since 1934 in respect of claims 
for personal injuries by reason of this Act and was therefore not part 
of the common law of England on July 1, 1960 when the Ghana 
Constitution came into force and was consequently not part of the 
law of Ghana. But the Court of Appeal refused to accept this conten­
tion for two reasons. In the first place the English Act of 1934 did
2 Court o f Appeal (Civil Appeals) 1969, unreported. See ‘Annual Survey o f  African 
Law’, vol III, 1969, pp 69 -70 .
2S (1963) 1 GLR 310.
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not create a new common law rule; it merely provided a statutory 
remedy where none existed before at common law. The common 
law rule, therefore, remains in force in England except that by reason 
of certain statutes it cannot be successfully pleaded in bar to certain 
specified actions. The mere provision of a new remedy by statute 
does not imply an expansion of the old common law rule which 
preceded it. Statutes only supplement the common law where the 
latter does not provide a particular remedy. The G hana courts 
could accordingly take cognisance of the English Law Reform 
(Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1934 as having modified the rules 
of common law. The second reason for the rejection by the Court 
of Appeal o f  learned counsel’s submission was that the 1934 Act, 
not being a statute of general application in England on July 24, 
1874, does not form part o f  the common law in G hana as defined 
in section 17 of the Interpretation Act, 1960. Similarly in Adclae 
v Sm ith,29 the administrator of  the estate of a deceased person claimed 
damages against the defendant as compensation for causing the 
death of the deceased through a motor accident in September 1960. 
The following month, the plaintiff instituted an action at common 
law on behalf of the estate o f  the deceased. Subsequently he sought 
to amend the action so that he could proceed under the Fatal Accidents 
Act, 1846 on the ground that the claim was being made on behalf 
of the defendants o f  the deceased. It was held, applying the decision 
in Elrouh v Hamili, that an action for compensation for the death 
of a person brought on behalf o f  his estate is barred by the actio 
personalis rule and is not maintainable at common law. It was further 
held that the amendment sought by the plaintiff was barred by section 
3 of the Fatal Accidents Act.30 Under section 3 of the Fatal Accidents 
Act, 1846, as applied to G hana, an action must be commenced within 
twelve calendar months of the deceased’s death. While it is true 
that this particular limitation period was in 1954 amended in England 
to three years by section 3 o f  the Law Reform (Limitation of  Actions) 
Act of that year, this Act does not apply to Ghana.
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Character of the “ Received” English Law
1 he received English law covers both civil and criminal laws as well
24 (1963) 1 GLR 349.
It was held in Marshall v London Passenger Transport Board (1936) 3 All ER 83,
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as the rules of evidence and procedure since, as Maitland once 
observed, "the English common law rules are embedded in the inter­
stices of procedure” .31 The rules of civil law exist both in judicial 
decisions and in statutes which have been re-enacted, with or without 
modifications, in local statutes which are to be found in every 
Commonwealth territory in a set o f  Revised Editions of the Laws 
published at periodic intervals. This set o f  publications o f  enacted 
law constitutes the Statute Book o f  each territory. In the fields of 
trade and commerce, English mercantile and commercial laws pre­
dominate. Thus company law, partnership, contracts and agency, 
sale of goods, carriage of  goods by land and sea, shipping laws, 
negotiable instruments, banks and banking laws, are the most 
important that we need enumerate here. Another area of  civil law 
regulated by English common law principles are the law of tort, 
the law of trusts and equity, industrial law and the conflict of laws 
(private international law). Although some of these laws are based 
upon the English common law and statutes, there are yet local 
variations and peculiarities dictated by the prevailing circumstances 
of the time and place. The element of English law is less strong in 
the field of  jurisprudence and legal theory as well as of public inter­
national law, although the former is in its local orientation still 
haunted by the ghost of Austin and the doctrine of judicial precedent 
while in public international law the local practice is still based on 
the teachings of the Dualist School, despite the growing tendency 
towards independence which is discernable in the new concept and 
practice of contemporary international law, especially the law of 
international institutions.
In the light of the preceding analysis, it is easy to appreciate that 
the degree of Englishness of the common law varies with particular 
territories by virtue of their respective historical antecedents. Thus, 
as we have seen, Sierra Leone law is probably the most English, 
while Kenya exemplifies a territory with fairly strong English law 
tendencies, due no doubt to the long period of  European settlement 
and administration, both of which have encouraged the proliferation 
of  English law. On the other hand, in Nigeria and Ghana, where 
English law has had perhaps the longest connection, the process 
of dismantling many of the edifices of  English law since independence 
has been most rapid. Economic and industrial developments h ave
that if a required amendment seeks to set up a new cause o f action which was statute 
barred, the amendment should not be allowed.
" T F T  Plucknett, A Concise History o f  the Common Law , 4th ed, London.
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in a sense both increased and diminished the borrowings from English 
law: increased by reason of the understandably English legal
training of the lawyers at independence which made them turn readily 
to English models; diminished, because of the upsurge of  nationalism 
and its attendant leanings towards constitutional autochtony. Not 
an inconsiderable part of the resurgence of nationalist aspirations 
has been due to cultural revival and political identity.
Let us now turn to the criminal part o f  the received English law. 
English Criminal Law has entered Commonwealth Africa by direct 
as well as indirect routes. Apart from the singular instance of Sierra 
Leone, the other African territories have “ received” their law of 
crime in the form of Criminal Codes and Criminal Procedure Acts. 
In the case of Sierra Leone, the English Common Law of Crimes, as 
supplemented by some local statutes, is operative law — for example, 
in addition to the common law offences, whole provisions of the 
Perjury Act, 1911; the Forgery Act, 1913 and the Larceny Act, 1916 
(now largely replaced by the Theft Act, 1968) apply. The Criminal 
Code of Ghana, before its revision in 1960. derived from the St. 
Lucia Code of 1889 which was originally intended for Jamaica but 
which failed to adopt it. In the case of Nigeria, the Queensland 
Criminal Code of 1899 which was first introduced into Northern 
Nigeria in 1904, was later applied to the rest of Nigeria at 
amalgamation of  northern and southern Nigeria in 1916. It remained 
the criminal law for the whole of Nigeria until 1959. when Northern 
Nigeria adopted the Sudanese Criminal Code which itself derived 
from the Indian Penal Code of 1860; this Indian Penal Code was, 
of course, based upon English law. The Northern Nigeria Penal 
Code of 1959 has replaced the former Criminal Code and the Islamic 
law of crimes which were formerly administered by the traditional 
courts in Northern Nigeria.
The development in East Africa has taken a somewhat opposite 
course, because there the Indian Penal Code was the received law 
until it was replaced in the 1930's by the “ model penal code” prepared 
by the British Colonial Office in London upon the basis o f  the Nigerian 
Criminal Code which thus served as the source of  the Penal Codes 
ol Tanzania, Uganda, Kenya. Rhodesia. Malawi and the G am bia .32 
Whatever the movement from the Queensland model code and 
its Indian counterpart, there can be no doubt that the ideas and 
p ra ctices of the English law of crime, itself not wholly codified, supplies
On this whole question, see the interesting article by James S Read entitled. 
Criminal Law in the Africa o f Today and Tom orrow’, Journal o f  African Law , 1963,
vol VII, pp 5 -17 .
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the underlying unity of law and thought on the subject of the Criminal 
Law. It is true that the Indian Penal Code has, since the pioneering 
days of Lord Macauley in the 1860’s, diverged more from the pure 
English sources; the history of  the administration of  criminal justice 
in both East and West Africa has shown a remarkable resilience 
and similarity in both its inward and outward forms. One interesting 
aspect of the introduction of  English law through the medium of 
the criminal codes is that questions have been raised as to whether 
it is intended to apply English law in East and Central Africa and in 
the Gambia as at the date when the English enactments came into 
force, or whether only from the date when the Codes were enacted. 
Certain offences like piracy and treason have been defined in these 
Codes by reference to the law “ for the time being in force” 
in England.33 This kind of  provision is not likely to be welcome 
in the independent Commonwealth African territories, as they are 
productive of  the same types of problems which we have seen above 
to characterize similar provisions in local court enactments importing 
English Law of Matrimonial Causes and Probate Law in West Africa. 
Another aspect of this matter which calls for comment is the inclusion 
in each of the Criminal or Penal Codes of some territories o f  inter­
pretation clauses in which it is laid down that the code shall be 
interpreted in accordance with the principles of interpretation 
obtaining in England and that certain expressions shall have the 
meaning attached to them in English Criminal Law.34 A notable 
illustration of this phenomenon occurs in M awji & anor v R .i5 There, 
a husband and his wife were convicted o f  the offence of conspiracy 
under section 110(a) of the Penal Code of Tanganyika, their marriage 
being potentially polygamous. Under English law. husband and 
wife cannot be convicted of  conspiracy, but the local courts held 
that this did not apply to the marriage in Tanganyika which was 
potentially polygamous. On appeal to the Privy Council, the local 
courts were held to have been in error in refusing to import the English 
fiction of the legal unity of man and wife into the then Tanganyika, 
and that the appeal should be allowed on the ground that the rule 
of legal unity applied to the spouses of any marriage regarded as 
valid under the local law.
It is at this point necessary to note that the Criminal Codes of 
Nigeria and Ghana contain specific provisions to the effect that.
’ ’ Eg Kenya Penal Code, Cap 24, s 40; The Criminal Code o f The Gambia, Cap 21, 
s 35; Uganda Penal Code, Cap 22, s 53.
14 See the East African Penal Codes, eg Tanganyika Penal Code, Cap 16, s 4.
35 (1957) AC 126.
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in construing each code “ a court shall not be bound by any judicial 
decision or opinion on the construction of any enactment, or of 
the common law, as to the definition of any offence” . The Judicial 
Committee of the Privy Council has had occasion to pronounce 
upon this statutory provision and to confirm that they are not to be 
modified in any way by “ glosses or interpolations derived from any 
expositions, however authoritative, of the law of England or Scotland” . 
Thus, in Wallace-Johnson v R the appellant was charged with sedition 
under section 330 of the Gold Coast Criminal Code which, however, 
omits any reference to resort to violence, which is an essential ingredient 
of the English common law definition of sedition. The question, 
therefore, arose as to whether this English law requirement should 
be read into section 330. The Privy Council on an appeal from the 
then Gold Coast held that this could not be done because (a) section 
330 was intended by the local legislature to be exhaustive,36 and 
(b) any reference to violence as an ingredient of the statutory offence 
of sedition was omitted deliberately so as to take account of the 
volatile situation in West Africa at that time. As Their Lordships 
observed:
The elaborate structure o f  section 330 suggests that it was intended to contain  
as far as possible a full and com plete statement o f  the law o f  sedition in the 
Colony. It must, therefore, be construed free from any glosses or inter­
polations derived from any expositions, however authoritative o f  the law 
o f England or o f  Scotland.
Section 7(3) of the Criminal Code which provided that the court 
should not be bound by any judicial decision or opinion in the 
construction of any other statute or of the common law as to the 
definition of any offence was not expressly referred to in support 
of their conclusion, although English decisions might on other matters 
and in other circumstances still be referred to in construing the Criminal 
Code. It is interesting to note that this Privy Council opinion in 
the Wallace-Johnson Case was followed by the Court of Appeal 
for East Africa in Yonasain & ors v R, a U gandan case in which the 
issue was whether the English common law rule that the principal 
offender must first have been prosecuted to conviction (the rule 
in Smith v Selw yn ) before the accessory after the fact could be charged, 
applied in Uganda. The Ugandan Criminal Procedure Code was
' See also the Nigerian case o f R v Nameri (1951) 20 NLR 6, and my British Colonial
Law, 1962, pp 154-58.
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silent on the trial of accessories after the fact. The Court of Appeal 
for Eastern Africa accordingly applied the procedure laid down in 
the Criminal Procedure Code, saying:
W hat is true o f the G old Coast law o f  sedition is true also o f  the Uganda 
law o f  accessories after the fact, and it is unnecessary in our opinion to engraft 
anything onto it from English law.
Although it was the Criminal Procedure Code of Uganda that was 
immediately in issue in that case, nevertheless the court did not refer 
to section 3 of the Uganda Penal Code which provided as follows:
This code shall be interpreted in accordance with the principles o f  legal 
interpretation obtaining in England, and expressions used in it shall be 
presumed, so far as is consistent with their context, and except as may be 
otherwise expressly provided, to be used with the m eaning attaching to 
them in the English Criminal Law and shall be construed in accordance  
therewith.
IV 
Juries and Assessors in the Judicial Process
It remains to note in outline one more significant feature of the jud i­
cial process in Commonwealth Africa. The use of juries and assessors 
as part of the judicial process varies somewhat from territory to 
territory. The jury, often regarded by many — G oodhart for example 
— as the most characteristic feature of the English legal system, 
was once so in many territories in Africa, but it has never really 
taken root and is already on the way out in most of  these. We shall 
deal with this fairly briefly anon. Assessors, on the other hand, 
abound in both civil and criminal causes, and judges commonly 
sit with assessors in most territories, except in Nigeria where judges 
sit alone despite express provisions to be found in many a local court 
law indicating the use of assessors. Let us now consider the uses 
of juries and assessors separately.
Trial by Jury
I rial by jury in the countries of Commonwealth Africa may have 
owed its origin to the prevalence of  Jury Trial in England in the 
18th and 19th centuries or may have been prompted by the European 
settlements in certain parts of Africa. Jury Trial, therefore, took
on some importance in Sierra Leone, the Gambia, G hana and Nigeria 
on the West Coast, in Kenya on the East Coast and in Southern 
Rhodesia in Central Africa. In the West African territories, Jury 
Trial has been confined to the former colonies proper where European 
settlements or influence dictated its introduction, while in Kenya 
and Southern Rhodesia it has been confined only to Europeans. 
Its existence in Zanzibar before 1949 has been ascribed to the influence 
of Indian and Kenyan laws. Jury Trial in Sierra Leone has had the 
longest ancestry in Commonwealth Africa, although it has been 
witnessing a steady decline in the past 70 years or so. Even as far 
back as 1898, the Trial by Jury (Amendment) No 3 Ordinance of 
that year provided that the Attorney-General could apply for an 
order for trial with the aid of assessors in all cases, whether capital 
or non-capital; this was probably to enable the accused person to 
seek an alternative method of achieving fair and impartial trial in 
case it was apprehended that tribal or racial animosity might influence 
the jury. While in West Africa generally, race has never been an 
important factor in the qualifications of jurors, the situation in Kenya 
and Southern Rhodesia has been different.37 The Kenyan Criminal 
Procedure Ordinance of  1906 enacted (in section 2) that all Europeans 
and Americans “ committed for trial to a Court o f  Session” (later 
changed to High Court) should be tried by a jury of Europeans and/ 
or Americans, and the pattern has been followed ever since. The 
Kenyan legislation required that the verdict o f  the jury must be 
unanimous, the only qualifications for jury service being that a ju ror  
must be male, a European, and aged between 21 and 60. There are 
no property qualifications or literacy requirements. There is no 
statutory provision permitting the accused person to elect for trial 
with the aid of assessors instead o f  trial by jury. Jearey has suggested 
the following three reasons for the successful operation o f  Jury Trial 
as developed in England:
First, the com munity in which it operates must be socially hom ogeneous, 
that is, there must be no racial, cultural, religious or linguistic divisions. 
Secondly, the people in the com munity must be sufficiently advanced edu­
cationally and otherwise to understand the responsibilities cast on them as 
jurors and to set the fulfilment o f those responsibilities above private prej­
udices. Thirdly, the people o f the com munity must be in basic agreement 
with the laws which, as jurors, they are required to enforce.
See generally on this matter J H Jearey, ‘Trial by Jury and Trial with the Aid of  
Assessors in the Superior Courts o f British African Territories’, Journal o f  African Law ,
1%0. no 2, pp 133-146.
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As applied to Africa, the writer was of  the opinion that the absence 
of these conditions was responsible for the unimportant part which 
Jury Trial plays in practice in the administration of  the criminal 
law, and thought that it was surprising that the Jury Trial has survived 
at all till now.
Whether one agrees or not with Jearey’s theory, there can be no 
doubt that the operation of the jury system in Africa has had only 
minimal success, and one may attribute this to the fact that it is not 
wholly in harmony with the African juridical concept of determining 
the guilt or innocence of an offender.
Trial with Assessors
In nearly all Commonwealth African States, with the possible excep­
tion of Nigeria, all trials in the superior courts not held with a jury 
are normally held with the aid of assessors. In former Basutoland, 
Bechuanaland, Swaziland, Northern Rhodesia, Nyasaland (Malawi), 
Tanganyika and Uganda, there was no trial by jury at all, but only, 
trial with the aid of assessors.38 Certain principles of trial with the 
aid of assessors have become established and these are: that the 
assessors are neither sworn nor affirmed before they sit with a judge 
at a trial; that the accused is not formally given ‘in charge’ of the 
assessors; that jurors, not assessors, are judges of fact; that it is 
no part of the assessors’ duty to decide as to the guilt or innocence 
of the accused because they are not required to return a verdict as 
jurors are; and that their advisory opinions need not be unanimous. 
In the Ugandan case of R v Bazilio Sentamu ,39 Edwards, C J, after 
observing that sections 272 and 283 of the Criminal Procedure Code 
o f  1950 had been taken from section 309 of the Indian Criminal 
Procedure Code 1898, made the following observation:
Is it necessary to sum up to assessors? Section 283(1) says ‘the judge may 
sum up the evidence for the prosecution and defence' it is to be noted that 
there is nothing about explaining the law to the assessors. This is, I believe, 
a deliberate om ission. All that a judge may do is to ‘sum up the evidence'. 
It is clearly undesirable that a judge should befog assessors, som e o f whom, 
while full o f  natural wisdom  and possessing shrewd minds, are not likely 
to understand an elaborate lecture on English Law ... Section 283(4) makes 
it optional for the assessors either to give their opinions individually at 
the end o f the summing up (where there is one) or to retire — presumably
'"Even in Nigeria where only the Lagos State has retained trial by jury, legislation 
is about to be passed abolishing this form of trial.
39Jeary. op cit, p 282.
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to retire either separately or together ... If they do retire, in my view, there 
is no need for them to be ‘locked up’, as used to be done in England with 
juries in certain cases. They have not been sworn and they do not ‘sit in 
judgment' on the accused.
The learned Chief Justice, after comparing his personal experience 
of the role of nautical assessors in Board of Trade Inquiries in England, 
gave the following warning:
In short, confusion is arising in some o f those East African territories by 
reason o f the quite erroneous belief held in some quarters that assessors 
are the equivalent o f  jury m en.40
In the Gold Coast case of  R v Bio,41 however, the approach was 
different. There, the accused had been charged with the murder 
of a woman at the Kumasi Assizes and the trial judge had fully stated 
the case of  the prosecution without a word in favour of the accused 
as to the alleged circumstances of the murder. On appeal, the West 
African Court o f  Appeal, in quashing the conviction, observed that 
this was a case of misdirection by non-direction in summing up to 
the assessor who should have been correctly and fully instructed 
in the trial judge’s summing up. Again, in R v Brimali,42 the trial 
judge had failed to put the case for the defence to the assessors on 
the question of the danger of receiving in evidence an alleged con­
fession made by the accused to a convict or even to a prison warder. 
The West African Court o f  Appeal quashed the conviction o f  the 
accused for murder, pointing out that the trial judge had failed to 
direct the assessors as to the prosecution’s duty to prove the guilt 
of the accused person beyond a reasonable doubt.
It would seem that both the West African Court o f  Appeal and 
Edwards, C J, in the Uganda High Court case held that in summing 
up to assessors, the judge should deal only with the evidence and 
not with the relevant law, as he would do if he were summing up to 
a jury. Yet it is possible to take the same view as that taken by the 
Court of Appeal for Eastern Africa in Andrea’s case,43 that it would 
be difficult for assessors to give a rational opinion on the general 
issue in a given case without being instructed as to the law involved. 
Another aspect o f  trial with the aid of assessors is to determine
40 Ibid, p 283.
41 (1945) 11 W ACA 46.
42 (1945) 11 W ACA 49.
Andrea/O Kulinga & ors v The Queen (1959) JAL 71.
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what happens to a decision, where there is a summing up to the as­
sessors, reached as a result o f  the judge omitting to direct them on 
a certain point or even misdirecting them on such a point. It is agreed 
by both the West African and the East African Courts of Appeal 
that an omission to direct assessors as to the burden of p roof  is not 
fatal to a conviction since the judge who is presumed to know the 
law is alone responsible for the decision.44 But failure by the judge 
to direct the assessors as to any aspect of the defence has always 
been held to be fatal to a conviction. Thus in Wafula S /O  Waminira 
v R ,45 the Court o f  Appeal for Eastern Africa reduced a conviction 
for murder to one of  manslaughter because of the failure o f  the trial 
judge to put the defence of provocation to the assessors. Such a 
failure to direct the assessors could be regarded as strong evidence 
o f  non-direction of himself by the trial judge. The distinction between 
the verdict of a jury by which the trial judge is bound, and the opinion 
of assessors by which he is not bound, may be underlined by reference, 
for example, to the Nigerian Criminal Procedure Code, section 
449(1) and the Kenyan Criminal Procedure Code, section 318(2). 
In Washington S /O  Odindo v R ,46 the Court of Appeal for Eastern 
Africa held that, although a local statute, the Tanganyika Criminal 
Procedure Code, section 283(1), provides that the judge has a discre­
tion whether or not to sum up to the assessors, “ it’s a very sound 
practice (to sum up) except in the very simplest cases” and that “ the 
opinions o f  assessors can be o f  great value and assistance to the trial 
judge, but only if they fully understand the facts o f  the case before 
them in relation to the relevant law. If the law is not explained and 
attention not drawn to the salient facts o f  the case, the value o f  the 
assessors’ opinions is correspondingly reduced.”
One final point must be made about an aspect o f  trial with assessors, 
and that is whether the trial judge could take into account the opinion, 
unsupported by evidence, of one of the assessors on a question of 
customary law. In R v M utwiwa ,47 the Court of Appeal for Eastern 
Africa answered the question in the affirmative, citing section 89(1) 
o f  the Kenya Civil Procedure Code empowering a court to summon 
assessors tor the purpose of determining “ questions which may arise 
as to the laws or customs of any tribe, caste or com m unity” . The 
Court took the view that it must be for the same purpose that assessors
44 R v Wuseni (1939) 5 W ACA 73; Appiah Danquah & ors v The Queen (1951) 13 
W ACA 134; R v Jeck-Jezelani (1947) 14 EACA 70.
45 (1957) EA 498.
46 (1945) 21 EACA 392.
47 (1935) 2 EACA 66.
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are employed in criminal cases. Similarly, in R v Kiswaga,48 in which 
the appellant was charged with murder, the assessors gave an opinion 
as to Baha custom, on which it would appear that the trial judge 
had based his judgment in convicting the accused person of murder 
instead o f  manslaughter. In reviewing the verdict, the Court of 
Appeal for Eastern Africa said that, “ if for conviction of murder, the 
prosecution depends upon local custom, that local custom should 
be proved in evidence for the prosecution so that the witnesses may 
be cross-examined and the accused may have an opportunity of 
controverting it by other evidence". We need not spend much time 
explaining here in detail the conditions subject to which proof of 
local custom would be accepted by a court of law, other than to 
say that the witnesses must be expert in the sense that they must 
be qualified to depose to the custom in question, or the nature and 
extent o f  a particular custom may be determined by the court con­
sulting a treatise recognized as such by the community. Once satisfied 
about the quality of the opinion of the expert witness, the judge may 
then ask the assessors in a criminal trial to give their opinion regarding 
the weight to be attached to it. The main purpose of the statutory 
provision for trial with the aid of assessors is to protect an accused 
person against a possible miscarriage of justice. This is one reason 
why it is a necessary requirement in all cases that assessors must, 
unlike jurors, deliver their opinion in open court.
V
Summary
We have now seen that the reception of English law can take one of 
four different forms. Firstly, it can be received by a Commonwealth 
African country through the omnibus formula of ‘the common law, 
the doctrines of equity and statutes of general application’ in England 
as at a specified date. Secondly, the reception can take place through 
a local re-enactment of particular rules o f  English common law, 
equity or statutes, with or without modifications. Thirdly, English 
law can be made applicable in a territory by means of a local statutory 
provision that English law will be deemed applicable from time to 
time to particular subject matters, such as we have noticed with 
probate and matrimonial causes until the recent changes made in 
Nigeria and G hana by the Matrimonial Causes Decrees of 1970
4S (1947) 15 EACA 50.
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and 1971 respectively. Fourthly, English law can also be introduced 
indirectly through interpretation clauses embodied in local codes 
like the Criminal or Penal Codes wherein it is provided that English 
law may be employed in the construction of other provisions of  the 
Code, provided o f course that the particular provisions requiring 
interpretation are in pari materia.
In whatever form it has been “ received” or introduced in a partic­
ular Commonwealth African country, English law requires to be 
applied always with due regard to the following warning which Lord 
Denning gave with such felicity in the Kenyan case o f  N yali L td  v 
The A ttorney-G eneral:49
M oreover, if  it were relevant I would add that the power to grant a franchise 
o f  tolls com es within the very words o f  the agreement with the Sultan for 
it confers on the officers o f  the British Governm ent ‘full powers in regard 
to the levy o f  tolls'. The next proviso says, however, that the com m on law 
is to apply ‘subject to such qualifications as local circumstances render 
necessary’. This wise provision should. I think, be liberally construed. It 
is a recognition that the com m on law cannot be applied in a foreign land 
without considerable qualification. Just as with an English oak, so with 
the English com m on law. You cannot transplant it to the African continent 
and expect it to retain the tough character which it has in England. It will 
flourish indeed but it needs careful tending. So with the com m on law. It 
has many principles o f  manifest justice and good sense which can be applied 
with advantage to peoples o f  every race and colour all the world over: but 
it has also many refinements, subtleties and technicalities which are not 
suited to other folk. These off-shoots must be cut away. In these far off 
lands the people must have a law which they understand and which they will 
respect. The com m on law cannot fulfil this role except with considerable 
qualifications. The task o f making these qualifications is entrusted to the 
judges o f  these lands. It is a great task. 1 trust that they will not fail therein.
49 (1955) f All ER 646, p 653.
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L EC TU R E TWO
JUDGES AND CUSTOMARY LAW
I
Recognition of African Customary Law
One of the earliest judicial statements on recognition of African 
law as law is the following pronouncement by the Privy Council 
in the leading case of In Re Southern Rhodesia. ' .
Some tribes are so low in the scale o f  social organization that their usages 
and conceptions o f  rights and duties are not to be reconciled with the insti­
tutions or the legal ideas o f  civilized society ... On the other hand, there 
are indigenous peoples whose legal conceptions, though differently developed, 
are hardly less precise than our own. When once they have been studied 
and understood they are no less enforceable than rights arising under English 
law.
Nearly a quarter of a century later, in the Nigerian case of Oke  
Lanipekun Laoye & ors v Amao O vetunde2 Lord Wright, in delivering 
the judgment of  the Privy Council, made the following definitive 
pronouncem ent:
The policy o f  the British Governm ent in this, and in other respects is to use 
for purposes o f  the administration o f  the country the native law and custom s 
in so far as possible and in so far as they have not been varied or suspended  
by statutes or ordinances affecting Nigeria. The courts which have been 
established by the British G overnm ent have the duty o f  enforcing these 
native laws and custom s, so far as they are not barbarous, as part o f  the law 
of the land. In particular, native laws and custom s regulating the appoint­
ment and election o f  chiefs have been recognized as having the force o f  
law.
Before we embark upon an examination of the judicial develop­
ment of customary law, we may observe, very briefly, certain statutory 
provisions sp e llin g  out the circumstances in which customary law
1 (1919) AC 211.
2 (1944) AC 170; see also Esugbayi Eleko v Nigerian Government (1931) AC 662.
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would be enforced in the higher courts in the various Commonwealth 
countries in Africa. A representative provision, which is also con­
venient as a common course for both G hana and Nigeria, was the 
following from the Supreme Court Ordinance 1876, which laid the 
foundation of the modern legal systems of both countries:
N othing in this Ordinance shall deprive the Supreme Court o f  the right to 
observe and enforce the observance, or shall deprive any person o f the bene­
fit o f  any Native Law and Custom , such law or custom  not being repugnant 
to natural justice, equity and good conscience, nor incom patible either 
directly or by implication with any law for the time being in force.
Despite the significant developments that have taken place in the 
legal systems of Nigeria and G hana, this passage is still to be found 
substantially the same in all the subsequent enactments on our High 
Courts. It would be equally true to say that this statutory provision 
has set the pattern for similar court enactments throughout C om m on­
wealth Africa.
On the other hand, it has also been established by the statutes 
o f  most Commonwealth African countries that customary law will 
normally apply to disputes coming before the courts when both 
parties are Africans, though this is not an invariable rule. It will 
also apply when, although one party is an African and the other is 
not, it will be unjust to either party to apply English law (or, in a 
few African States, the Roman-Dutch Law). By contrast, customary 
law will not apply either where one of the parties has entered into 
any transaction on the express or clearly implied bases of  English 
law (or, in relevant cases, the Roman-Dutch Law), or where the 
transaction in question is entirely unknown to customary law. It 
remains to add that, in nearly all cases, statute contains what is known 
as the residual clause which is to the effect that where there is no 
precise rule either of customary law or of English law (or Roman- 
Dutch Law) which is applicable to a case, the court has the discretion 
to decide according to the principles of natural justice, equity and 
good conscience. It is tempting at this point to want to stop to dilate 
on the application as well as the implications of  the somewhat fluid 
principles of “ natural justice, equity and good conscience” , but we 
must resist the temptation and leave further elaboration to these 
and subsequent lectures to be dealt with as and when occasion war­
rants.3
The matter has been dealt with extensively elsewhere, eg in my Law in a Changing 
Society, ch VI.
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A subject o f  considerable importance in considering the question 
of applying customary law is the ascertainment o f  what a particular 
system or body really is. This is sometimes referred to as the rule 
in Angu v A ttah ,4 which requires that customary law is to be proved 
in the first instance by calling witnesses until its rules become so 
familiar to the courts that judicial notice may be taken of them. 
But it is necessary to remember M 'Carthy J's warning in Ababio II 
v Nsemfoo (1947) 12 WACA 127, p 128. that the rule was “ intended 
to apply to what may be described as British Courts before which 
it is sought to prove a particular custom. There is no ground for 
extending its application to Native Courts o f  which the members 
are versed in their own native customary law, although there is nothing 
to prevent a party from calling witnesses to prove an alleged custom. 
If the members o f  a Native Court are familiar with a custom it is 
certainly not obligatory upon it to require the custom to be proved 
through witnesses.” Similarly, in Kigizi v Lukiko o f  B ugandaf it 
was held that the members of the Buganda Native Courts “ generally 
speaking require no evidence to inform them what (their) customs 
are” . The principle underlying the rule in Angu v Attah  may be said 
to be epitomized in what Butler Lloyd said in Buraimo v B a m g b o ye f 
“ A particular custom may by frequent p roof in the court become 
so notorious that the court takes judicial notice o f  them.”
The Evidence Acts of some Commonwealth countries7 contain 
provisions for ascertaining customary law by calling persons know­
ledgeable in it to give expert evidence; legal textbooks of authority 
may also be consulted as one of the sources for ascertaining customary 
law. Sometimes, statute may provide that an application may be 
made by a court to a Local Authority for a declaration of  what is 
in its opinion the customary law relevant to a particular case.8 Pro­
gressive opinion is that, despite all these modes of ascertaining cus­
tomary law, it is no longer acceptable, whether as a rule of law or 
of practice, that customary law in independent African States should 
still be treated as a fact to be proved, like any other matter o f  fact 
or of foreign law, by calling evidence of it from these extraneous 
sources. The use of  assessors who sit with the judge may be excused 
to some extent in the process o f  ascertaining rules o f  customary
a (1016) Gold Coast Privy Council Judgments 1874-1928, 43. p 44.
5 (1943) 6 Ug LR 113.
"(1940) 15 NLR 138, p 140.
See ss 14. 15, 16, 61 and 62 of the Nigerian Evidence Act, 1958 Edition o f  the
Laws.
See Native Authority (Amendment) Ordinance N o 3 o f 1945 (Nigeria).
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law in particular cases. The right trail has fortunately been blazed 
by Ghana which in its Courts Act, 1960, provided that customary 
law should no longer be treated as a matter o f  fact, but as law;9 
and that, if the judges who are to apply a particular rule of customary 
law feel any doubt, they are free to consult whatever sources, such 
as by empanelling a group of persons to inform themselves before 
applying the law .10 The old rule in Angu v Attah  has thus been dis­
placed by this new rule. This, it is submitted, is the right course for 
all independent Commonwealth African States to take.
II
Judicial Development of Customary Law
Let us now return to a consideration of the judicial development 
of customary law in a number of significant areas o f  similar or at 
least comparable concerns to the various African countries. Perhaps 
the most important aspect o f  customary law in Commonwealth 
Africa is the ubiquitous phenomenon of land tenure.
In the locus classicus, Amodu Tijani v Secretary, Southern Prov­
inces. 1 the following broad outline of the indigenous ideas underlying 
the land tenure systems throughout the Commonwealth was laid 
down by the Privy Council:
The next fact which it is important to bear in mind in order to understand 
the native land law is that the notion o f  individual ownership is quite foreign 
to native ideas. Land belongs to the com m unity, the village or the family, 
never to the individual. All the members o f  the com m unity, village or family 
have an equal right, but in every case the Chief or Headm an o f  the com m unity  
or village or head o f the family has charge o f the land, and in loose mode 
o f speech is som etim es called the owner. He is to som e extent in the position  
of a trustee, and as such holds the land for the use o f  the com m unity or family. 
He has control o f  it, and any member who wants a piece o f  it to cultivate 
or build upon, goes to him for it. But the land so given still remains the 
property o f the-com m unity or family. He cannot make any important 
disposition o f the land without consulting with either the elders o f  the com ­
munity or family, and their consent must in all cases be given before a grant 
can be made to a stranger. This is a pure native custom  along the whole
length o f this coast, and wherever we find, as in Lagos, individual owners,
 ^S 67(1); also Courts Act, 1971, s 50(1).
10 S 67(2); also Courts Act, 1971, s 50(2).
“ (1921) 3 NLR 21.
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this is again due to the introduction o f English ideas. But the native idea 
still has a firm hold on the people, and in m ost cases, even in Lagos, land is 
held by the family. This is so even in cases o f  land purporting to be held 
under Crown grants and English conveyances. The original grantee may 
have held as an individual owner but on his death all his family claim an 
interest, which is always recognised, and thus the land becom es again family 
land.
The principles o f  customary land tenure enshrined in this passage 
have been the subject o f  judicial analysis and refinements in our 
courts, and they may be summarized in a number o f  propositions 
as follows: (a) that the family or sometimes the village or the com­
munity, is the unit o f  landholding, never the individual; (b) that 
this family ownership is not the fee simple absolute in possession 
of English law, with which it should never be confused; (c) that the 
individual holding was under the customary form of tenure allocated 
or deemed to be allocated to him by the local chief or family head, 
although as will soon be seen, land could be acquired by an individual 
as the first cultivator or settler in a virgin forest in times gone by;
(d) that land granted by the family or community to a stranger remains 
the property of  the grantor who enjoys a right of reversion should 
the grant determine in one of the seven ways to be considered presently;
(e) that, before land can be granted to a stranger by the chief or the 
family head, all the elders o f  the family or community must be con­
sulted and their consent obtained thereto; and (f) that when an 
individual owner of land dies, the land devolves upon his children 
as family land. The seven ways in which an individual family mem­
ber's right in land may determine may be summarized as follows: 
(1) by express surrender or release; (2) by ab an d o n m en t;12 (3) by 
tailure of effectual occupation or user; (4) by alienation or attempted 
alienation; (5) by denial o f  the title of the land-owning family; (6) by 
refusal or failure to pay the customary dues or to render the custom­
ary services; and (7) by 'bad  behaviour’ to the Chief or to the family 
head, as the case may b e .13
I ll
Specific Aspects of Development
We may now turn to a consideration of the judicial development
Baillie & ors v Effiong (1923) 5 N LR 28.
All these are discussed in the light o f decided cases on pp 139-46 of my Nigerian
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of the concept o f  family property or the family compound, with 
particular reference to the rights of the individual members therein. 
As good a beginning as any may be made with the interesting Ghana 
case o f  Hagan v Kotey & 3 ors. 14 In this case, the first three defendants 
were children of one Herbert Charles Kotey, deceased, and the fourth 
defendant was his grandson. The plaintiff, who was the successor 
of the deceased and head of the maternal family, brought an action 
in these two capacities for accounts of rents collected by the defen­
dants from a house which was in the possession of  their father at 
the time of his death; he also sued for an order for ejectment from 
the house and an injunction to restrain them from having anything 
to do with it. The original plaintiff during the pendency o f  the suit, 
and Hagan, the present plaintiff, was on his own application sub­
stituted. The defendants accordingly contended that Hagan had no 
locus standi as not having been properly appointed to succeed the 
original plaintiff. The Accra High Court held that if the family 
property in dispute had been the self-acquired property of  the deceased 
Herbert Charles Kotey which became family property on his death 
intestate, a successor could not have been appointed except at a 
joint meeting of the maternal and paternal families o f  the deceased. 
There was evidence, however, that the property was the ancestral 
property of  the deceased and, therefore, o f  the plaintiff 's family. 
That being so the only persons entitled to appoint a successor to 
sue in respect of the property would be the members of  the deceased's 
maternal family alone, and no stranger to this family had a right 
to be invited. The plaintiff's appointment was therefore in o rder .15 
The court, nevertheless, proceeded to hold that, at customary law, 
property acquired with money contributed by members of  the family, 
even by two members only, is family p roperty ;16 that the self-acquired 
property of a person who succeeds to the property o f  another member 
of the family becomes merged into the family p roperty ;17 and that 
as, on the evidence, the deceased Herbert Charles Kotey succeeded 
to and controlled the estate of  many members of  the family even if 
the house in dispute had been acquired by him alone, it became 
family house in his hands and remained so at his death, to be taken
Land Law , 4th ed. Sweet & Maxwell Ltd, London, 1967.
I4(1961) GLR 594.
15 Carboo v. Carboo (1961) GLR 83; O koe v Ankrah (1961) GLR 109 were 
distinguished.
7setsewa v Acquah & anor (1941) 7 W ACA 216; Nugent v Nartey & anor (1958) 
3 WALR 537.
17 Antu v Bendu (1929) FL 26 -2 9 , 474.
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over by his maternal family. Therefore, the proper person to take 
charge and assume control of the house was the plaintiff who had 
been duly appointed by the maternal family. Again in Nkonnua 
v Annafi, 18 a somewhat related problem, this time involving a distinc­
tion between stool property and family property, arose for a decision. 
There, the plaintiff, as the Queen Mother of the Odan Division of 
Akyem Abuakwa and head of the Aduana Royal Family of Otwereso 
and Osenase brought an action of declaration of title to a farm, 
recovery of possession and mesne profits. She contended that the 
original forest was cultivated by members of her family into a farm­
stead and that her deceased uncle developed the farmstead into a 
cocoa farm during his occupancy of the Osenase stool, although 
he abdicated from the stool before his death. During his tenure of 
office, a stool treasury was established into which were paid the pro ­
ceeds from all stool farms, but the farm in dispute was not included 
among those the proceeds of which were paid into the treasury, 
to the knowledge of the stool elders. The plaintiff's deceased uncle 
treated this farm as his private property so that on his abdication 
from the stool, the farm was not included in the inventory of stool 
properties which he handed over to his successor. The defendant, 
a son of the plaintiff's uncle, and the present occupant of the stool, 
claimed the farm in dispute as stool property. It was held that, on 
the evidence, the land was the property of the Aduana Royal Family 
even before the plaintiff's uncle took possession of it, and that the 
cocoa farm he made on it was accordingly family property; a fortiori 
it retained that character where the ex-stool occupant merely devel­
oped a family farmstead into a cocoa farm. It was further held 
that, where a person acquires property with the assistance of a mem­
ber of his family, that property becomes family property. Accordingly, 
it an occupant o f  a stool acquires property with the assistance of 
a member of  his family, the property is not stool property, but the 
family property of the stool occupant. In the instant case, there 
was evidence that the plaintiff assisted her uncle, both physically 
and financially, in making the cocoa farm. The court finally held 
that the farm in dispute was family, and not stool, property.
W ith these general judicial descriptions may be compared a number 
ot cases decided along similar principles in Nigerian courts. In the 
leading case of Lewis v Bankole,19 three pieces of land formed the 
estate of one Mabinuori who died leaving him surviving twelve
18 (1961) GLR 559.
19(1909) 1 NLR 82.
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children, to three of whom had been given some land adjacent to 
the main compound in which he had lived with the other nine children. 
Some of the children of the three had later been allotted houses 
and rooms in the main compound, and they brought an action against 
the remaining nine children claiming equal rights with them. After 
the Divisional Court had ruled differently, Osborne, C J ,  having 
taken detailed evidence as to the Lagos, and indeed, Yoruba customary 
law on the subject, held as follows:
(1) all the branches o f  the M abinuori family had a right to be consulted  
before family property could be leased or otherwise dealt with; (2) rents 
from a lease should be divided in equal shares am ong the respective branches, 
regard being had to property received by any o f  the founder's children during 
his life-time; (3) the different branches o f  the founder's family should be 
represented per stirpes on the family council, each branch having one vote; 
(4) grand-children o f the founder, the plaintiffs in this case, had no inherent 
right to build in the family com pound without the prior consent o f  the family 
council; (5) normally, members o f  a family who do not reside on the family 
property have no general right o f  ingress and egress, but have a right o f  
entry to attend family meetings and, if members o f  the family council, a 
right o f  entry to inspect the state o f  repairs; such rights must, however, 
be exercised as not to interfere unnecessarily with the quiet enjoyment o f  
the occupants.
To this clear enunciation of the rights of non-resident grandchildren 
of the founder of the family in the family house or compound must 
be added the equally careful judicial pronouncement in Thomas v 
Thomas & anor,20 regarding the rights of resident members therein. 
In an action between members of a family for sharing the rents of 
leased portions of the family house, Butler Lloyd, J, in the Supreme 
Court held as follows:
N ow  so far as I can gather from the existing decisions, the rights o f  members 
o f  a family with regard to a family house are (1) to reside in it; (2) to have 
reasonable ingress and egress; (3) to have a voice in its m anagem ent; and 
(4) to share in any surplus o f  income derived from it after necessary outgoings 
have been met; and if these rights are infringed they can com e to this Court, 
which will enforce them by partition and/or sale if necessary.
There are two new points thrown up by this decision: one is the 
question of the right of residence of the individual member of the
20 (1932) 16 N L R  5.
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family, and the other is his right to apply to the court for partition 
or sale of the property. By later judicial pronouncements, it has 
been held that the individual member’s right o f  residence is not only 
for life but is normally transmissible to his own children on death 
(Richardo v A hal\lx Adagun v Fagbola22) though he may not alienate 
by will (Taylor v W illiams22) or during his lifetime, eg by mortgage 
or purported attachment for debt (Miller Bros v Ayeni).24 The 
individual's right in family property has also been distinguished 
from rights held in common (i e concurrent interests) under English 
law: see Caulcrick v Harding ;25 George v Fajore.2b Webber, C J ,  
once made a distinction between rights acquired by an individual 
by purchase in recent times and those acquired by him as an individual 
member of  a landowning family, as follows:
It is indubitable that if the learned Judge had found in favour o f  a sale o f  
the land, a grant o f  declaration o f  title conveying a fee simple was inevitable 
but he does not appear to have discriminated between rights in the acquisi­
tion o f  native land by purchase and rights acquired under native law and 
custom —  the former being proprietary  rights and the latter possessory  rights 
or rights o f  occupancy.
We need not allow ourselves to be diverted by this interesting solecism 
of the learned Chief Justice concerning the distinction between 
possessory and proprietary interests.
Now, with regard to the individual mem ber’s right to go to court 
to demand partition of  the family house, again, judicial refinements 
have established that this right exists under customary tenure in 
case of dispute among the family members about occupation rights 
or about the sharing of rents from leased family property. It was 
thus described in Richardo v A hal:27
The council o f  the family, or o f  neighbours, as the case might be, would 
divide the property into two or more parts, as required, and the eldest child, 
whether male or female, would take the first choice.
The same principles of partition have been described for Iboland by
21 (1926) 7 NLR 58.
22 (1932) 1 1 NLR 110.
2' (1935). 12 NLR 67.
24(1924) 5 NLR 40.
25 (1926) 7 NLR 48.
20(1939) 15 NLR 1.
2 (1926) 7 NLR 58, p 59.
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M M Green in her Land Tenure in an Ibo Village.2*
The court, which in modern litigation has replaced the family 
council at least in urban areas, will not order sale or partition of 
family property if one of the customary rights of the individual mem­
bers enumerated above has been infringed. Thus in Thomas v 
Thomas 29 the court refused to order sale or partition on the mere 
ground that the family head had not allowed him a share of the net 
rents which were shown to be nil. There was a similar refusal in 
Bajulaive v A kapo ,30 where the only reason why certain individual 
members had demanded partition was that they wanted the family 
property turned into cash. The param ount consideration for the 
family council or the court, when called upon to order sale or partition, 
is what in a given situation is best for the family as a whole.
This brings us to a consideration of  the indigenous institution 
of The Family House. This was thus explained in Bajulaiye v Akapo  :31
The purpose o f  the institution is, as its name implies, to provide a place 
where members o f  the family can reside if they so desire and, so long as that 
purpose is still capable o f  achievem ent, I conceive that it would be wrong 
for the Court to order the sale o f  property subject to this form o f tenure.
Further light was thrown on the subject by the judgment o f  Carey, 
J, in In the matter o f  the Estate o f  Edward Forster f 2 where property 
left under a testator’s will was held to be intended as the “ family 
house” under the local law of tenure. Fie observed:
A family house (in the custom o f  Yorubas o f  Lagos) is a residence which 
the father o f a family sets apart for his wife and children to occupy jointly  
after his deceased. All his children are entitled to reside there with their 
mothers and his married sons with their wives and children. A lso a daughter 
who has left the house on marriage has a right to return to it on deserting 
or being deserted by her husband. N o one has any chargeable or alienable  
interest in the family house. It is only with the consent o f  all those entitled 
to reside in the family house that it can be mortgaged or sold.
1 have elsewhere compared the institution of family house with the 
English settlement.33
28 On pp 13-14.
29 (1932) 16 NLR 5.
30(1938) 14 NLR 10.
31 (1938) 14 NLR 10.
32 (1938) 14 NLR 83.
33 Sec my Nigerian Land Law , 4th ed, p 222.
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It should be added, however, that partition or sale o f  a family 
house may still be ordered by the court if the overriding interest 
of the family so dictates in a particular case. This was so held 
in Giwa v Otun ,34 although the trust deed in that case clearly 
shows that it was the testator’s intention that English law should 
apply.
We have seen above that no individual has an absolute fee simple 
estate in land under customary tenure. Judicial decisions have, 
however, clarified the situation by laying it down that, on a sale of 
the entire interest o f  the family in any piece of  family land with the 
consent of all the principal members of the family, the purchaser 
acquires an estate which can only be a fee simple estate of English 
law: A lade v Aborishade,35 Similarly, where family property has 
been duly partitioned either by the family council or by the court, 
into individual portions and conveyed to the members as such, each 
has a fee simple absolute interest in his own portion which he can 
convey to a third party as freely and as fully as he could an absolute 
estate acquired by him by means of  an ordinary conveyance in English 
property form: Balogun v Balogun.36
Partition clearly has the effect o f  breaking down the family structure 
with all its incidents o f  customary tenure. But where, as in Bassey 
v Cobham ,37 family land has been granted to an individual member 
for his occupation or use, it still remains family property although 
he may have improved it by, for instance, clearing some bush or 
reclaiming a swamp thereon.
If so far we have been considering the position as regards forms of 
landholding and user in the towns and urban areas in G hana  and 
Nigeria, we should now turn our attention to the legal situation in the 
agricultural areas to consider the interesting concept of the customary 
tenants and its development by our courts. Under G hana customary 
law there are two main forms of customary tenancies — Abusa and 
Abunu (sometimes called Abetsem, in the Fanti language). In Re Land 
at Nkwantang Christian Boy Owusu & anor v Manche o f  L a b a d if8 
Deane, C J, enunciated the principles relating to G hana customary 
tenancies in these words:
i4 (1934) 11 NLR 160.
’'(1962) W NLR 74.
46(1924) 5 NLR 90.
(1943) 9 W ACA 78; see also Chairman, LEVB  v Ashani (1937) 3 WACA
143.
1 nreported. Divisional Court, February 9, 1932; referred to on p 97 of 
' ‘"'lev and Oko v Construction and Furniture (W est Africa L td ) & ors (1962)
I CLR 86.
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N ow  there is no doubt that the courts acting on equitable grounds have 
recognised estates as having been carved out o f  stool lands when persons, 
subjects o f  the stool, have settled down upon stool lands and have for a long 
period o f time so identified themselves with the lands as to becom e well 
recognised as the owners, the courts, in spite o f  the fact that the statutes o f  
Limitations have no application between natives, so that mere occupation  
alone gives no right as against the owner, have always held that such occupa­
tion, if coupled with circumstances which raise an equity in favour o f  the 
occupier, should enure to the advantage o f  the occupier as against anyone 
who seeks to oust him from such occupation. But it is to be noted, what is 
indeed clear upon principle, that mere occupation alone for a time however 
long raises no equity, although it may serve as evidence o f  an agreement by the 
party claiming to abandon or release a right. It is only where the original 
owner has so acted as to induce the occupier to alter his position on the 
reasonable faith that he has released or abandoned his claim, that any equitable  
right accrues to the occupier, and apart from such circumstances, occupation  
will be immaterial.
In Donkor v Asare & ors,39 the facts briefly were as follows. In 1952, 
the defendants applied to the Akwapim Stool for a grant of land for 
development into a football field. As the Oyoko Family was in posses­
sion, the Stool approached the family in accordance with customary 
law and the latter made a direct grant of a piece of land to the defendants 
under an agreement that the defendants should develop the land and 
share the proceeds with the family on the basis of one-third to that 
family. Two years later, a member of  the Oyoko family purported to 
sell the land to the plaintiff without the consent o f  the head and 
principal member of the family. A year later, the plaintiff purported 
to buy the land from the family. Thereafter, the Oyoko family gave 
the defendants notice to quit, but they refused. The plaintiff thereupon 
brought an action against the defendants who were given judgment 
by the trial court. On appeal to the Accra High Court, (Land Division), 
it was held that the plaintiff had failed to prove that the sale had been 
in accordance with Guaka custom and that, in any case, the agreement 
between the Oyoko family and the defendants created a right in town 
land of the same nature as Abusa or Abunu (Abetsem) tenancy of 
agricultural land which cannot be determined upon short notice except 
where a tenant has denied the title of his grantor.40 Ollenu, J, made 
the following interesting observation:
It is enough lor me to observe that from the evidence that the licen ce was 
39(I960) GLR 187.
Oheimen v Adjei anor 2 WALR 275 and Thompson v Mensah 3 W ALR 240 were 
cited wuh approval.
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granted with custom ary practice, and particularly from the evidence led both 
by the co-plaintiff and the first defendant that under the said agreement the 
defendants were to develop the land at their own expense and to share all 
proceeds accruing from it with the owners, it appears to me that the licence 
granted is not a mere licence in the English sense, determinable at will; rather 
it is a right in town land which is o f  the same nature as Ahusa or Abunu 
(Abetsem ) tenancy o f an agricultural land.
Yet another interesting feature of the G hana customary tenancy 
was dealt with in Asuon v Faya .41 There, the plaintiff brought an 
action against the defendant for the recovery of  an old cocoa farm 
which he claimed to be his family land. He claimed that the land was 
entrusted to the defendant to manage, but this was denied by the 
defendant who alleged that it was granted to his predecessor on an 
Abusa customary tenancy by the occupant o f  the stool of  Nkuntanasi 
who was the head of  the Anona family. The disputed land was situated 
in Fanti land within the village of the stool. The question for deter­
mination was whether the disputed land was plaintiff's family land or 
whether it was part o f  stool land as defined by section 31 of the 
Administration of Stool Lands Act, 1962.42 It was held by the High 
Court at Cape Coast that the defendant or his predecessor was never 
a manager or caretaker of the cocoa farm in dispute, but occupied it 
only as an Abusa tenant under customary law. The court explained 
that the purpose of the Administration of Stool Lands Act and the 
Rent Stabilization Act was to do away with absentee-landlordism 
and the Abusa and Abanu systems and to revolutionize the tenure 
of landholding insofar as land tenancies caught by the Act are con­
cerned.
In Akrofi v Weresi & anor,43 Coussey, P, explained the nature of 
these forms o f  tenancy as follows:
It is a com m on form o f  tenure throughout the country for a landowner who 
has unoccupied forest or virgin land, which he or his people are unable to 
cultivate, to grant the same to a stranger to work on in return for a fixed share 
ol the crops realised from the land. In such a case the tenant-farmer, although  
he has no ownership in the soil, has a very real interest in the usufruct o f  the 
land. The arrangement may be carried on indefinitely, even by the original 
grantee's successor, so long as the original terms o f  the holding are observed.
41 (1963) 2 GLR 77.
Under s 31 o f the Act: “ Stool land includes land controlled by any person for the 
benefit ot the subjects or members o f a stool, clan, company or community as the case 
may be and all land in the Upper and Northern Regions, other than land vested in the 
President and accordingly ‘stoo l’ means the person exercising such control.”
4 '2  WALR 257, p 259.
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The West African Court of Appeal explained44 that Abusa is the 
system whereby an owner of uncultivated land grants it to another 
person (usually a stranger) to cultivate and to share the produce of 
that farm with the owner in the proportion of one-third to the latter 
and two-thirds for himself. Abunu, on the other hand, is the system 
by which a person who has already cultivated his farm afterwards 
hands it over to another person to plant and maintain it with a view to 
the proceeds being shared in halves or where the owner of  land gives 
financial assistance to the tenant to make the farm on the landlord’s 
land.
In Total Oil Products L td  v Obcng and M anu ,45 the first defendant 
leased a piece of land to the plaintiff company for a term of years and 
put it in possession. He was an Ashanti man and not a subject o f  the 
Akim Abukwa stool. He had purchased the land from the second 
defendant who was a subject of that stool. Before the lease was 
executed, the plaintiff company paid the first defendant rents in 
advance out of which the first defendant paid the second defendant 
the purchase price of the land and the buildings thereon. The plaintiff 
company, having been ejected from the land by the Tafo stool and 
upon the failure o f  the first defendant to put them back into possession, 
was obliged to take another lease of the same land from the Tafo 
stool. The company, therefore, brought an action to have the lease 
granted by the first defendant rescinded and also claimed recovery of 
the rent as well as general damages. It was held, inter alia, by the 
Accra High Court, that (a) the right of a person by customary law to 
the free use of land is limited to land in its natural state, ie land which 
has nothing but natural products thereon, not land which has been 
developed by human skill, industry or capital. No person is entitled 
to the free use of a cocoa farm made by another, or a house built by 
another person; (b) that a stool subject forfeits his usufructuary title 
to stool land in his possession if he denies the title of the stool, and. this 
he can be deemed to do where he claims that the land he occupies 
belongs to a stool other than the stool to which he is a subject and that 
he holds the land as grantee of that stool. The second defendant has 
not made any such claim and cannot, therefore, be said to have ever 
forfeited his title to the land; (c) a fee simple estate is unknown in 
customary land law, but a conveyance which purports to convey the 
fee simple in land is not thereby void; rather it has the effect of trans­
ferring the highest estate or interest which the transferor has in
44 On p 260.
45 (1962) 1 GLR 228.
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the land;46 (d) a stool cannot alienate land in the possession of a 
subject without the consent of that subject;47 (e) a lease by a stool 
subject of land in his possession does not constitute an alienation 
of his usufructuary title and does not, therefore, require the consent 
of the stool. As a stranger-transferee is in the same position as his 
subject-transferor, the grant by the first defendant to the plaintiff 
company is, therefore, valid in spite of the absence of such consent; 
and (f) the grant of a lease by the Tafo stool to the plaintiff company 
is null and void because the stool purported to grant the land to 
someone else without the consent of the subject in possession.48
Let us now compare the G hana judicial treatment of this interesting 
phenomenon with the somewhat similar treatment of  the same subject 
in Nigerian courts. The theory, in brief, is that where strangers have 
been granted land for occupation and use, they are entitled to continue 
in peaceable enjoyment until they forfeit their rights either by alienating 
a portion o f  the land to others without the prior consent of the grantors 
or of their descendants, or by doing any other act or thing which would 
work a forfeiture under customary law, eg by failure to pay the cus­
tomary tribute or by putting the land to uses other than those originally 
fixed. The court has, however, in the exercise of its equitable jurisdic­
tion, not always allowed the landlords or grantors and their descendants 
to obtain a forfeiture. In C hief Uw'ani v A kom  & ors,49 certain head­
men of four compounds of Aros had settled at Ukpom in the Bende 
District of Owerri Province, with the permission of the respondent 
as representing the community to whom the land belonged. When 
one Aro later alienated his farming rights to another Aro, the re­
spondent Chief brought an action of ejectment against the people in 
all the four compounds. The Supreme Court ruled, however, that the 
Aro people should be permitted to remain on the land on payment of 
an annual tribute o f  £15 (jNAO.OO) to the respondent and his people.
An interesting illustration of the treatment o f  this subject by the 
Court is the recent decision of  the Supreme Court in Odunaran & ors 
v Chief John Asarah & ors.50 The plaintiff brought this action as 
representing themselves and the entire people o f  Uwerun in the 
Central Urhobo District of the Mid-Western State. The land in 
dispute is a portion of their land. Since its first settlement by their
■'/ Adday v Bonsu //(1 9 6 1 ) GLR 273.
Lightly & ors v Ashinfi (1955) 14 W ACA 676; Oheimen~\ Adjei & anor (1957)
2W ACR 275.
Thompson v Mensah (1957) 3 W ALR 240; see also Kotey  v Odoi (1962) GLR 347.
(1928) 8 NLR 19
50 (1972) 6 SC 1.
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ancestor from time immemorial, they had lived and farmed on the 
land, raised rubber and coconut and palm plantations on the land, 
put tenants on it, fished in the creeks and ferried people from one side 
of a river lying therein to the waterside, had jujus on the land and, in 
fact, exercised maximum acts of ownership on the land without 
hindrance from the defendants or any other people until the Tennessee 
(Nigeria) Inc entered upon the land in search of  oil in November, 
1965. The five children of the plaintiffs' ancestor now occupy the 
five main quarters. It was further proved that, long after the plaintiffs' 
predecessors had settled on the present site, the defendants' ancestors 
came and settled at a place about three miles away; the defendants 
begged the plaintiff's, and the latter agreed, to allow them to live with 
the plaintiff's on their own side of the bank o f the river. The learned 
trial judge then granted a declaration of  title to the plaintiff's, ordered 
that the defendants refund to the plaintiff's the sum received by them 
from the oil company in respect of the land in dispute, granted an 
order for forfeiture against the defendants and their people in respect 
of all rights and privileges hitherto enjoyed by them on the land in 
dispute, and also an injunction restraining the defendants and their 
people from further trespassing on the land in dispute.
It is clear that, on the issue of  title, where a plaintiff claims that a 
defendant is his customary tenant on a piece of  land while the 
defendant, on the other hand, also claims to own the land, the question 
before the court is whether the defendant’s possession was by the 
plaintiff's permission. It is for the plaintiff to show that he put the 
defendant there. The learned trial judge found that, in the instant 
case, although traditional evidence was relied upon by both sides, 
the respondents had established that they put the appellants on parts 
of the land in dispute. While it is true that Ashogbon v Odunsi,51 and 
Ogbakumanwu & ors v Chiabolo52 have established that customary 
tenants should not suffer forfeiture for trite acts of  misbehaviour and 
that the courts are loath to order forfeiture except in the most 
exceptional circumstances, it is to be observed that Ashogbon v Odunsi 
was essentially a case of  an insult to the Chief as head of  the family, 
while the court in Ogbakumanwu case refused to order forfeiture 
because the defendants at the pre-trial stage honestly believed that 
they were joint owners with the plaintiff's. The appellants' misconduct 
in leasing or letting the land in question to the oil company was such 
a gross act of misconduct as to warrant forfeiture, as indeed the court
51 ’ NLR 7.
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did in Onisiwo v Fagbenro,53 where the court ordered forfeiture 
because the customary tenants purported to grant a lease of part of 
the land. It may also be pointed out that in that case there was a 
specific plea for relief against forfeiture by the defendants, but there 
was not in the present case. The Supreme Court observed:
It is to be noted that in alm ost all the reported cases in which the courts have 
been disposed to grant relief against forfeiture by a com m unity o f immigrant 
customary tenants, it has been on the ground that to order forfeiture would  
work great hardship on such tenants who might otherwise have nowhere 
else to go. That is, however, not the case here, where the appellants' own 
homeland is adjacent to the respondents' and is not shown throughout the 
proceedings to be already over-crowded or uninhabitable.
In Waghoreghor & ors v Aghenghen & ors,54 the court, in another 
recent case involving acquisition of land for petroleum exploration 
in the Mid-West, had to consider the nature of the rights of customary 
tenants and the extent to which they are entitled to a share of the 
compensation money paid to the customary landlords as owners. 
In the case itself, the defendants had at least as individuals through 
their predecessors in title been granted rights of user with respect to 
the land for which they had at all material times paid tributes, they 
had from time immemorial planted economic crops and other produce 
thereon and generally farmed them according to the ordinary course 
of husbandry practised in the locality, and there was no finding that 
the plaintiffs had either lived or farmed on the disputed land. No 
dispute would seem to have arisen as between both parties over all 
these years until Shell-BP began to explore for oil on this land. There 
is neither authority nor warrant for the assertion that, in order to 
become customary tenants, the defendants must establish an express 
grant to them as a community, such as was presumed to have taken 
place in the undisputed portion of the land; customary tenants can 
and often have their parcels o f  land granted to them individually, 
provided they duly honour the incidents of tenure, especially the 
payment of tributes. It was not in dispute in this case that the 
defendants were lawfully on the disputed land. If, as contended by 
the plaintiffs, the defendants are not customary tenants, what are they? 
T hey occupied and used the land as ordinary customary tenants do, 
the plaintiffs' had no concurrent rights of user with the defendants in 
respect of the disputed land, the defendants had duly been paying
53 21 NLR 3.
54 (1974) 1 SC 1.
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tributes, the £105 (/N-210.00) paid by Shell-BP was compensation for 
user and economic crops, the acquisition had indeed displaced only 
the defendants who are in possession of the land, and the courts had 
in two previous judgments refused to grant either forfeiture or an 
injunction against the defendants. The only reasonable conclusion to 
draw from these legal facts is that the defendants are either customary 
tenants of the disputed land or possess rights analogous to those 
of such tenants. All the incidents of customary tenure are present. 
The defendants cannot be regarded as licencees by arguments derived 
from English land law, as the learned trial judge had done. In 
customary land law parlance, the defendants are not gifted the land; 
they are not 'borrowers’ or ‘lessees’; they are grantees of  land under 
customary tenure and hold, as such, a determinable interest in the 
land which may be enjoyed in perpetuity subject to good behaviour. 
This interest has in practice now been regarded by the courts as 
practically indefeasible, once permanent buildings or other forms of 
improvements like extensive commercial farming and/or occupation 
have been established thereon by the grantees. Any proved mis­
behaviour is usually now punished by a fine, as has happened in the 
present case. They enjoy something akin to emphyteusis, a perpetual 
right in the land of another. A very important factor is that the 
grantor of the land, once it has been given to the grantees as customary 
tenants, cannot thereafter grant it or any part of it to a third party 
without the consent or approval of the customary tenants. The grantor 
is not allowed to derogate from his g rant.55
As with the customary tenant in this type of  legal situation where 
the grantors do not live on the land or farm thereon, “ possession is 
nine-tenths of the law’’. It is they who would lose not only their 
means of livelihood, but also their very existence, by the compulsory 
acquisition of the land in question. With respect to the disputed land, 
the defendants were held to be customary tenants, not licencees and, 
as such, entitled to two-thirds of  the compensation money.
In Bassey & ors v E teta ,5b the plaintiff's were granted the two-thirds 
share o f  the rent received from the lessees of land to whom the 
defendant grantors had illegally leased part of the grantee’s land; the 
plaintiffs had therefore adopted or ratified the defendants’ illegal act. 
But in Chief Etim  <£ ors v C hief Eke & ors,51 where it was an express
Chief Sam Warri Esi v Itsekiri Communal Land Trustees & ors (1961) W RNLR  
15, p 21.
56 (1938) 4 W ACA 153.
57 (1941 j 16 NLR 43.
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condition o f  the original grant that the grantors should retain a 
concurrent right o f  exploitation of the resources of the farmland, 
the subject of the grant, with the grantees, the proceeds from reaping 
palm nuts and rents of the land were held to be apportionable equally. 
It is unnecessary to import the concept of  a quasi-contractual obliga­
tion into this situation, as the court obviously did in Bussey v Eteta 
(see p 155 thereof). It is sufficient that, in the exercise of its equitable 
jurisdiction, the matter would be a fair distribution of the proceeds of 
the land, be they from lease or sale or compulsory acquisition. The 
main consideration is that the grantees would, by the surrender of 
their possessory title, lose so much more than the grantors whose 
reversionary interests are now quite small, if not nebulous.
The practice regarding Itsekiri Land Trust furnishes an example of 
how the radical title o f  a piece of land could be in one entity while the 
possessory rights reside in another; there is also the principle of 
apportionment o f  the proceeds as between the two. In the recent 
decision in Itsekiri Communal Land Trustees v Warri Divisional 
Planning Authority & ors,5H the Supreme Court awarded one-third 
to the Itsekiri Land Trustees and two-thirds to the customary tenants 
as fair shares in the compensation money paid for the acquisition of 
land. No hard and fast rule can be laid down as to the exact proportion 
of the shares in every case. It seems strange that the learned trial judge 
in this case had refused to entertain the defendants’ claim to apportion­
ment on the sole ground that apportionment is unknown to customary 
law. The principle of apportionment is part and parcel of every system 
of law that recognizes rights and obligations in relation to parties to 
a dispute. The High Court at Ughelli, like every other High Court 
in the Federation, is invested with equitable jurisdiction in all disputes 
before it which require the application of principles of  equity. The 
case before the learned trial judge is one such, and it is not consonant 
with justice that that court should declare a non liquet in this matter. 
If apportionment is unknown to customary law, how does the principle 
of compulsory acquisition form part of customary law so as to be 
payable to the plaintiffs?
IV 
The Customary Pledge of Land
■mother interesting area of  customary law in which our judicial
(1971) 11 SC 235.
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processes have done much to clarify the issues and develop the law is 
the customary pledge of land. Here, again as in the case of  customary 
tenancies, we shall draw mainly upon the examples of G hana and 
Nigeria, if only because the indigenous pledge has had the most 
developed set of principles evolved in our courts for nearly a century.
Let us begin with an examination of  G hana  law on the subject. 
In Acido Kofi v Addo Kofi,59 land was pledged in 1869 to secure a loan 
of 6/6d. In 1926 the successor of the pledgor offered to redeem it 
from the successors of  the original pledgee. It was held that the 
pledgor or his successor was entitled to redeem it after that long lapse 
of  time. Similarly in Kuma & anor v Kofi & anor,60 land which was 
originally pledged for either one keg or half a keg o f gun powder was 
held to be redeemable even though the action to redeem was being 
brought after some generations of the plaintiff's successors of  the 
pledgee had passed. It was laid down in Ebiassah v Ababio,61 that as 
soon as the debt is paid the pledgee must vacate the land or be ejected. 
Notice is normally given to the pledgee before the am ount of  the 
debt is tendered by the pledgor or his successors. A pledgee of  land 
under customary land law is not entitled, as is a legal mortgagee under 
English law, to sell the pledged land for failure to pay the debt in time; 
he can only do so upon a court order. In the Keta case of  Dabla v 
Ativor ,62 the father of the plaintiff' pledged the land in 1916 to the 
defendant. There were a few coconut trees on it at the time of the 
pledge. The defendant later developed the land into a plantation. In 
1947, when the plaintiff’s father died, he gave notice to the defendant 
of his intention to redeem the land. The defendant refused to accept 
payment and claimed that the transaction between him and the 
deceased was a sale and not a pledge since by customary law, a pledgee 
should not be permitted to improve the pledged property without the 
pledgor’s permission; the plaintiff and his predecessor in title, having 
sat by and permitted him to improve the land, were estopped from 
disputing that he was the owner of  it. The defendant failed to prove 
a sale by documentary evidence, but the oral evidence that the transac­
tion was a pledge was irresistible. The West African Court o f  Appeal 
upheld the judgment of the Land Court that the transaction was 
clearly a pledge. It is quite clear as Ollenu, J, pointed ou t ,63 that the
59 1 WACA 284.
60 1 WALR 128.
61 12 WACA 106.
Unreported judgment of the Land Court, delivered March 5, 1949; confirmed by 
WACA on February 7, 1951, and discussed on pp 100-101 of N A Ollennu’s Customary 
LQnd Law in Ghana, 1962.
63 Ibid, p 102.
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principle that the pledgee who improves the pledged land does so at 
his own expense and does not become the owner of  it by reason of 
such improvement is in consonance with both the customary law 
principle and the equitable doctrine of acquiescence. On the well- 
established maxim “ once a pledge, always a pledge” , “ acquiescence 
can never arise where a person, knowing quite well that he has no title 
to land and that he has only a limited interest in it, spends money to 
improve it in a manner which he knows he is not entitled to do. In 
such a case he cannot claim the benefit of the principle.”
That any improvement carried out by the pledgee can never be a 
bar to redemption by the pledgor or his descendants was again 
emphasized in D zanku  v K w adw o64 in which a family had pledged 
a parcel of land for six shillings. Several years later, a descendant of 
the pledgor wishing to redeem the land tendered the six shillings to the 
defendant, a descendant of the pledgee, who refused the payment. 
The plaintiff'alleged that the land was now worth £500. On appeal to 
the Ghana Court o f  Appeal, it was held that a pledge is perpetually 
redeemable and that a pledgee is entitled to use the property for his 
own benefit and without accounting to the pledgor, but that the fact 
that the pledgee has spent his own money to improve the property 
cannot bar the pledgor from recovering the property upon payment 
of the debt of six shillings and no more.65
We may now turn to Nigerian case law by beginning with the quite 
recent case of O koiko & anor v Esedalue & anor.66 There, the plaintiff 's 
case was that one O m oro had a piece of land called Omokpa and five 
children, one of whom called Esegbe pledged the land after Omoro 's 
death to one Eto, who was the grandfather of  the first defendant, for 
three pieces of cloth. Anatom a, the grandfather o f  the second 
defendant, and Use, the grandfather of the third defendant, had each 
contributed a piece of cloth to Eto's  own piece of cloth to make up the 
three pieces of  cloth required for the pledge of  Omokpa land by 
Esegbe to whom the cloths were given. They all proceeded to put the 
land to use and had continued to do so till the present action was 
brought. Evidence was led to prove that, a few years previously, his 
tamily decided to redeem Omokpa land from the defendants who 
agreed to the proposal on the condition that the plaintiff's family 
should pay the sum of £1,000 (N-2,000) to the defendants’ families. 
1 he plaintiff's family regarded this am ount as being excessive and so
^ (I960) GLR 31.
kaji v Kofi 1 WACA 284 was cited with approval.
"(1974) 3 SC 1.
JU D G E S  A N D  C U ST O M A R Y  L A W
45
THE JU D IC IA L PROCESS IN COM M ONW EALTH AFRICA
refused to pay. A little later, the plaintiff's family renewed the demand 
to redeem their land but, this time, the am ount asked for by the 
defendants was reduced to £600 (^4-1,200) which the plaintiff’s family 
still considered excessive in view of the fact that O m okpa land was 
originally pledged for the equivalent of £15 (4430). Thereupon, the 
defendants changed their tune and put forward the claim that the 
land was originally an absolute sale by Esegbe to their grandfathers, 
and not a pledge. There was uncontradicted evidence that, according 
to the custom of the Iyede people, the sale o f  land was unknown, 
and that land could only be pledged and was redeemable on payment 
of the exact amount for which it was pledged and no more.
The learned trial judge found as a fact that the actual date of  the 
transaction was not established and that the defendants had been in 
exclusive possession of the land since it was pledged to them by the 
plaintiff's family. He nevertheless held that pledged land is redeem­
able, however long it might have been in the pledgee’s possession. 
With regard to the evidence that the defendants grew rubber plantations 
on the land, the High Court at Ughelli held that, although a customary 
pledge permits the pledgee exclusive possession of the pledged land, 
it does not confer on him such rights as are exercisable by an absolute 
owner of land. The pledgee only enjoys a licence to use the land so 
long as the mortgage debt remains unpaid, and any accretion to the 
land during the period o f  his occupation passes to the pledgor on 
redemption. After citing Elias Land Law and Custom , p 178, 2nd 
edition, and the interesting case based on it o f  Jimoh Amoo v Rufai 
Adigun,b in which the pledgor was on redemption allowed credit for 
the improvement made on pledged premises by the pledgee while in 
possession, the court came to the following conclusion on this point:
I also endorse the view that a mortgagee is not entitled to com pensation  
for any econom ic trees or improvements he may have made on the pledged 
land as the inability o f  the mortgagor to pay such com pensation may deprive 
the mortgagor the right o f  redemption o f  the property which native law and 
custom  allows him.
The High Court then granted to the plaintiff recovery of  possession ot 
Omokpa land which he held to have been pledged and not sold by 
Esegbe to the grandfathers of the defendants, and a perpetual injunc­
tion against the defendants from using the land or interfering with the 
plaintiff's occupation and possession of  it. The plaintiffs were also
67(1957) W RNLR 55. p 56.
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ordered to repay the sum of £15 (T430) as refund o f the mortgage 
debt due to the defendants for the pledged land. The Court further 
ordered that the defendants must be given an opportunity to harvest 
their crops on the land and remove their property, structures, farm 
implements and other articles from the pledged land.
In the present case, the defendants led no evidence at all to discharge 
the onus on them that the original transaction was a sale which gave 
them absolute title to the land or that, contrary to the evidence of 
the plaintiff and his witnesses, the sale of land was known to Iyede 
customary law: Ochonma v Unosi.6H Similarly, in Leragun & ors v 
Funlayo,bq where the plaintiffs claimed recovery of  land which the 
defendant admitted had originally been pledged to her for the sum 
of £12 :10 /-  and later sold to her for an additional sum of £8, but 
there was no evidence produced by the defendant as to the alleged sale, 
it was held that the mere planting of economic crops in the pledged 
land is not by itself conclusive as to the defendant’s ownership, and 
also that lapse of time (in this case over thirty years) is not a bar to 
recovery of  a pledged land.
The Supreme Court made the following noteworthy observation:
Now , this appeal raises in an interesting form an age-long question o f  
customary pledge o f  land, namely, whether the use to which pledged land 
has been put by the pledgee in occupation is in any way circumscribed and 
also whether any improvement carried out by the pledgee while in possession  
can be com pensated for in som e way by the pledgor; underlying the two 
inter-related questions is, o f  course, the basic issue as to whether the use 
made by the pledgee o f  the land should be regarded as interest on the capital 
originally borrowed by the pledgor. One invariable rule o f  custom ary pledge 
that can be gathered from the reported cases is that the pledgee always goes 
into possession and has the right to put the land to som e productive use. 
To that extent, such use is a kind o f  interest due on the am ount o f  the loan. 
The very nature o f  a custom ary pledge, which is perpetually redeemable, 
is that the pledgee has only a temporary occupation licence and that he must 
yield up the pledged land as far as possible in the form he took it on originally.
I his means that he must put it to only ordinary use so that its return to the 
pledgor should be unencumbered in any way. The planting o f  econqm ic  
crops like cocoa or rubber can only be undertaken by the pledgee in possession  
at his own risk, unless o f  course there is express contract permitting him to 
do so. If the land pledged is already planted by the pledgor with econom ic 
trees, there may be a presumption in favour o f  the pledgee using the land as 
such until redemption o f  the pledge. The whole question was first raised
’ (1965) NM LR 321, p 323.
"'(1956) W RNLR 167.
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in what is probably the first case on customary pledge heard by Nigerian  
courts which took place in 1889. In Kuahen v. A vose, where there was a pledge 
o f  palm trees. Smalman Smith, C.J., held that the am ount o f  the produce 
which came to about £12 per annum while the prevailing custom ary tribute 
was £9 per annum must be taken into account so that the capital borrowed 
could be reduced each year by the excess o f  £3 per year. The learned Chief 
Justice regarded as 'unjust' a custom  according to which, as alleged by the 
plaintiff, the pledgee was entitled to ‘farm the trees and hold them until the 
original debt be paid, giving and rendering no account o f  the value o f the 
produce, which in this case am ounted to more each year than the amount 
paid as tribute’. The matter was taken a step further in Jimoh Am oo  v. Rufai 
Adigun (1957) W .R .N .R . 55 in which the plaintiff's claim for an account of 
rents collected by the defendant pledgee while in possession o f  the plaintiff's 
shop in respect o f a loan was granted. It seems to follow  from these two cases 
that the court will in all proper cases take into consideration the nature and 
character o f the use to which the pledgee has put the land while in possession, 
so that any unjustified benefits thereby derived by the pledgee may be brought 
into the final account when the pledge is ultimately being redeemed. N o  
longer, it would seem, can the pledgee in possession take all the benefits from 
his commercial exploitation o f the land and still get back his original capital; 
much less can he claim against the pledgor any benefit arising from his having 
planted the land with econom ic crops like cocoa or rubber, or from his 
having carried out improvements on the pledged premises.
The Court further pointed out:
In the present case, the loan took the form o f  three pieces o f  cloths worth 
£15 (2430) handed over to the grandfather o f  the pledgor by the grandfather 
o f the pledgee. The debt was, therefore, not incurred by the pledgee lending 
money to the pledgor but by being given three pieces o f  cloth. The general 
incidents o f  tenure o f pledged land, however, attach to it so as to make it 
perpetually redeemable. We think that the planting o f  the land with econom ic  
crops like rubber must be regarded as necessarily incidental to the use o f the 
land since there is no evidence that it was forbidden under the terms o f the 
original pledge; but it is also clear, nevertheless, that the pledgee has no right 
to any com pensation or credit for the plantations, which accrue to the pledged 
land on the principle o f  quicquidplantatur solo, solo credit. It was, therefore, 
as an act o f grace rather than as a matter o f  legal right, that the learned trial 
judge ordered the plaintiff/appellant to permit the respondents to reap the 
next harvest before returning the pledged land to the appellant. The law is 
that the pledgee should quit the land as from the date o f  the judgem ent in 
favour o f  the pledgor.
Finally, the Court said:
One other important point is that the pledgor’s right o f  redemption cannot 
be clogged in any way by the pledgee, such for instance as by dem anding any 
amount in excess o f the sum for which the land was originally pledged, or by 
planting the pledged land heavily with econom ic trees, or by using other
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subterfuges to delay or postpone the pledgor's or his successor’s right to 
redeem ; nor is lapse o f  time a bar to the exercise o f  the right o f  redemption, 
for custom ary pledges o f  land are perpetually redeemable.
V 
Law Relating to Customary Marriages
We may attempt here a brief summary of the essentials and incidents 
of a customary marriage by reference to a few cases in illustration. 
Thus in Yaotey v Quaye ,70 R married under the Marriage Ordinance 
Cap 127 (1951 revised edition) and had three children by this marriage 
of whom the plaintiff was the eldest. R divorced the ordinance wife 
and married the defendant under customary law, and the issue was a 
girl. R also had another child by another woman whom he did not 
marry either according to the Ordinance or under customary law. 
When R died intestate in 1961, he was survived by all the five children 
and the two women. The plaintiff’s eldest child applied for letters of 
administration on the ground that she and the other two children of 
her mother were the only lawful children of their deceased father by 
virtue of the Ordinance marriage o f  their mother. The defendant 
ordered a caveat, alleging that as a widow by customary law, she was 
entitled to a share in the estate, as also was her child who was a lawful 
child of the deceased. The Accra High Court held that, (a) as R was 
survived by children of the marriage under the Ordinance, succession 
to his estate should be governed by section 48 of  the Marriage 
Ordinance; (b) by customary law all children who are acknowledged 
by a man as his children are lawful and the defendant’s child was 
accordingly entitled to share equally with the plaintiff and her brother 
and sister; (c) the essentials o f  a valid customary marriage in Ghana 
are the agreement by the parties to live together as man and wife, 
consent of the families of both established either expressly or impliedly 
and consummation o f  the marriage in the sense that the couple lived 
together openly as man and wife. Accordingly, the defendant was 
the lawful wife o f  R, but the other woman was not a wife by customary 
'aw; (d) the fifth child by that other woman was however acknowledged 
by R as his child and, accordingly, was entitled to share in her deceased 
father’s estate; and (e) that it is an incident o f  customary marriage 
tbat the husband should provide maintenance and shelter for the 
u iie. After his death this responsibility devolves upon his family.
7|J(1%1) GLR 573.
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Consequently, the family head is bound to provide maintenance 
for the widow of a deceased member of the family during the 
period of the funeral. Thereafter he must offer her in marriage to 
another member of the family. If the family does not want 
her to remain with them, proper customary proceedings similar 
to customary divorce proceedings should be instituted to settle the 
m atter.71
It will be noticed that this case, in addition to explaining the prob­
lems raised when a man has mixed a customary marriage to one 
woman with an Ordinance marriage to another also raises the issue 
of legitimacy of the children of  the marriage. Under G hana customary 
law, as indeed under its Nigerian counterpart, there is no question of 
illegitimacy of children born of marriages contracted thereunder. 
The issue of illegitimacy, however, arises in the case of  children born 
to a man by another woman during the subsistence of  an Ordinance 
marriage.72
The importance of the type of marriage contracted by a man is 
that on it may depend the rights of  the issue of  the marriage to inherit 
or not to inherit their father. On the authority of  the Nigerian case of 
Cole v Co/e.73 and the G hanaian case of Coleman v S h a n g c4, whenever 
a man married under the Marriage Ordinance dies leaving a wife or 
a wife and children surviving him, succession to his estate will be 
determined by English law. It follows that where there is mixture of 
a statutory marriage with one under customary law in the sense 
already explained above, the children of the statutory marriage in 
strict theory take, on their father’s intestacy, all the property to the 
exclusion of those born out of  wedlock. Our courts have nevertheless 
interpreted the inexorable operation of  customary law notions in 
such a way that all the children of a deceased intestate tend to share 
equally. The principle usually applied in such cases is that o f  natural 
justice, equity and good conscience. Let us briefly illustrate. In 
Siaw  v Sorlor,15 S  died in 1935, survived by two wives married under 
customary law, one of the wives having born him one child while 
the other had several children. After his death his brother T, who 
had been duly appointed successor by the family, shared the deceased’s 
self-acquired property per capita among all the children of  the two
1 The case o f Coleman v Shang (1961) GLR 145, PL was cited as on all fours with 
the instant case.
72 Nartey & ors v Koshie & anor (1961) CLR 728.
73 (1898) 1 NLR 15.
74 (1961) GLR 15.
75 (1960) GLR 77.
T H E  JU D IC IA L  PROCESS IN  C O M M O N W E A L T H  A FR IC A
50
JU D G E S  A N D  C U ST O M A R Y  L A W
marriages. Each child duly accounted to T  for the proceeds of his 
portion o f  the land until T ’s death two years later. Thereafter the 
children ceased to account to anyone. Some 24 years later, the plain­
tiff. the only child by one o f  the deceased’s wives, sued the defendant 
who was of the several children by the second wife, claiming that 
the division done by T  was a temporary arrangement to pay off his 
father’s debts, and that he was by Shai customary law, entitled to a 
share of the property equal to half per stirpes. It was held by the 
Accra High Court that, (a) although under Ga-Adangbe customary 
law, the general principle might be that the property of a deceased 
person might be divided am ong the children per stirpes on the basis of 
the number of  wives, nevertheless, customary law gives a discretion 
to the family to share the property per capita if adherence to the strict 
rule v/ould cause inequity and hardship; (b) such a discretion in a 
family applies generally whatever the local rules o f  inheritance may 
be; (c) in the instant case, the plaintiff, on whom the onus lay, had 
failed to establish that the per capita apportionment in question was 
intended to be temporary. With this Ghana case should be contrasted 
the Nigerian decision in Danmole v D aw odu.'6 There, a deceased 
intestate left him surviving nine children by four wives married 
according to Yoruba customary law. On appeal to the Supreme 
Court of Nigeria in 1958, it was held (a) that distribution should not 
be among all the nine children per capita but into four shares per 
stirpes according to the num ber of wives; (b) that this mode of dis­
tribution is the universal principle in Yorubaland; (c) that if a dispute 
should arise among the claimants, the family head had a final dis­
cretion to order that the per capita method rather than the per stirpes 
method should be adopted ; (d) that the per capita method was a 
relatively modern innova tion ; and (e) that the per stirpes method is 
not contrary to natural justice, equity and good conscience. The 
Privy Council upheld these decisions.
A Ghanaian case which is interesting because customary law was 
applied to regulate the intestate succession to the estate of a deceased 
Ghanaian Moslem is K w akye  v Yuba & ors.11 There, two brothers 
bP  and KK, both deceased, were Moslems. KK  died without issue. 
The defendants were the children of  KP. The plaintiff was the custom­
ary successor to KK, and claimed a declaration o f  title to a farm 
left by KK  and for accounts. The defendants contested the claim on 
die iollowing three grounds: (a) that the plaintiff's appointment as
’(1962) 1 WLR 1053 PC.
7 (1961) GLR 720.
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successor was invalid because it was made at an improperly constituted 
meeting; (b) that the plaintiff was not a uterine brother of KK  and, 
in any case, there was a brother of  the full blood of the deceased who 
could have been appointed; and (c) that the deceased KK  was a 
Moslem and succession to his estate must be governed by Islamic 
law and that as the deceased died without issue, the defendants as 
the children o f  his brother were the proper persons to succeed him. 
The High Court of Accra held (a) that the appointment of the successor 
was in order and that in G hana  succession is not based upon a person’s 
religion but it is regulated by customary law unless otherwise provided 
by statute; (b) that as K K  was alleged to have been a Moslem. 
M ohammedan law would apply to his estate if it was proved that his 
marriage satisfied the conditions of  the Marriage of M ohammedans 
Ordinance Cap 129, particularly section 10 thereof which requires 
that the marriage must have been registered under the Ordinance; 
(c) that a marriage by a M oham m edan according to Mohammedan 
law is at its very best a marriage by customary law, and does not 
affect succession to his estate, unless the said marriage is registered 
under the Ordinance; and (d) that as there was no evidence of  the 
registration of KK's marriage, Mohammedan law cannot apply to his 
intestate estate.
It is of passing interest to remark that both the form of marriage 
and succession to the estate of an intestate may sometimes depend 
upon whether the particular society is patrilineal or matrilineal. Both 
types are to be found in nearly all societies in Commonwealth Africa. 
The patrilineal form of succession is the predominant type in Nigeria, 
while the matrilineal is very much in evidence in Ghana. For example, 
succession in Accra is matrilineal, the maternal family consisting of 
descendants in the direct female line of a common ancestress, however 
remote the relationship.78 It has, however, been held obiter in Siaw  v 
Sorlor,79 that the children of  a deceased person whose intestate 
estate is subject to matrilineal succession are entitled to support and 
to training from their father's estate and also to a share each of their 
father’s personalty.
We may illustrate very briefly in this connection how the courts 
have handled problems relating to customary marriages either in the 
light of application o f  the doctrine of repugnancy or by appeal to 
constitutional rights o f  the individual. Thus, through the application 
o f  the doctrine of repugnancy, the courts have gradually set their
78 Okoe v Ankrah (1961) GLR 109.
79(1960) GLR 77, p 79.
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face against certain obnoxious or obsolescent practices or aspects of 
customary law. On the ground that an alleged custom is contrary to 
natural justice, equity and good conscience, the court held in Edet v 
Essien,80 that where a man was engaged to be married to a woman 
under customary law and the latter deserted him for another by whom 
she had two children, the deserted man could not claim the children 
under an alleged local Efik custom. On the other hand, in Amachree v 
Goodhead,81 the defendant chief was the head of the family of  the 
husband for whom the wife bore no children until his death. The 
wife, who had remained in the house of her deceased husband's 
family, later had a daughter by another man outside. The family of 
the wife claimed the child on the ground that it was illegitimate and 
could not either physiologically or legally belong to the defendant 
chief’s family. The Divisional Court at Degema, affirming a Native 
Court's  decision, held that the child belonged to the chief's  family to 
whose custody the child was therefore assigned. The court considered 
this decision to be in accordance with both customary law and natural 
justice or humanity.
It must nevertheless be said that in so many o f the cases decided on 
this principle, no consistent principle is discernible and that some of 
the decisions are hard to justify. This is probably an area in which the 
court has not made a very notable contribution.
But in the cases coming before the court on pure issues of  customary 
marriage and the family, the courts have tended to apply straight 
judicial reasoning. For example, in Chawere v Aihenu & anor*2 a 
wife under Yoruba customary law deserted her husband having been 
seduced by the plaintiff, with whom she later cohabited. A Native 
Court ordered the plaintiff to refund to the injured husband £20 as 
‘dowry’ previously paid by him on the wife. The woman later deserted 
the plaintiff for a third man, with whom she was living when the action 
was brought against her and the third man for the return of the £20 
and £4 :10 /-  (as the cost o f  a sewing machine bought for her). The 
court held (a) that the lower court was wrong in holding that the very 
fact of a woman living in adultery with another man made her become 
the wife of the adulterer under customary law; (b) that the claim of the 
plaintiff could be against the adulterer only or by way of damages for 
adultery with the plaintiff 's wife; and (c) that on the evidence the 
plaintiff's claim was bad because the third man was not responsible
so (1932) 11 N LR 47.
81 (1923) 4 NLR 101.
82 (1935) 12 NLR 4.
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for the w om an’s desertion of the plaintiff. In very similar 
circumstances, the G hana Court of Appeal held in Ginburo 
& anor v Kaba83 that the husband was not entitled to a decree 
ordering the alleged wife to return to the man who brought 
the action.
Again, in the recent case of  Egri v Ukperi,84 the Supreme Court of 
Nigeria held that a claim by a man for the return of his 'wife' under 
customary law must fail because the alleged customary marriage had 
not been established by evidence and the claim was in any case contrary 
to the wife’s constitutional right to freedom of association under 
section 26(1) of  the Constitution of the Federation. The court observed 
that, in proceedings before a customary court, an order for the repay­
ment of  bride price or 'dowry', assuming that one was in fact paid by 
the husband, is usually made subsequent to an order for the dissolution 
of a customary marriage. But the plaintiff, in the present case had 
been granted £20 as refund of dowry allegedly paid by him, although 
he was suing, not for a dissolution, but for the return of his 'wife’ by 
her father who denied the marriage. The order for the repayment 
made by the lower court was therefore set aside, as was, o f  course, 
the order compelling the 'wife’ to return to the appellant. In another 
recent Supreme Court decision in Osamwonyi v Osamwonyi,85 there 
was an action for the dissolution of a marriage under the Marriage 
Act on the ground of a precedent customary Benin marriage between 
the wife and another man, which was unknown to the petitioning 
husband at the time of the statutory marriage. The law is that, in 
order to invalidate a marriage under the Act on the ground that, at 
the time of the aforesaid marriage, there was a customary marriage 
by one of the parties still subsisting, the customary marriage must be 
proved with a high degree of  certainty.86 In the present case, it was 
established that, under Benin customary law, a daughter could 
not be married off to a man by her parents without her consent. 
The court took the view that the consent of the bride-to-be 
was a condition precedent to a marriage under the Benin customary 
law, and that this requirement was consistent with natural justice, 
equity and good conscience. The court also held that, as there 
was no proof of  cohabitation between the wife and the third m an . 
payment o f  dowry alone does not constitute marriage under B en in  
customary law.
83 (1971) 2 GLR 416.
84 (1973) 3 SC (SC 364/1971).
85 (1972) 10 SC (SC 295/69).
8b Abisogun v Abisogun (1963) 1 ALL NLR 237.
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Law Relating to Chieftaincies
The institution of chieftaincy has also been a subject of many judi­
cial pronouncements, especially in determining the legal nature and 
status of holders o f  these customary titles.87 This is a matter of some 
importance when considering the political or even legal role of a 
chief in society. One notable case in which the court had found itself 
called upon to define the issue is Giwa & ors v Alashe,88 in which 
Smalman Smith, C J, said:
Such a position (i.e., o f  a chief) only carries a certain social status and dis­
tinction am ong his fellows, but no authority beyond that o f any other private 
person. More especially do I draw attention to this fact, inasmuch as certain 
pretensions have recently been advanced by persons calling themselves 
W hite-Capped Chiefs, to control over land in the lawful and beneficial 
occupation o f persons owing no rent or service to them.
This strictly limited view of the chieftaincy was provoked by the 
occasion, but it also stated a necessary reminder to the unnecessary 
arrogation of power sometimes assumed by past chiefs. But the real 
question as to what a chief is was thus answered in Adanji v Hunvoo :89
Now what is the chieftaincy? I say without hesitation that it is a mere dignity, 
a position o f  honour, o f  primacy am ong a particular section o f  the native 
com m unity...
That, depending on the particular context, the title of chief may 
not carry the status and dignity envisaged in Adanji v Hunvoo in respect 
of Badagry is borne out by Baker, C J, in Ononye v Obanye & ors:90
The Okpala (Okpara) is described in Dr. M eek’s Law and Authority in a 
Nigerian Tribe as the senior elder (or more correctly the recognised head) 
of the extended family. He receives obedience and tokens o f  respect and has 
duties in assisting members o f  the family: he is also the holder o f  the family 
ofo (sacred symbol o f  office) and is the chief priest and cerem onial head o f
87 See Laoye & ors v Oyetunde (1944) AC 170 and Eshughayi Eleko v Nigerian Govern­
ment (1931) AC 662 for the recognition by the courts o f the customary law relating to 
chieftaincy, especially from the point o f view of political power and status.
(1891) Lagos Reports o f Certain Judgments of the Supreme Court, etc, (1884-92),
p 45.
89(1908) 1 NLR 71.
90 (1945) 11 W ACA 60.
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the cult o f  the founder o f  the family. The senior Okpala is the ritual head
o f the group; he has not executive authority but is consulted on all matters
affecting the welfare o f  the kindred.
A case in which the question of a chieftaincy recently arose for 
determination before the Supreme Court is Akanbi & ors v Yakubu & 
ors.91 There, the plaintiffs in their capacity as senior traditional 
heads responsible for the traditional appointment of the Bara of 
Ijagbo sued the defendants seeking a declaration that the approval and 
selection of a particular candidate (the fourth defendant) was not 
made in accordance with the customary law, that it was null and void, 
and that an injunction should be issued restraining the fourth defendant 
from performing any of the functions of Bara of Ijagbo or from holding 
himself out as such. The facts are that, several years ago, a number of 
persons from the town of Offa gradually migrated to the site o f  the 
neighbouring village o f  Ijagbo until at the commencement o f  the 
present suit, there were 35 compounds in the village. Each compound 
consisted of between 50 and 70 persons, thus making a total o f  about 
2,500 persons. The village would appear to be administered by six 
compound heads acting as a council or committee o f  elders, o f  which 
one of their number would normally act as chairman. Although the 
headship of each com pound was normally elected by the members of 
the compound, nevertheless in the case o f  the com pound head that 
would be made chairman there must also be formal adoption and 
approval by the remaining five compound heads. It would seem that 
the position of the chairman of committee is not that of the ordinary 
traditional chieftaincy, though the expressions ‘king-makers’, 'chief’ 
and sometimes ‘king’ were freely used by both sides to the case, in their 
pleadings as well as in evidence. It is also generally agreed that the 
head of the Bara compound, who was the father of  the fourth 
defendant, was the last chairman of the committee of  six and often 
went by the title of Onijagbo, but it is not agreed that the title was 
either traditional or borne by chairmen previous to the last holder of 
the post. The Onijagbo or Bara would, if properly appointed in 
accordance with the customary rules and procedure, normally carry a 
position of honour or dignity among the community o f  Ijagbo and 
was generally accepted and respected as such.
The defendants argued that since the plaintiffs and their witnesses 
said that there had never been an Onijagbo of Ijagbo, it is clear that the 
defendants had not committed any breach of the custom of which
91 (1973) 12 SC  1.
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the plaintiffs could complain and that, as there are 35 family heads in 
the village, the plaintiffs could not fight for a right belonging ex­
clusively to only one of  the six family heads. They further submitted 
that the position of  the president of Ijagbo village committee comes 
within the definition of ‘chief' under section 3 of the Interpretation 
Law, Cap 52, of the Laws of the Northern States and that under 
section 11 o f the Chiefs (Appointment and Deposition) Law, Cap 20, 
of the Laws of the Northern States, the jurisdiction of  the High Court 
is ousted. Their final submission was that, in accordance with section 
78(6) of the Constitution o f  the Northern States, the court has no 
jurisdiction to entertain a chieftaincy dispute.
The plaintiffs, on the other hand, argued that the fact that the six 
heads of compounds administer the village and even control it does 
not make them chiefs, neither does it make the Onijagbo of Ijagbo 
a chief. When the six heads of compound meet, they collectively 
control the whole community, but the chairman of the committee has 
no control over the whole community of the village. It has become 
traditional for the committee to act jointly, not individually. They 
pointed out that the fourth defendant did not claim that he was made 
the chairman of  the six heads of compounds or that he is even one of 
them. All that the evidence has established is that the Sole Adminis­
trator, as the Local Government Authority for Oyun Division, 
appointed him a tax collector, which is not the same thing as appointing 
someone a chief. They contended that the case is not a chieftaincy 
matter and that the court, therefore, had jurisdiction over it. The 
learned trial judge upheld the plaintiffs’ claims.
The Supreme Court held that there was no evidence before it to 
show that the president o f  the committee of the six compound heads 
was a chief in the accepted connotation of the term in law. or that he 
could even be regarded as a ‘head chief' in view of the definition of this 
expression in section 3 o f  the Interpretation Law, Cap 52, which 
defines a head chief as one who is not subordinate to another chief or 
native authority. The Court observed:
W e are o f  the view that the chairman or president o f  the com m ittee of the 
six heads o f  com pounds at Ijagbo cannot be a chief because he is no more 
than a titular head o f  a gerontocracy appointed by the remaining five from  
tim e to time and to whom  he is accountable for his actions. He would  
appear on ly  to be a primus inter pares who has no authority o f  any kind over 
the v illage com m unity o f  Ijagbo apart from the nebulous power and influence 
granted him if properly appointed by his remaining five colleagues. All the 
six m em bers o f  the gerontocracy have a collective responsibility towards 
their com m unity. The society is clearly republican in its political com plexion
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and has yet to evolve into a chiefship or indeed a kingdom. It is like what 
Ibadan was before the appointm ent o f  the first Olubadan —  congeries o f  
com pounds with family heads who meet together to administer the affairs o f  
their com m unity. The social contract theory, if one may apply it to the Ijagbo 
society, would make it appear to be at an inchoate stage, in that the other five 
members o f  the com m ittee have not yet agreed to surrender their sovereignty 
to an almighty ruler in return for protection and succour; or, if one subscribes 
to that view o f  the social contract theory which recognizes two stages in the 
process, the com m unity would seem to have achieved only a pactum  unionis, 
not yet a pactum  subjectionis. They may one day evolve to a position in which 
a formal supplication might be made to the Kwara State Governm ent for 
the recognition o f  their chairman as a chief in the traditional sense, but 
that stage does not appear to have been reached when this action was 
brought.
We may note in passing the fact that there have been some under­
standable differences of  approach between the European judges and 
their African colleagues in the interpretation and even the application 
of  customary law principles. This is most noticeable in the employment 
of the doctrine of  repugnancy to disallow certain obnoxious customs 
and practices, such as the killing o f  twins at birth or the determination 
of  the paternity of  a child born out of normal wedlock especially in 
connection with the practice o f  what anthropologists call the levirate. 
Nevertheless, we need not make too much of this ethnic phenomenon 
since it is on record that some Nigerian judges of  earlier days also 
made implausible findings of  customary law, as when it was once 
held that the married woman or even a widow under customary law 
was without any right or interest in her husband’s or deceased 
husband’s estate. W hat is important in this connection is to remember 
that the judicial attitude, where it became difficult to accept, was 
almost invariably due to lack of  training or experience in customary 
law as part of the general professional equipment for membership of 
the profession. In two ways, customary law has been coming gradually 
into its own: (a) by its introduction into the academic curriculum of 
our various Faculties of  Law in all the universities in Africa as well as 
in some universities abroad, and also its position in the professional 
training at our Law Schools; and (b) by the importance which our 
Superior Courts have attached, particularly in recent years, to the 
need for a clinical examination and analysis of existing authorities 
wherever it becomes necessary to apply these to new cases coming on 
appeal before them, with a view to ensuring that customary legal 
rules and norms are laid upon sound and secure foundations for 
the future.
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L E C T U R E  T H R EE
THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 
I
Nature and Types of Conflict
In this lecture, it is proposed to consider the judicial handling of 
four main types of conflict: (a) between English law and customary 
law, (b) between local statute law and customary law, (c) between 
customary law and customary law,' and (d) between Roman-Dutch 
law and customary law. Where the issues are not straightforward, 
the court is called upon to make the choice as best it can. As we have 
seen, the essential problem is one of choice of law and, where statute 
has defined the respective areas of application of English law and 
customary law and the issues are clear, there is little for the court to 
worry about. A noteworthy example of a conflict between English 
law and customary law occurs in Nelson v Nelson. There, the plaintiff’s 
father, by a death-bed disposition, called Samansew, left certain 
self-acquired property to his eldest son, the first defendant, to take 
charge of it on behalf of himself and all the deceased’s children. The 
Government later acquired a portion of the land and the eldest son 
used part of the compensation money to purchase the land in dispute, 
the conveyance having been taken in his own name and in English 
form. The eldest son thereafter sold the land to the third defendant 
who leased it to the second defendant. The remaining children brought 
an action against the second and third defendants for a declaration 
of title to the land and recovery of possession. It therefore became 
necessary to decide whether English law or customary law should 
apply to determine the rights of the parties. It was contended that the 
appellants were guilty of laches and acquiescence in having allowed 
the eldest son to take a conveyance in English form and that English 
law should apply since the parties were not exclusively Ghanaians. 
The Supreme Court of G hana  upheld these contentions. On appeal 
to the West African Court of Appeal it was held that customary law 
should apply in order to obviate a substantial miscarriage of  justice
1 In certain areas o f Africa, the expression “customary law’ includes Islamic law.
Native Courts Law (Cap 78 of the Laws of Northern Nigeria, 1963), S 2: also, S 2 
' the High Court Law of Northern Nigeria (Cap 49), 1963.
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since section 74 of the C ourts Ordinance (Cap 4) provided that “ native 
customary law shall be deemed applicable” not only in causes and 
matters where the parties are natives, but “also in causes and matters 
between natives and non-natives where it shall appear to the court 
that substantial injustice will be done to any party by a strict adherence 
to the rules of any law or laws other than native customary law” . 
The Court pointed out that the original death-bed disposition by the 
appellant’s father, which was recognized by customary law, manifested 
an intention that his children should have a joint but exclusive interest 
in the land, and that to apply English law to the transactions after 
the father’s death would defeat the objects of the testator and this, 
notwithstanding that the second and third defendants were non­
natives. The Court observed that whatever the form of conveyance 
to the first defendant, there could be no doubt that it was the intention 
and purpose of  the children that the property purchased to replace 
that acquired by the Government was to be held on the same terms as 
the properties originally disposed of by the testator, the appellant’s 
father.
It might sometimes happen that a situation could arise which is 
neither governed entirely by English law, nor entirely by customary 
law. In such a case, the problem must ideally be resolved by a resort 
to what the courts have called the residual clause, that is to say. by the 
application to the case of  the proviso that “ in cases where no express 
rule is applicable to any matter in issue, the court shall be guided by 
the principles of justice, equity and good conscience” . In Rubbern 
and Lembemba  v Lime Shikuloya Nswima,2 both the plaintiff and the 
defendant were Africans of the Bemba people in Northern Rhodesia, 
the plaintiff being the son-in-law of the defendant. Both plaintiff 
and defendant were resident in the town of Lusaka. It would appear 
that, in 1955, a year after the plaintiff had married the defendant’s 
daughter, he had left his previous employment as chef at the Lusaka 
Hotel in order to run a tea-room and store for the defendant in a 
suburb of Lusaka. The exact terms of the contractual arrangement 
between the parties were in dispute. The plaintiff claimed that it was 
a term of the agreement that he should work for the defendant for 
three years, after which the shop should belong to him. The defendant, 
for his part, maintained the plaintiff had merely entered his service 
in accordance with Bemba customary law which recognized a custom 
that a son-in-law should render free service to his father-in-law in a 
form of marriage by service. As the defendant refused to return the
: HCCC N o 449/57. Judgment delivered on March 1958.
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shop to the plaintiff after the three years, the latter claimed com­
pensation for the services that he had rendered. The question was 
whether any compensation was due to the plaintiff; and if so, accord­
ing to what principle should it be determined. In other words, what 
system of law — English, Bemba or o ther— should govern the 
contractual arrangement? There is the further question as to whether 
it was competent for the parties to enter into a contract otherwise 
than in accordance with their customary law. The learned trial judge 
observed that, in respect of the application of customary law, “ it was 
never honestly intended by either the plaintiff or the defendant that 
Bemba custom should apply to their relations with one another, qua 
the defendant's shop” . Accepting the evidence of two African expert 
witnesses, the judge came to the conclusion that the custom whereby a 
son-in-law rendered free service to his father-in-law was already 
dying out in the urban areas of Lusaka. The provision of section 17 
of the then N orthern Rhodesia High Court Ordinance was that 
customary law should be applied in “ civil cases” except that “ no 
party shall be entitled to claim the benefit of any native customary 
law if it shall appear ... that such party agreed or must be taken to 
have agreed that his obligations in connection with all such transac­
tions shall be regulated exclusively by some law or laws other than 
native customary laws” , and also that “ in cases where no express rule 
is applicable to any matter in issue, the Court shall be guided by the 
principles of justice, equity and good conscience” . The position, 
therefore, is that customary law is the primary law applicable to civil 
disputes between Africans, unless the parties have rejected it in favour 
of some other law. Where there is no such law clearly indicated, the 
judge falls back on the residual clause requiring him to be guided 
by the principles of justice, equity and good conscience. It would 
appear that the parties did not expressly agree, at the time o f entering 
into the arrangements, to be bound exclusively, by Bemba customary 
law. N or could English law be applied since the learned trial judge 
found that “ the terms o f  any contract (between the parties) were 
vague and ill-defined” .
Now, how was the residual proviso to be applied to enable the Court 
to decide the jssue according to the principles of justice, equity and 
good conscience? The learned trial judge would seem to have followed 
the precedents set in other jurisdictions, notably in the Sudan and 
British India and to a large extent in West Africa by importing the 
rules of English law, in this case the principle of quantum m eruit, thus 
awarding the plaintiff a reasonable renumeration or compensation for 
his services. The learned judge, it is respectfully submitted, might
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have reached the same result by frankly applying equitable prin­
ciples which are universal in all legal systems, and should not have 
referred expressly to a principle of  the English law of contract. It 
may be mentioned in parenthesis that the provisions of  section 17 
of the former Northern Rhodesia High Court Ordinance are almost 
identical with those o f  the G hana (Gold Coast) Ordinance 87(1) 
and with section 17 o f  the Nigerian Supreme Court Ordinance, 
1914.
Where the parties to a dispute before the court are Africans, the 
onus is on the defendant to establish that customary law should not 
be applied to the transaction, and that English law should apply. 
Thus in Ferguson v Duncan,3 the plaintiff lent some money to the 
defendant and received a receipt which read: “ Received from G F F 
of D the sum of £200 as loan.” A few years later, the plaintiff sent his 
mother, as was the custom, to demand the repayment of the debt; his 
solicitor thereafter recovered £20 and the defendant mortgaged his 
house for the balance and remained in possession, which was in 
accordance with English law of mortgage. When the plaintiff sub­
sequently sued for the balance, the trial judge held that the transaction 
was governed by English law and so was statute-barred. The plaintiff 
appealed, contending that the transaction was governed by customary 
law. The respondent argued that customary law could not apply 
because there was no evidence of customary ceremonies in respect of 
the loan and also because the subsequent English mortgage of the house 
showed that English law should apply. The West African Court of 
Appeal held that the evidence did not establish that the transaction 
was to be exclusively regulated by English law and that the subsequent 
mortgage in English form was an afterthought and formed no part 
of the original transaction. The Court emphasized that the onus was 
on the defendant to satisfy it that customary law should not be applied 
to the parties in the case, and that the defendant had failed to estab­
lish this. The case was distinguished from Koney v Union Trading 
Co L td ,4 where the transaction was between an African and a Euro­
pean firm and it was clear that English law must apply to govern 
the relation between the parties, and the action was held to be 
statute-barred.
In cases where there is a conflict between one body of customary 
law and another, the court may sometimes be tempted to apply the  
rules of English Private International Law in order to determine the
3 1953 14 W ACA 316.
*(1947) 2 W ACA 189.
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applicable law. Thus in Ghamson and ors v Woovill,5 the defendant 
claimed possession of a house in Winnebah on the ground that it had 
been sold to him by deed by two persons who traced their title through 
their mother's mother by inheritance. This was disputed by the then 
head of the matrilineal family of the plaintiff’s grandmother claiming 
that, in accordance with the Fanti customary law, he became entitled 
to the house as the successor to the plaintiff’s deceased grandmother. 
There was evidence in support of this contention which was in ac­
cordance with Efutu law that prevailed in Winnebah to the exclusion 
of Fanti law. The question which the learned trial judge had to decide 
was whether succession to the grandm other’s estate should be 
governed by Efutu law, in which case the plaintiff’s claim would 
succeed, or by Fanti law according to which the head of the matrilineal 
family would succeed, since Fanti law was the law of the place of 
origin of the deceased grandmother. The learned trial judge applied 
the English rule of Private International Law that the lex situs was the 
appropriate law to govern succession to immovables. He therefore 
applied Efutu law and granted possession of the house to the defendant. 
On appeal, the West African Court of Appeal held6
(a) that since there was express local legislation governing the matter, 
namely section 15 o f the Native Courts (Colony) Ordinance 1944 and 
s. 74 o f  the Courts Ordinance, Cap. 4, the trial judge's application o f  the 
English rules o f  Private International Law, even by way o f analogy, was 
mistaken;
(b) that section 15 o f  the Native Courts (Colony) Ordinance 1944 did not 
oblige a native Court to administer only the customary law prevailing 
in its area o f jurisdiction, but permitted the court to administer “any law 
binding between the parties” ; and
(c) that in the instant case, the law binding between the parties, one o f  whom  
was a Fanti and one an Efutu, was Fanti Law, and this was because the 
title o f  the defendant depended on the prior title o f  the grandchildren  
o f  the deceased grandmother who were alleged to be entitled to succession  
in accordance with Fanti law.
II
Conflict Under Statutory Marriages
Somewhat more difficult problems arise in the field of conflict of laws
5 (1947) 12 W ACA 181.
"Per M'Carthy, J.
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where there was marriage under statute law in English form and the 
husband later died intestate. Two related questions then fall to be 
considered. The first is to determine who are entitled to inherit on 
the intestacy, and this raises the further question: Which law is to 
apply to govern the distribution of the estate? Let us look at the 
well-known case of  Ekem  v Nerba ,7 which relates to intestate succession 
to land situated at Cape Coast. A Nigerian who had long been resident 
in Cape Coast, while retaining his Nigerian domicile, married two 
Fanti women by the first o f  whom he had a daughter called Ekem, 
the plaintiff in the case. Nerba, the defendant in the case, was the 
second wife. The question was to determine which of them should 
inherit the intestate estate o f  the propositus. It was held by the local 
court that the lex situs, i.e. Fante law, applied to exclude Ekem from 
the succession. When the matter came before the West African Court 
of Appeal, this judgment was set aside, and the case was remitted to 
the local court with directions to take evidence as to what interest, 
if any, the plaintiff should have in her late father’s property in the light 
o f  whatever law was found to be appropriate. While one must regret 
that the WACA did not specify the law that should be applied by the 
lower court, the original judgment could not reasonably have been 
upheld since it would have had the effect of disinheriting the only child 
of the deceased intestate.
Where the application of  the appropriate customary law would work 
hardship in a particular case, the Court would disregard it in whole 
or in part in the interest of natural justice, equity and good conscience. 
Thus in Re W hyte,8 a Fante  died in Nigeria domiciled in Ghana, 
leaving a widow, an infant daughter and a sister who lived in Ghana. 
Under the Fante customary law, succession is matrilineal and a widow 
accordingly had no share in the estate of her deceased husband. The 
sister came to Nigeria to claim the entire estate of her deceased brother 
as she was entitled to do under Fante customary law, and offered to 
educate her niece in G hana out of the estate. Since to grant this lawful 
request would mean that the infant daughter would have to be sepa­
rated from her Nigerian mother to live in Ghana, the Administrator- 
General proposed to the C ourt that he be empowered to give two-thirds 
of the estate to the sister and the remaining one-third to the daughter; 
he also proposed that letters of  administration be granted to the widow 
as the daughter’s legal guardian. The CourfaCcepted this scheme of 
distribution in place of the full application of the Fante customary law:
7 (1947) 12 W ACA 258.
8 (1936) 18 NLR 70.
T H E  JU D IC IA L  PR O C ESS IN  C O M M O N W E A L T H  A FR IC A
64
The locus classicus on this whole subject is, however, Cole v Cole.9 
There, one John William Cole was a native of Lagos where he was 
also domiciled. In 1864, he left Lagos for Sierra Leone where in the 
same year he married M ary J Cole, the defendant. Soon thereafter he 
returned to Lagos where in 1866, the second defendant Alfred Cole 
was born. In 1897, John William Cole died in Lagos, leaving him 
surviving his wife. Mary J Cole, and his son Alfred Cole. His brother, 
the plaintiff A B  Cole, brought an action in 1898. claiming to be 
declared customary heir o f  the deceased J W Cole and trustee for 
Alfred Cole, the lunatic son. The learned trial judge granted the 
declaration sought by the plaintiff, holding that he was the customary 
heir of his deceased brother since they were born of the same father. 
Rayner, C J, held that in accordance with section 19 of the Supreme 
Court Ordinance customary law should govern the intestate estate of 
J W Cole. In the full Court, however, the decision was that customary 
law could not apply and that the English law of succession must apply. 
Griffith. J, gave the following reason for the decision:
Christian marriage im poses on the husband duties and obligations not 
recognised by native law. The wife throws in her lot with her husband, she 
enters his family; her property becom es his. (These parties were married in 
1863 and at any rate till 1876 were under the English law). In fact a Christian 
marriage clothes the parties to such marriage and their offspring with a status 
unknown to native law.
In such circumstances, can it be contended that the question of 
inheritance to the deceased in the present case should be decided in 
accordance with the principles of native law and custom? I think not. 
Such a contention would be contrary to the “ principles of justice, 
equity and good conscience” . “ Were such a contention to hold good, 
then an educated native Lagos gentleman — may be a doctor, or a 
barrister, or a clergyman, or a bishop (for there are all such) — marrying 
an educated native lady out of the colony and coming to reside per­
manently in Lagos would have his estate subject to native law in case 
he died intestate, his widow being required by a strict undiluted native 
law to act as wife to her brother-in-law in order to obtain support.” 
Having ruled out the application of the customary law of inheritance 
to the instant case, the court then went on to exclude the Statute of 
Distributions since in its view that statute only applies to marriages 
solemnized within the Colony of Lagos. It held that the common law
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of England in 1874 was the same as the law in England in 1863 when 
the marriage was contracted and that, according to English law, the 
eldest son was the heir, no matter whether he was a lunatic or not. 
Accordingly, Alfred Cole was declared the heir o f  the deceased, and 
the widow's right to dower and to one-third of her husband’s personalty 
was granted. Thus was consecrated the anomaly that whenever a 
deceased who in his life time had been married in accordance with the 
forms of English marriage dies intestate, English law must apply to 
govern succession to his estate, and that this English law would be 
the Statute of Distribution 1670-1685 if the marriage took place within 
the Colony but it will be the English common law of succession 
involving declaration of an heir and the widow’s right to dower if 
the marriage took place outside the Colony of Lagos.
That the decision itself was based upon a misconception has ever 
since been shown by subsequent decisions modifying and clarifying 
the issues involved. Thus in Asiata  v Gonca/lo, 10 the parties were 
Moslems, who had been sold into slavery in Brazil, got married 
according to the rights of  the local church and lived there for some 
years. Both husband and wife later returned to Lagos where, in the 
course of years, the husband took another woman to wife under 
customary law, by whom he had some other children in addition to 
those of  the first wife by church marriage. The Supreme Court held 
that the mere fact o f  church marriage was not conclusive evidence that 
the parties intended that their lives should be governed by English law. 
The Court was of the view that one must look at the true intention of  the 
parties when in a strange land, they merely conformed to the only 
form of marriage in vogue in their place of  residence at that time. 
It was clear from their subsequent mode of life that they really led 
the life of  traditional Africans. Accordingly, the Court held that 
intestate estate of the deceased husband must be governed by customary 
law which permitted all the children of both marriages to share in the 
inheritance. The matter was carried a stage further in Alake  v P ratt,11 
where it was held that, since all legitimate children are entitled to share 
in their father’s estate .under Yoruba customary law, children who. 
though born out of wedlock, are nevertheless legitimate by that law. 
are entitled to share equally with those who are the issue of  a statutory 
marriage. The WACA took into account the doctrine of acknowledge­
ment of paternity according to which children born out o f  wedlock, 
if recognized and treated by a deceased intestate as if he were their
10(1900) 1 NLR 41.
"  (1955) 15 W ACA 20.
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father, are put in a position of equality with those born in wedlock, 
since customary law does not recognize degrees of  legitimacy. It is 
significant that no reference was made to Cole v Cole in this case. 
The Court simply chose to follow the dictates of equity and good 
conscience in this particular case.12
In the well-known case of Bamgbose v Daniel and others,13 first 
decided by the WACA and later taken to the Privy Council on appeal, 
a Nigerian died intestate in Lagos, survived by twelve children and 
a nephew. The intestate estate was valued at £100,000. The twelve 
children were the offspring o f  polygamous marriages contracted by 
the deceased under Yoruba customary law. The deceased’s parents 
who were the grandparents of  both the nephew and the twelve children, 
had contracted a marriage under the Marriage Act of 1864 according 
to section 4 of which the English law of intestate succession should, 
notwithstanding any local law or custom to the contrary, govern the 
devolution of the estate not only o f  those married under the Act. but 
also of their issue. In view of this provision, the nephew contended 
that, in accordance with the decision in Cole v Cole, the Statute of 
Distribution, 1670, as the relevant English Law applied to exclude the 
twelve children as illegitimate descendants and that he alone was by 
English law the nearest legitimate kinsman of  the deceased intestate. 
Their Lordships of the Privy Council, in approving the earlier decision 
of WACA. held as follows: (a) that, for purposes of succession under 
the Statute o f  Distribution 1670, the legitimacy of persons claiming 
on an intestacy must be decided upon the basis o f  the law of their 
domicile; (b) that the law of Nigeria, as the law of the children's 
domicile, permitted the deceased to contract the polygamous marriages 
by which the children were born legitimate under the relevant cus­
tomary law; (c) that the Statute of Distribution 1670 and the decision 
in Cole v Cole cannot be limited in its local application to children 
who are the issue of m onogamous unions; and (d) that the twelve 
children of the deceased (Daniel) were entitled to inherit their 
father’s estate to the exclusion of their cousin, the appellant in 
the case.
That the principle involved in this case is o f  considerable relevance 
to other African countries is borne out by the decision, first o f  the
12 Inheritance upon the death intestate o f a deceased who was the issue o f a marriage 
under the Marriage Act is to be determined not by customary law but by English law 
which requires that the status o f those claiming under the estate depends upon the 
law of their parents’ domicile at the time of their own birth; in this case the customary 
law children born under a customary law marriage are legitimate and so would be 
entitled to take; Re Williams (1941) 7 W ACA 156.
1 ' (1952) 14 W ACA (1955) AC 107.
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Ghana Court of Appeal and then of the Privy Council in Coleman v 
Shang . 14 The facts may be summarized as follows: S' married A by 
customary law and had three children by her, before she either died 
or was divorced in accordance with customary law. S thereafter 
married W  under the Marriage Ordinance and had five children by her, 
o f  whom only one survived. W  died in 1940. During the lifetime of 
W, however, S lived and cohabited with the appellant by whom he had 
ten children. After W ’s death in 1940, S married the appellant in 
accordance with customary law. S later died intestate. W ’s only 
surviving child, the respondent in this appeal, applied for letters of 
administration, claiming to be solely entitled to S ’s estate as the only 
surviving lawful issue of the Ordinance marriage. The appellant, the 
third wife, resisted the application on the ground that respondent was 
not the only lawful child of  the deceased, since there were all these 
other children, and that she was a lawful widow of the deceased. 
She also claimed to be acting for herself and the deceased’s family. 
Succession to the deceased’s estate was governed by section 48 of the 
Marriage Ordinance 1949 (Cap 147) 1959 Edition. The lower court 
gave judgment for the child of the Ordinance Marriage holding that 
the appellant was excluded from the succession as being merely a 
widow by a customary law marriage and thereby not entitled to succeed 
under the Statute of Distribution. The G hana Court of Appeal, 
however, laid down the following definitive principles: (a) a person 
subject to customary law who marries under the Marriage Ordinance 
does not cease to be a native subject to* customary law by reason only 
of  contracting that marriage; the customary law will be applied to him 
in all matters, except those specifically excluded by the statute and 
other matters which are necessary consequences of the marriage under 
the Ordinance Courts Ordinance Cap 4 S 87(1); (b) a person subject 
to customary law cannot contract a valid marriage under the Ordinance 
while the customary law subsists,15 nor can he contract a valid marriage 
under customary law during the continuance of an Ordinance marriage 
(Marriage Ordinance, S 44); consequently, he cannot, during the 
continuance of his marriage under the Ordinance have a legitimate 
child except by his wife of  the said marriage (Marriage Ordinance, 
S 49); (c) the words “ leaving a widow or husband or any issue o f  such
“*(1961) AC 481; (1961) 2 AER 406.
15 Eg in Osamwonya v Osamwonyi (1972) 10 SC 1, where a husband petitioned for 
divorce from his wife married under the Nigerian Marriage Act on the ground that 
before the said marriage the respondent was already married to another man under 
customary law and that that marriage was subsisting; the petition was dismissed because 
he failed to prove that there was the prior customary marriage.
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marriage” in S 48(1) o f  the Marriage Ordinance merely indicate the 
condition precedent upon which English law will be applied to the 
estate of an intestate who married under the Ordinance; they do not 
limit the class of those entitled to a share in his estate; (d) in the 
application of the Statute of Distribution, which governs the distribu­
tion of two-thirds o f  the estate under S 48 of the Marriage Ordinance, 
“wife” and “ child” mean lawful wife and lawful child by the law of 
the domicile, and not by the law of England — Bamgbose v Daniel was 
cited with approval among other cases; (e) if a man who is married 
under customary law intends to marry again under the Ordinance, 
he must either marry the same person to whom he is already validly 
married according to customary law, or if he intends to marry a person 
other than such a wife, then he must first determine the customary 
marriage lawfully; any marriage which a man purports to contract by 
customary law, while the marriage under the Ordinance still subsists, 
is null and void and any children of that relation are illegitimate; 
(f) accordingly, the three children of the deceased by his first wife were 
legitimate and entitled equally with the surving child of  the Ordinance 
marriage; the ten children by the appellant during W's lifetime were 
illegitimate by the Marriage Ordinance; the marriage between the 
deceased and the appellant was valid and she was entitled to a share 
in her deceased husband’s estate in accordance with the Statute of 
Distribution; and (g) letters of administration should be granted to 
the appellant (who was illiterate) and the respondent (the child of the 
Ordinance Marriage) jointly on behalf of those who were entitled. 
The Privy Council accordingly upheld the decision of  the G hana Court 
of Appeal by which a joint grant of letters was made to the appellant 
and the respondent.
Similar consideration to those we have been discussing arose in 
Molungoa Khatala v Francina Khatala. 16 In that case, the deceased 
Bk married M  in 1914 both by Basuto and Christian rites. The 
appellant was their eldest son. M  died and, in 1955, Bk married FBk. 
again both by Basuto and Christian rites. Bk died shortly after this 
second marriage, leaving £300 credit in the Post Office Savings Bank 
and certain livestock. The appellant, as the deceased’s eldest son, 
claimed to be his heir under Basuto law and was given judgment in 
the Basuto Court of first instance. On appeal FBk successfully claimed 
under Basuto law that, as the deceased’s widow, she had a better right 
than the appellant. A further appeal to the Central Appeal Court was 
allowed and the original judgment restored. On a further appeal to
Basutoland Civil Appeal N o 1 of 1964. Judgment delivered on August 23, 1964.
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the court o f  the Judicial Commissioner, the original judgment was 
restored. A further appeal to the High Court was dismissed. Before 
the Central Appeal Court, the respondent agreed that there was 
community of property under the general law (that is Roman-Dutch 
law) between the deceased and herself by virtue of the marriage by 
Christian rites and that the appellant was not entitled under Basuto 
law to more than one-half o f  the joint estate held by the deceased and 
herself. Alternatively, she claimed that as widow of the deceased, she 
was entitled to retain the bank book because, under Basuto law, a 
“ widow has charge o f  all her deceased husband’s property during her 
lifetime". It was held (a) that the Marriage Proclamation does not lay 
down the legal effect of registering under the Proclamation, a marriage 
under Basuto law; (b) that by S 12 of the Proclamation No 26 of 1884 
“ Native law may be administered in suits to which all the parties are 
Africans" and that this was the reason that provision so provides; 
(c) the Proclamation supported this finding, since where Basutos living 
according to Basuto customs “ marry according to Basuto rites as 
well as according to Christian rites, their proprietary relations during 
their joint lives and their intestate succession rights after the death 
of one of them are governed by Basuto law"; and (d) that the res­
pondent as widow had a right to be maintained in accordance with 
Basuto law, but that she should deliver the Post Office Bank book 
to the appellant.
A case from the Gam bia which raised more or less the same issues 
o f  conflict o f  laws as Bamgbose v Daniel and Sluing v Coleman is 
Samba Bah and Another v M ary Taylor and others. 1 The question 
which fell for determination was whether only children who would be 
recognized as legitimate children under English law can take upon an 
intestacy occurring under the English Statute o f  Distribution, or 
whether an extended meaning should be given to the term ‘children’ so 
that children who might be illegitimate by English law were legitimate 
by the law of their parents’ domicile when they were born. What 
happened in this case was that one Mary Taylor claimed against the 
appellants, a father and daughter, who lived in part o f  the premises 
in dispute, a declaration of  title in the Gambian Supreme Court in 
Barthurst, which was within the Colony area. Other plaintiffs soon 
joined Mary Taylor claiming that they were entitled as collateral 
relatives of  the previous owner of  the land, one John Cessay, who 
died in 1943, under English law The defendants had counter-claimed 
on the ground of long possession. The plaintiffs were, however, granted
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a declaration by right o f  inheritance. The defendants appealed to the 
West African Court of Appeal on the grounds that they had a good 
title by adverse possession and that the respondents, (the plaintiffs in 
the lower court) were, being illegitimate, not entitled to succeed under 
English law. Under section 15 of the Intestate Estates Ordinance, 
Cap 33. the real estate o f  a deceased intestate “ shall be distributable 
in like manner as personal estate is now distributable and amongst and 
to the same persons” . This brings the succession under the Statute 
of Distribution 1670 as amended by the Administration of  Estates Acts, 
1685; so that the widow Marian Cessay was entitled to one-half of 
the property, while the other half was, in the absence of any living 
descendants, distributable amongst the collaterals and their descen­
dants. Since they were illegitimate by English law, they were held not 
entitled to succeed. It is very strange that both Bamgbose v Daniel 
(supra) and Shang v Coleman in which the relevant customary law of 
the domicile had in similar circumstances been applied by the West 
African Court o f  Appeal and the Ghana Court of Appeal respectively 
and finally confirmed by the Privy Council in both cases, were not 
mentioned in the decision o f  the Gambian Supreme Court. It would 
seem that the deceased intestate was a W olof and that the Wolof 
recognize descent through both the male and the female lines, al­
though in practice their law o f  inheritance might be modified by 
Islamic principles, thus enabling the respondents to qualify as the 
closest relatives of the deceased to succeed to his property on 
intestacy.
I l l
Conflict Between English Law and Customary Law
Consideration of the possibility of the application of Islamic law in 
the Gambian case just described leads us to examine the position where 
there is a conflict of laws between English or local statute law and a 
body of customary law, which for our purpose, includes Islamic law. 
An interesting illustration of this occurs in Kliarie Zaidan v Fatima 
Khali! M ohssen.18 The parties to the case are Lebanese Moslems, the 
deceased husband having died domiciled in Lebanon and intestate. 
He was survived by the defendant wife, also domiciled in Lebanon 
and by the plaintiff who is his aged mother who had given a power of 
attorney to a brother of the deceased. Both the wife and this brother
18 (1973) 1 1 SC l.
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had also been resident in Warri in the Mid-Western State o f  Nigeria, 
but the mother of the deceased and other surviving relatives had never 
been to Nigeria. Both parties admitted that the defendant wife and 
the deceased were lawfully married in accordance with Moslem law. 
The main question was to determine the law to be applied to the 
intestate succession to the immovable property of the deceased. The 
learned trial judge in the Warri High Court held that the applicable 
law was the Moslem law of Lebanon and not the Administration of 
Estates Law, Cap 19, o f  the Laws of Western Nigeria, 1959, which is 
applicable in the Mid-Western State of Nigeria. For the deceased 
brother, it was argued that the applicable law is either English law 
or customary law. By English law was meant, of course, the Adminis­
tration of Estates Law; on the other hand, customary law could not 
apply on the alleged ground that Moslems, like the parties in this case, 
are not subject to the jurisdiction of any customary law. It was finally 
submitted that the lex situs should govern the devolution of the intestate 
estate, in support of which contention Coleman v Sluing, 14 and King v 
Elliot,20 were cited on behalf o f  the wife; however, it was submitted 
that the local administration of Estates Law could not apply to the 
deceased’s estate because (a) the terms of that law are not-really 
applicable to a potentially polygamous form of marriage like the one 
involved in the instant case; and (b) because, on a true construction of 
that law. anyone subject to Moslem law is excluded from its operation. 
It was further argued that Moslem law is one of the systems of law, 
like Roman Law and Rom an-Dutch Law, which have no territorial 
boundaries in the sense that they are not confined to one country, 
and that the High Court Law of the Mid-Western State provides that 
the Court may apply an “ appropriate customary law” as defined in 
section 20 of the Customary Courts Law, Cap 31, of Western Nigeria 
1959. Where there is a conflict between two systems of customary law. 
the rules to be applied are set out in section 20 of that Law which 
provides that, in land matters, the appropriate customary law shall 
be the customary law of the place where the land is situated and that, in 
causes and matters arising from inheritance, the appropriate customary 
law is the customary law applying to the deceased. On appeal to the 
Supreme Court of Nigeria, it was held that the lex situs governs the 
immovable property of a deceased intestate, and the lex situs means 
“ the law of Nigeria which embraces customary law including the 
conflict rules between two systems of customary law as laid down in
iy (1961)2  A.
20 (1971) 1 Ghana LR 54. 57.
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section 20 of the Customary Courts Law which is a summary of the 
various previously existing decisions on internal conflicts of laws” .21 
The Supreme Court, in holding that the lex situs is the customary law 
of the deceased which is Moslem law in this particular case, ruled as 
follows:
It follow s therefore that having regard to our own built-in rules in section 20 
of the Customary Courts Law governing the choice o f  law in the application o f  
the lex situs to the intestate succession o f  a deceased person in Warri, the 
applicable law is not that o f  the Administration o f  Estate Law (Cap 1), but the 
(M oslem ) customary law o f Lebanon, which is the one binding between the 
parties (section 20(3)(a)(i) o f  the Customary Courts Law). We are o f the view  
that, in this context, customary law is any system o f  law not being the com m on  
law and not being a law enacted by any competent legislature in Nigeria but 
which is enforceable and binding within Nigeria as between the parties subject 
to its sway.
A case in which the application o f  Islamic law as a form ofcustomary 
law arose for determination is Timothy Adesubokan v Yunusa.22 The 
plaintiff son o f  the deceased claimed against the defendant, sole execu­
tor of  the will, a declaration that the probate granted to the defendant 
in respect o f  the estate of the deceased be revoked, as the deceased was 
a Moslem, died as a Moslem, and left heirs and wives who were 
Moslems. The testator in the will made some bequests to one of his 
sons and devised his properties to two others. The learned trial judge 
felt that the distribution to his sons should be under Maliki law which 
favours equal shares. The learned trial judge in the High Court of the 
North-Central State of Nigeria held (a) that a Moslem of the Northern 
States of Nigeria, though entitled to make a will under the Wills Act. 
1837, has no right to deprive by that will any of his heirs, who are 
entitled to share his estate under the Moslem law, of any o f  their 
respective shares; (b) that, in the case of a will of movable property, 
the testator must comply with his personal law, that is, the customary 
law of his particular locality unless such customary law is repugnant 
to natural justice, equity and good conscience or is incompatible with 
any law for the time being in force which does not deprive any person 
of the benefit of the personal law of the testator; and (c) that, where
Within the context o f the High Court law all persons in Nigeria, whether Nigerians 
or foreigners, are subject to the jurisdiction of every High Court in Nigeria. This point 
was confirmed in Mary Ekem  v Egha Nerba (1947) 12 W ACA 258, pp 259-60 , an appeal 
t roni Ghana to the West African Court o f Appeal on the analogous provision o f section 
15 of the Native Courts Colony Ordinance o f the then Gold Coast.
22 (1971 ) SC 25/70.
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the testator is a “ native” within the meaning of the Land Tenure Law 
and the will concerns immovable property situated in the Northern 
States of Nigeria, the testator must comply with the customary law of 
succession of  the place where the land is situated. He accordingly 
proceeded to set aside the probate of  the will. On appeal to the Supreme 
Court it was held that the Wills Act of 1837 is a statute of general 
application which applies to the Northern States of Nigeria and that 
the definition of “ native law and custom” in both section 2 of  the 
Native Courts Law (Cap 78) of the Laws of Northern Nigeria (Cap 49) 
includes Moslem law. The learned trial judge had construed the words 
“ and nothing in this law shall deprive any person of the benefit of any 
such native law and custom ” to mean that in this case the Wills Act 
shall not deprive the plaintiff o f  the benefit o f  Moslem law. The 
Supreme Court held that these words mean only that nothing in the 
High Court law shall deprive any person of the benefit of any customary 
law, including Moslem law, which is not incompatible directly or by 
implication with any law for the time being in force, in the present 
case the Wills Act, 1837. The learned trial judge took a view of the 
law which violates the provisions of the Wills Act, 1837 under which 
a testator can dispose of  his property real or personal — as he pleases. 
The provision of  the Maliki law which he invoked is undoubtedly 
incompatible with section 3 of  the Wills Act, 1837. The judgment of 
the lower court was accordingly set aside and the probate of the will 
granted to the defendant. The principle of  the case just considered 
was recently applied by the Gambia Court of Appeal in the case of 
Teresa Saidy v Sa ika .2i One Fordie Saidie lived in London at the 
time he made the will in 1970. His signature was identified by his wife 
who was the appellant in the case. The will was duly attested and three 
persons including the appellant were made executors and trustees of 
the will. Since the deceased and the appellant were living together in 
a house in Banjul at the time of his death, the house constituted the 
matrimonial house which the deceased bequeathed to her. Succession 
to the sum of £6,000, being personalty, would be governed by the 
lex domicili at the time of  his death. He also made a bequest of the 
remainder of  his estate to trustees on trust to sell and convert the sale 
into money which should be applied to the payment of debts, estate 
duty and other expenses for twenty-one years from the date o f  his 
death and thereafter to apply the residue as a trust fund “ for the benefit 
o f  such poor of  the people of  Gambia and Kolibantang, West Africa, 
as they shall in their absolute discretion think fit” . The deceased was
2 3 Civil Appeal No 4/73 delivered on May 7, 1973.
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born at Bain, in the Gambia, in December 1911. His father was also 
born at the same place. The deceased had been married to one Gwen 
Mary Ali, whom he had divorced in 1952. He had applied and been 
registered in 1967 as a citizen o f  the United Kingdom and Colonies. 
As a result of the registration he had been issued a British passport in 
which his personal status was shown as that of a British subject. Teresa 
Saidie, the appellant and a Christian, was married to the deceased in 
1969, although she had lived with him as his mistress since 1949. She 
first came with him to the Gambia in 1957. The deceased and the 
appellant were married in England and, throughout the proceedings 
it was assumed that the marriage was monogamous. Siaka Saidie 
claimed to be a younger brother of the deceased born o f  the same 
parents. He said that he had not seen his brother for about eighteen 
years prior to his death. He himself was living in Freetown all that 
time; but, at the time he gave evidence in the case, he described himself 
as the watchman of the house of his brother as he was out o f  a job. 
On the basis o f  the evidence adduced, it would appear that, although 
the deceased may have been born at Bain in the Gambia, his father 
was from Kolibantang in Senegal. The younger brother sought a 
grant to himself of letters of  administration in respect of the estate 
of the deceased on the ground that he and his deceased brother were 
Moslems; and also that he should have the bigger share in the estate 
since the surviving wife was a Christian who should not administer 
the estate of  a Moslem, although she would be entitled to one-third 
of the estate. In effect, his claim was in the nature of a declaration that 
the will was invalid to the extent of two-thirds of the estate of Fordie 
Saidie. The two main issues were: (a) was Fordie Saidie a Gambian 
citizen subject to Moslem law, and (b) is the will made in 1970 invalid 
to the extent of two-thirds of the estate of Fordie Saidie? It was 
submitted before the G am bia Court of Appeal that the Wills Act 
1837 is the law which governs the distribution of the estate of the 
deceased and that there was no restriction on the power of testation 
conferred by the Act; and that in the Gambia, Moslem law is part 
of customary law, so that, on the authority of the Adesubokan Case, 
when customary law is incompatible with the Wills Act, such customary 
law is void. The Court below had, however, based its decision on the 
Adesubokan Case as decided by the North-Central State High C ourt,24 
not knowing that that judgm ent had been later reversed on appeal to 
the Supreme Court of Nigeria, as we have just seen above. In the 
result, the Gambia Court o f  Appeal held that, in the Gambia, as in
Reported in Journal o f  African Law , vol XIV, no 1, 1970, pp 56-64 .
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Nigeria, Moslem law is part o f  customary law and the Wills Act, 1837 
is a statute of general application. It was, therefore, held that the will 
he made was valid and the younger brother’s claim accordingly failed.
Thus far we have been discussing cases of  conflict of laws between 
English or local statute law and customary law, including in this term 
Islamic law where applicable. We have seen that the power of testation 
given under the Wills Act, 1837 is irrespective of the religious belief 
of the maker of the will, so long as the exercise of  such power is not 
inconsistent with the principles of natural justice, equity and good 
conscience or incompatible with an existing local enactment relating 
to the subject. A case in which the testamentary power is expressly 
restricted by local statute is Thompson Oke & anor v Robinson Oke 
and anor 25 A testator who was a retired police officer, aged about 
96 years, died in 1960 having devised by will a property in Warri to 
one of his sons who was the first defendant in the present case, while 
the second defendant was one of the executors of the will. The plain­
tiffs were the eldest son and daughter of the testator whose mother, 
being a member of the land-owning family, permitted her husband, 
who was a stranger to the locality, to build a house and some adjoining 
apartments on the land in question. The deceased lived there with 
the plaintiffs' mother till his death, after which it was found that he 
had made a will leaving the property to one of the younger sons by 
another woman. The question then arose as to whether the testator, 
who was an Urhobo man, could devise the house by will to the 
defendant who was the testa tor’s son by another man, or whether the 
Itsekiri customary law should govern the succession, so that the eldest 
son of the testator should alone inherit the house in which the testator 
had lived and died. The defendant contended that the Wills Law gave 
the testator testamentary capacity to devise the house to him as the 
deceased did and that the transaction was governed by English law. 
The Supreme Court of Nigeria held (a) that customary law, and not 
English law or the local Wills Law, should govern the succession to 
the estate o f  the deceased testator; (b) that, accordingly, the plaintiff/ 
appellant was entitled to the house as the eldest son of the testator 
under the Itsekiri customary law; (c) that section 3 of  the Wills Law 
makes the testamentary capacity of a testator subject to any relevant 
custormay law and, in any case, deals only with the devise of a “ real 
estate” , an interest unknown to customary law; and (d) that neither 
the plaintiff’s mother could make an absolute gift of her portion of 
family land to her husband testator, nor could the latter alienate
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whatever interest he might have in the house to anyone other than 
his first son.
In the Botswana case of Fraenkel and anor v Sechele,26-a somewhat 
unsatisfactory solution would seem to have been applied by the 
Basutoland, Bechuanaland Protectorate and Swaziland Court of 
Appeal. An African married under the Marriage Proclamation, 
bequeathed his estate to his wife by will, to which he later added a 
codicil providing for certain legacies in favour of  another woman with 
whom he had lived for some years before his death. The will appointed 
the first appellant as executor. In the High Court, the wife (who was 
the respondent in this case), brought an action to set aside the will 
and the codiciliary legacies on the ground that the provisions of  both 
documents were contrary to Tswana customary law which should 
govern the devolution of the deceased’s estate. The High Court upheld 
the validity of the will “ to the extent that the said deceased had testa­
mentary capacity” , but invalidated the legacies and directed that the 
will be administered in terms of the customary law. The Court reached 
this decision after taking evidence of Tswana customary law relating 
to wills. The curious result was to uphold the substantive provisions 
of the Tswana customary law and to apply them within the framework 
of a will executed according to the general law of Botswana, that is, 
the Roman-Dutch Law. In effect, the judgment assumed that the two 
systems of law could be reconciled in regard to a particular transaction, 
and that any possible conflict between them need not necessarily be 
resolved by reference to one of  them only. This hybrid approach did 
not, however, find favour with the Court of Appeal. It preferred to 
concern itself merely with the interpretation of conflicting or obscure 
statutory provisions relating to the application of the customary law 
of marriage and succession in general and of wills in particular. It 
considered that the evidence of  customary law relied on by the lower 
court had been wrongly admitted. The Court of Appeal inferred that 
the intention of the legislature was to-permit “ an African to escape 
the restrictions of  tribal law by making a will in terms o f  the Wills 
Act” , and seemed to regard the general Roman-Dutch law and the 
customary law as mutually exclusive. It, therefore, allowed the appeal 
and upheld the validity of  the will. The customary law o f  succession 
was disregarded in favour of the provisions of the general law of 
Botswana, that is, the Rom an-Dutch law, which decrees an unlimited 
freedom of testamentary capacity. Thus was bypassed the important 
question as to the nature of the rights of the deceased testator in some
'Delivered in Lobatsi, July 7 -9 , 1964. See (1967) JAL, pp 51-52.
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of the property which he had purported to devise by his will— a 
question that was explicitly dealt with in the Thompson Case just 
considered in connection with Nigerian law. The Botswana Court of 
Appeal in the instant case chose to leave it to the executor to determine 
whether “ in fact the deceased had such personal rights in the property 
mentioned in the codicil as to entitle him effectively to dispose o f  the 
same” . It is strange that the Court decided to abdicate its function 
in this matter in this way. In the first place, it should not have con­
fined its observation to the property mentioned in the codicil, but 
should rather have included the property devised by the will itself. In 
the second place, the Court should have been explicit as to whether the 
Tswana customary law should be applied in the determination o f  the 
nature of the deceased's rights in the properties in question. These 
two comments have been made in respect of the C ourt’s ruling that 
the executor should settle the matter. The proper course open to the 
Court was to have come to its own definitive conclusions on both 
questions, as did the Nigerian Supreme Court in the analogous 
situation already discussed.
It is fair to observe that the attitude of the Botswana Court of 
Appeal in this case by applying the Roman-Dutch law as the applicable 
law is reminiscent of the similar attitude that non-African judges 
adopted by applying English law in West Africa in situations of 
conflicts between that law and African customary law. When more 
and more of  the judges would be Africans, there might be less and less 
disposition on the part of the judges in Central and East Africa to 
have all too ready a recourse to English law whenever there is a problem 
of internal conflict of laws.
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LEC T U R E  FOUR
JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE 
CONSTITUTION
In this lecture it is proposed to discuss the judicial approach to the 
problems of  interpretation of the various constitutions in C om m on­
wealth Africa. In so diverse and plentiful a field anyone attempting 
to analyse the situation is bound to be eclectic in his methods if the 
aim is to select those salient features of the judicial treatment of 
significant constitutional provisions which should give an insight into 
the judicial process. The aim, therefore, will be to consider some three 
or four groups of matters o f  contemporary constitutional importance. 
The first will be a general consideration of certain constitutional 
principles such as the nature and power of parliament, certain pro­
visions of the constitution relating to fundamental human rights and 
problems associated with racial discrimination against the background 
of its prohibition in particular constitutions, and the place of con­
ventions in the written constitutions of  Africa. The next is to consider 
the issue of preventive detention and the related question of emergency 
legislation. The third broad field we shall explore in depth deals with 
problems concerning the legality of illegal regimes, or the validity of 
coup d ’etats , in Africa. We shall now consider these matters seriatim.
I
General Constitutional Issues
In Wari v Ofori-Attah & ors,1 there arose a question of great con­
stitutional importance in which an Act of the Parliament of Ghana 
and a ministerial order made under it were both held to be invalid by 
the Kumasi High Court. The plaintiff, the Gyasehene of Ejisu, claiming 
that he was a chief and the customary custodian of the customary Ejisu 
stool, sought a declaration that the Statute Law (Amendment) (N o 2) 
Act, 1957, was invalid, null and void, as it contravened section 35 
of the Ghana Constitution Order-in-Council, 1957, and that the Ejisu 
Stool Property Order 1958 made under the Act was itself invalid, null 
and void. Section 35 of the Constitution laid down certain procedures
1 (1959) GLR 181.
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which must be complied with before a Bill could be declared to have 
been passed by the Speaker of the House of Assembly. If the Bill 
affected the traditional functions or privileges of a chief, the Speaker 
was required forthwith to refer it to the House of Chiefs of the Region 
concerned before the second reading of the Bill could be moved in the 
House of Assembly at least three months thereafter. In this particular 
case, however, this procedure was not followed and the Governor- 
General signified the Royal Assent to it. Some eight months later, 
purporting to exercise his powers under the Act, the Minister o f  Local 
Government made the Ejisu Stool Property Order, 1958, which 
provided that Nana Kofi Atta was thereby authorized to take pos­
session and prepare an inventory of all the Ejisu Stool Property. 
After carefully examining the claims of the plaintiff for the declaration, 
the Court held that the plaintiff was a chief and the customary custodian 
of the Ejisu Stool P roperty ; that the Act directly affected the traditional 
functions of the Chief as such a Chief; that the Act was invalid because 
the procedure laid down in section 35 of the Constitution had not 
been followed; and that the order made thereunder was, ex hypothesi, 
invalid. Murphy, J, made the following interesting observation:
1 do not find the com parison with the powers o f federal and state (or provincial) 
legislatures very exact. In G hana there is only one Legislature and all laws 
passed by it are presumed to be for peace, order and good governm ent, in 
accordance with section 31(1) o f  the Constitution. Obviously the fact that 
a law is so passed cannot alone exclude it from the ambit o f section 35, since, 
if this were so, section 35 would not have applied to any law. The only criterion, 
in my view, was whether a Bill directly affected the traditional functions and 
privileges o f  a Chief. If it did so, the procedure laid down in section 35 had 
to be followed, whatever other purpose the proposed legislation might have.2
The main interest of this case is to illustrate that an Act of Parliament 
as a sovereign legislature may be declared invalid for non-compliance 
with procedural requirements provided in the relevant constitution. 
It is sometimes thought, erroneously, that only under a federal consti­
tution can a court declare an Act of  Parliament invalid. This case 
shows that even under a unitary constitution like that of G hana at 
the material time, a court can declare an Act of Parliament invalid 
if so authorized by the Constitution. It shows that the unitary state 
o f  Ghana is different from the unitary state o f  the United Kingdom 
where no court can ever declare an Act o f  Parliament invalid, the usual 
constitutional reason being that the latter has no written constitution.
2 Ibid, pp 186—87.
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In Adegbenro v A kintola ,3 an important constitutional principle 
was affirmed by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council to the 
effect that, where it is desired to incorporate a British rule or convention 
in the constitution of a Commonwealth country, express provision 
must be made. The facts o f  the case were that, by section 33(10) of  the 
Constitution of Western Nigeria, it was provided that the Governor 
should not dismiss the Regional Premier “ unless it appears to him” 
that the Premier had lost the support of the majority of the members 
of the Regional House of Assembly. The Governor, purporting to 
exercise his power thereunder, dismissed the Premier on the strength 
of a letter signed by 66 out of 124 members of the House declaring 
that they no longer had confidence in the Premier. The Regional High 
Court held that the Governor could not dismiss the Premier as he had 
purported to do since he could only remove the latter as a result of an 
adverse vote against him taken on the floor of the House. The Supreme 
Court of Nigeria, by a majority of four to one, upheld the decision of 
the High Court. On appeal to the Privy Council, the decision o f  the 
Supreme Court of Nigeria was reversed on the ground (a) that the 
Constitution of Western Nigeria was a written one, the wording of 
which could not be overridden by the extraneous principles of  other 
constitutions which were not explicitly incorporated into it; and (b) 
a fortiori, the British Constitutional Convention relating to the 
sovereign’s right to dismiss the Premier could be of no guidance, since 
this was no longer considered to be within the scope of practical politics 
in Britain. This decision greatly surprised Nigerian constitutional 
lawyers who had all along assumed that the conventions of the British 
Constitution which had not been expressly excluded from the Nigerian 
Constitutional Order-in-Council, could be invoked in construing 
provisions relating to the Cabinet system of government. The Govern­
ment of Western Nigeria thereupon introduced an amendment to the 
Constitution taking away the implied power of  the Regional Governor 
to dismiss a Premier except on the basis of an adverse vote to that 
effect taken on the floor o f  the House. As was then required by the 
Constitution of the Federation, the relevant legislative amendment 
was sent to the Parliament in Lagos which ratified it because the same 
provision was also contained in the Federal Constitution in respect of 
the Head of State vis-a-vis the Prime Minister. During the debate 
on the amendment which took place in both the Regional Legislature 
and in Parliament, the protagonists of the measure cited the British 
Government’s enactment of the Gambia Validation Order-in-Council
J (1963) AC 614; (1963) 3 WLR 63.
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of 1963 which had retrospectively got rid of  an inconvenient judicial 
decision only a few weeks previously. Professor Geoffrey Sawer, who 
approved the Privy Council's  interpretation of section 33(10) of the 
Western Nigeria Constitution in Akintola  v Adegbenro,4 nevertheless 
welcomed the retroactive amendment of it in these words:
It is a sensible provision. Constitutional monarchs and their gubernatorial or
presidential equivalents are well advised to inform themselves on such matters
only by reference to events in the corporate lives o f  the legislatures.5
While still on the subject, we may note in passing the Privy Council 
decision in Ningkan v S li.6 There, the Acting Chief Justice of Borneo 
High Court had held invalid a purported dismissal of the Chief Minister 
by the Governor of the State on the strength of a letter apparently 
signed by 21 out of the 42 members of the unicameral State Legislature. 
The Chief Minister had demanded, as had the then Western Nigeria 
Premier, that the question of his having lost the confidence of the 
legislature be tested on the floor of the House, but his request was 
turned down and the Governor thereafter proceeded to appoint 
another candidate as Chief Minister. When Adegbenro v Akintola ,7 
was cited to the learned judge he somewhat disingenuously distin­
guished that case and held that a Premier could not be dismissed by a 
State Governor except in consequence of a majority vote taken on the 
floor of the House in favour of his dismissal. This decision would 
appear to have been accepted in the Borneo State at that time, as the 
similar decision of Western Nigeria had been.
According to the learned judge, there were two main differences in 
Western N igeria : the G overnor could remove the Premier if it appeared 
to him that the latter no longer commanded the support of the majority, 
whereas in Malaysia, the Chief Minister must actually cease to do so; 
again, the “ support" referred to in the Western Nigeria Constitution 
is less of a term apart than the “ confidence” mentioned in the Sarawak 
document. Confidence means voting. The confidence of the legislature 
was to be tested objectively. One must confess that this is a piece of 
logical hair-splitting, a mere attempt to make a distinction without a 
difference.8
4 (1963) AC 614.
5 See his article, ‘Emergency Powers in Nigeria and Malayan Federation', Malaya 
Law Review, (1964), vol 6, no 1, pp 83 -99 . He added in a footnote:
‘‘Substantially the same effect is achieved under the well-drawn provisions o f the 1963 
Centre Constitution, ss (68(5), 87(1), (2), (8) and (11) and 93.”
6 (1966) 2. Malayan Law Journal, 187.
7 (1963) AC 614.'
M This special pleading by the learned judge has been rightly criticized by Thio in his 
article, ‘Dismissal o f Chief Ministers’. Malaya Law Review, pp 283-91.
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When, in Ningkan v Government o f  Malaysia f  the Privy Council 
approved the dismissal o f  the Chief Minister of Sarawak only after 
the local legislature had passed a majority vote of no confidence in 
him. Their Lordships referred to the judgment in Ningkan  v Sli without 
any adverse comments, it would seem that we are entitled to infer that 
their earlier decision in Akintola  v Adegbenro was thereby impliedly 
overruled or to regard it as having been decided on its own peculiar 
facts.
In Sabally and N ’Jie v Her M ajesty’s Attorney-General,10 there was 
a general election in the Gam bia in 1962 which the Gambia Court of 
Appeal had declared invalid. Thereafter the Gambia Validation 
O rder11 had been made by the British Government in order to validate 
the results of the election. The English Court of Appeal held, inter alia, 
that the British Settlements Acts, 1887. under which the Order was 
made, empowered Her Majesty-in-Council to make laws with retro­
spective effect whenever it should be deemed necessary in the case of 
any British overseas settlement, which the Gambia was at that time. 
The Gambia House of Representatives had enacted the Elections Act, 
1963, section 11 of which had the effect of meeting the problem created 
by the making of the G am bia Validation Order. It therefore follows 
that the plaintiff’s challenge of the 1961 electoral register had been 
brought after the enactment of the new legislation; the plaintiff might 
have lost, since the Gambia Court of Appeal had based its judgment 
in the plaintiff's favour on the 1961 register. The facts briefly were 
that the plaintiff, an unsuccessful candidate at the general election, 
sued for a declaration that the Gambia Validation Order-in-Council, 
1963, was invalid on the ground that it sought to validate retrospectively 
the election which was invalid because it failed to comply with the 
1961 Constitution. There was consequently an impasse. The Privy 
Council ruled that the 1963 Order was valid either on the ground that 
it was legislation under the reserved power of the Crown contained in 
section 74 of the Constitution or that it was within the power granted by 
the British Settlements Act. That Act had extinguished the prerogative 
right to grant representative legislatures to settled colonies, and 
everything done thereafter by the Crown-in-Council in a British 
settlement was done under the legislative powers conferred by the Act.
An interesting attempt to invalidate an independence constitution 
occurred in Buck v Attorney-General,12 The point was that the then
9 (1968) 1 MLJ 119.
’"(1965) 1 QB 273. See also (1964) 3 All ER 377.
SI (1963) No 1051, made on May 30, 1963.
12 (1969) ch 745; (1965) 2 WLR 1033.
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newly independent State of Sierra Leone was made up o f the settled 
colony and the hinterland Protectorate. Six inhabitants o f  Freetown, 
as the descendants of the original settlers, brought an action for a 
declaration that the establishment of the new state was invalid because 
the British Crown held the colony in trust for the settlers and their 
descendants and that they were entitled to obtain independence for the 
colony and set up their own government thereover. By virtue of section 
2 of the British Settlements Act 1887, the Crown has power to establish 
by means of an Order-in-Council laws and institutions for the peace, 
order and good government in a British settlement, even though such 
laws and institutions are also to apply to a neighbouring protectorate. 
Accordingly, the Court o f  Appeal in England rejected the plaintiffs’ 
claim on the ground that they as descendants of the original settlers of 
the colony had no interest in or rights over the territory and that in 
any case the English courts before one of which the suit had been 
brought lack jurisdiction to make a declaration impugning the validity 
of the Constitution of a foreign independent State, especially when it is 
clear that that is the object o f  the suit. The court decided, therefore, 
that the independent State o f  Sierra Leone was validly established by 
the Sierra Leone Independence Act, 1961.
In Akar  v The Attorney-General o f  Sierra Leone, 13 Tejan-Sie, C J, 
in the Supreme Court o f  Sierra Leone, was faced with the task of 
following the provision of  section 1 of the Constitution which reads:
Every person who, having been born in the former colony or Protectorate of 
Sierra Leone was on the 26th day o f  April 1961 a citizen o f  the United Kingdom  
and colonies or a British protected person shall becom e a citizen o f  Sierra 
Leone on the 27th day o f  April 1961.
Provided that a person shall not become a citizen o f  Sierra Leone by virtue 
o f  this sub-section if  neither o f  his parents nor any o f  his grandparents was 
born in the former colony or Protectorate o f  Sierra Leone.
It is clear that this section makes any person of whatever race who 
satisfied the conditions stated automatically a citizen of  Sierra Leone. 
In 1962, the House of  Representatives adopted an amendment which 
introduced the phrase “ person of Negro African descent” in place of 
“ every person” which has had the effect of depriving certain persons, 
who would have qualified for automatic citizenship, o f  such a right. 
Of course, such persons may by application become registered citizens. 
The 1962 amendment was made retrospective to April 27, 1961. the 
date of independence. By a further amendment, it was sought to 
remove the limitation of citizenship to persons of Negro African
13CC 68/67 A N o 30. October 26, 1967.
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descent from the category of discriminatory legislation, since protection 
against discriminatory legislation is one of the entrenched provisions 
of the Constitution. This second amendment was also made retrospec­
tive to April 27, 1961. John Akar, a former Director of the Broad­
casting Corporation of Sierra Leone, brought an action challenging 
the validity of the two amendments to the Constitution by seeking a 
declaration that they were ultra vires the Constitution and therefore 
null and void. The plaintiff was born in Sierra Leone in 1927 to a 
Lebanese father and a Temne mother. His father was born in Senegal, 
had never been to Lebanon, and had lived in Sierra Leone for some 
56 years. Thus the plaintiff was a citizen of Sierra Leone under the 
original section 1 of  the Constitution, and the 1962 amendment had 
the effect of depriving him of that right. The question was whether the 
Parliament of Sierra Leone had power to amend the Constitution in 
this way. Counsel for the plaintiff submitted that Parliament had no 
such power and that “ once a citizen, always a citizen” . It was, however, 
contended on behalf of the Attorney-General that Parliament was 
competent to enact the amendments which could be regarded as being 
reasonably justifiable in a democratic society and was valid because 
the proper procedure for amendment had been followed. The learned 
Chief Justice, while accepting the contention of the Attorney-General 
that the amendment procedure under the Constitution had been duly 
followed, rejected the amendments themselves on the ground, inter alia, 
that the intention of the Founding Fathers of the Sierra Leone Constitu­
tion, particularly in section 1, was to create a non-racial citizenship for 
the country. He therefore held that the validity of any amendment of 
the Constitution must depend on the extent to which such amendment 
did not derogate from this basic intention. He accordingly concluded 
that the purported amendment was a direct negation of  the basic 
intention behind the Constitution, and that both amendments were 
invalid as not being reasonably justifiable in a democratic society. 
This bold decision must be one of the very few in which a court in an 
African Commonwealth country has expressly disallowed legislation 
on the ground that it was not reasonably justifiable in a democratic 
society. It seems strange, however, that the learned Chief Justice had 
chosen to overrule legislation, not on the basis of its procedural and 
substantive validity as enjoined in the relevant sections of the Constitu­
tion, but on that of its objective or moral validity. By so doing, the 
learned Chief Justice would seem to have opened himself to the charge 
of going beyond his task of  mere interpretation of the constitutional 
provisions, so that he himself could be said to have exceeded his judicial 
powers as much as Parliament has exceeded its own by passing ultra
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vires legislation. The retrospective nature of the amendments could, 
of course, have been frowned upon rather than the ground chosen by 
the learned Chief Justice. Fortunately, however, the Sierra Leone 
Court of Appeal reversed the Supreme Court by re-stating the proper 
function of the courts as being limited to an examination of the 
procedural and substantive validity of the legislation. It is not their 
business to preoccupy themselves with moral considerations or the 
rightness or wrongness of  the legislative policy of Parliament.
With this interesting exercise in legislative provision for discrimina­
tion within the constitutional framework in Sierra Leone may be 
compared two recent cases in Kenya on the same subject. The two 
cases are Madhwa & ors v City Council o f  N airobi14 and Re M aangi. 10 
In the Madhwa Case, certain holders of stalls in the municipal market 
at Nairobi, who were tenants o f  the defendant Council, were served 
with notices to quit, and they brought an action for a declaration that 
the notices were void as being in conflict with certain provisions of the 
Constitution of Kenya. The notices to quit had been based upon a 
resolution of the City Council in pursuance o f  Government policy 
of Africanization of commerce, the plaintiff's being non-Africans who 
had been given three m onths’ notice for the termination of their 
tenancies and the re-allocation of the stalls to suitable Africans for 
whom loan should be provided from Government funds to enable 
them to take up the tenancies in question. The plaintiff's claimed that 
both the policy and the resolution violated the provisions of sections 
14 and 26(2) of the Constitution of Kenya, and that their implementa­
tion would amount to unlawful discrimination and an infringement of 
the plaintiff’s’ constitutional rights. Counsel for the plaintiff's contended 
that four of the plaintiff's having been born in Kenya were entitled to 
be registered as citizens under section 2(1) of the Constitution and that 
they should be treated as if they had become citizens by registration. 
The delay in registering the plaintiff's had been that o f  the Government 
of Kenya, not that of the Nairobi City Council. As matters stood, the 
plaintiff's were not yet citizens of Kenya but were still citizens of the 
United Kingdom and Colonies. The learned trial judge in the High 
Court of Kenya was, however, of the view that it was immaterial to the 
determination o f  the suit whether or not the plaintiff's were citizens of 
Kenya. The learned trial judge held that both the policy and the notices 
were discriminatory against the plaintiffs and therefore contrary to 
the provisions of section 26(2), and that they were therefore void.
14 (1968) EQ 406.
15 (1968) EA 637
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In Re Maangi, an African widow of a deceased African inspector 
of police had applied for the grant to her of letters of  administration 
in respect o f  the intestate estate of her husband. The important 
question of  principle which arose for determination was the existing 
practice which, based upon a provision in the Indian Acts (Amend­
ments),16 was deemed to preclude the making of such grants to 
Africans. Both counsel who appeared in the case agreed that section 9 
of the Indian Acts (Amendments) is discriminatory within the 
meaning of section 26(3) of the Constitution of Kenya; it was also 
thought that the section is discriminatory insofar as it restricts the 
application to Africans of the Indian Probate and Administration Act. 
The Kenyan High Court accordingly held that the widow of the 
deceased intestate was entitled to obtain the grant of letters of  adminis­
tration in respect of her deceased husband’s estate. It seems strange 
that it was only in 1968 that Kenyan Africans were for the first time 
legally declared entitled to the grant of letters of administration in 
respect of the estate of a deceased intestate African.
An interesting case which shows that, even in the post-independence 
period in Kenya with its settler problems, an attempt could still be 
made to revive or retain some of the vestiges of colonialism is R v 
W ilken.11 There, a European was accused of the murder of some 
Africans, and a mixed panel of assessors resident in Kenya was es­
tablished to assist with the trial of the case. The accused, a European, 
challenged the validity of the trial on the ground that it had been the 
practice in Kenya for Europeans standing trial to be tried only by 
all-European juries. It was, however, held that the constitutional 
guarantee of freedom from discrimination which is enshrined in the 
Constitution of Kenya does not entitle a European accused person to 
be tried by a panel of assessors who are exclusively Europeans.
II
Preventive Detention and Emergencies
Of all the cases of preventive detention heard before G hanaian courts 
in the early years of  independence, perhaps one o f  the most important 
was Re Akoto & 7 ors. 18 In November 1959, the appellants were 
arrested and placed in detention under an order made by the Governor-
Cap 2 o f the revised edition, o f  the Laws of Kenya, 1948. section 9 which deals with 
non-applicability o f Indian law to African except as therein strictly defined
''(1965) EA 286.
18 (1961) GLR 523.
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General and signed on his behalf by the Minister of the Interior under 
section 2 of  the Preventive Detention Act, 1958. Their application to 
the High Court for writs of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum was refused. 
On appeal to the Supreme Court the following main contentions were 
urged by their counsel on their behalf: (a) that the learned trial judge 
acted in excess of jurisdiction when he refused the application without 
making an order for a formal return; (b) that, by virtue of  the Habeas 
Corpus Act o f  1816, the Court is required to enquire into the truth 
of the facts contained in the grounds upon which the Governor- 
General was satisfied that the order was necessary to prevent the 
appellants from acting in a manner prejudicial to the security of the 
State; (c) that the Minister o f  the Interior who signed the order for and 
on behalf of the Governor-General was actuated by malice; (d) that 
the grounds upon which the appellants were detained did not fall 
within the ambit of the expression “ acts prejudicial to the security of 
the State” ; (e) that by virtue of  section 3 of the Criminal Procedure 
Code of 1951, now section 1 of the Criminal Procedure Code 1960, the 
Governor-General was precluded from exercising the powers conferred 
on him under the Preventive Detention Act, to make an order for the 
arrest and detention of  the appellants without trial except in accordance 
with the Criminal Procedure Code; (f) that the Preventive Detention 
Act, 1958, was in excess of  the powers conferred by Parliament by 
article 13( 1) of the Constitution, or was contrary to the solemn declara­
tion of fundamental principles made by the President on his assumption 
of office; and (g) that the Preventive Detention Act, not having been 
passed upon a declaration of emergency, was in violation of the 
Constitution of the Republic of Ghana. An affidavit was filed on 
behalf of the Minister of the Interior which stated that the detention 
order was made in good faith and that the Governor-General was 
satisfied that the “ order is necessary to prevent the persons detained 
from acting in a manner prejudicial to the State” . The grounds of 
detention served upon the said detainees contained particulars of the 
previous acts upon which the conclusion of the Governor-General 
was based. In delivering the judgment of the Supreme Court, Korsah. 
C J ,  held (a) that the affidavit disclosed all the facts relevant for 
determining whether the writ of habeas corpus should issue or not, 
and the learned trial judge was entitled to dispose of the case on the 
basis of the affidavit a lo n e ;19 (b) that although the Habeas Corpus 
Act 1816 is a statute o f  general application, it did not apply to the 
instant case because the Preventive Detention Act gave full discretion
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to the Governor-General, (later the President) if satisfied that such 
an order was necessary. Upon production of the order, the only 
question which had to be considered was its legality. If the order was 
lawful, the detention was ipso facto  lawful;20 (c) that the Court could 
only look into allegations of bad faith by high officers of the State if 
there was positive evidence which was, however, singularly absent in 
the instant case;21 (d) that the term ‘security of the State’ is not limited 
to the defence of G hana against a foreign power and the powers of  the 
Preventive Detention Act might be invoked where the basis of law was 
sought to be undermined and attempts were being made to cause 
disruption in the normal functioning of government; (e) that the 
Preventive Detention Act should be distinguished from the Criminal 
Code in that while the Code concerns itself with Acts already 
committed, the Act was aimed at preventing the future commission 
of acts prejudicial to the safety of the State; (f) that article 13(1) o f  the 
Constitution imposed only a moral obligation upon the President of 
Ghana. The declaration which the President was required to make 
was like the Coronation Oath of the Queen of England and did not 
constitute a Bill of Rights which could be regarded as creating legal 
obligations enforceable in a court of law; (g) the effect of article 7 of 
the Constitution was that Parliament was sovereign and its legislative 
powers were qualified only with respect to the entrenched articles; 
and (h) that the Preventive Detention Act, 1958, was therefore not 
contrary to the Constitution, and Parliament was competent to pass 
such an Act even in time of peace.
Although the situation dealt with in Re Akoto  was not one in which 
a state of emergency had been declared, we find echoes of Korsah, 
C J's opinion that the Minister o f  the Interior's bona fides  could not 
be enquired into in the following dictum  of Ademola, C J N, in the 
Nigerian case of  Williams v M ajekodunm i;22 “ that a state of  public 
emergency exists in Nigeria is a matter apparently within the bounds 
of Parliament, and not one for this court to decide. Once that state 
of emergency is declared it would seem that according to the Consti­
tution, it is the duty of  Government to look after the peace and security 
of the State and it will require a very strong case against it for the 
court to ac t” . In that case, the Federal Parliament o f  Nigeria had 
f o u n d  it necessary to declare a state of emergency under section 
65 o f the Nigerian Constitution of 1960 in Western Nigeria as a 
r e s u l t  of w'hat the Parliament believed to be a breakdown of law and
2 Liversidge v Anderson (1942) AC 206, HL was followed in this respect.
2 Nakkuda Ali v M F de Savaratue (1951) AC 66, p 77, PC.
22 (1962) I All NLR 328, p 336.
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order accompanied by two rival claimants to the one post of Regional 
Premier. The plaintiff was one o f  those whose movements were 
restricted in consequence of the emergency, and had brought an 
action challenging the bona fides  o f  the defendant who had been 
appointed an Administrator of  the territory during the period of 
the emergency. It is interesting to note the following observation 
o f  Lord MacDermott in Ningkan  v Government o f  M alaysia:21
It is not for their Lordships to criticize or comment upon the wisdom or 
expediency o f  the steps taken by the G overnm ent o f  M alaysia in dealing 
with the constitutional situation which had occurred in Sarawak, or to 
inquire w'hether that situation could itself have been avoided by a dilferent 
approach. But, taking the position as it was after Harley, J. had delivered 
judgm ent in September 1966, they can find, in the material presented, no 
ground for holding that the respondent G overnm ent was acting erroneously 
or in any way m ala fide in taking the view that there was a constitutional 
crisis in Sarawak, that it involved or threatened a break-down o f  stable 
government, and am ounted to an emergency calling for immediate action... 
these were essentially matters to be determined according to the judgment 
o f the responsible M inisters in the light o f  their knowledge and experience.24
A somewhat unusual type of  claim to fundamental rights and 
freedoms was upheld in People's Popular Party v Attorney-G eneral25 
In the Accra High Court, the plaintiffs, members o f  a duly registered 
political party, were refused a permit by the police to hold protest 
marches concerning certain important political issues, even though 
a permit had been given to another group (a United Kingdom one) 
to protest against one o f  the political issues. The police did not 
assign any reason for the refusal. The applicants sought a court 
order to compel the police to issue them a permit, claiming that 
their freedoms of association, movement and assembly as provided 
in the 1969 Constitution had been infringed. The respondent denied 
any such infringement, and asserted that the police had acted prop­
erly within their powers under the Police Act as well as under articles 
23 and 24 of the Constitution. It was held (a) that the applicants, 
by virtue of  their registration in the manner prescribed by law, had 
corporate personality and as the word ‘person’ must be deemed 
to include bodies corporate under the Interpretations Act, 1960. 
the applicants were entitled to the fundamental freedoms enumerated 
in article 12 of  the Constitution and enforceable under article 28
23 (1970) AC 379.
24 See my ‘Emergency in Malaysia and in Nigeria’, Nigerian Law Journal, vol 4, 1970. 
pp 149-52.
25 (1971) 1 GLR 138.
T H E  JU D IC IA L  PROCESS IN  C O M M O N W E A L T H  A FR IC A
90
thereof; (b) that the discretionary power vested in a police officer 
by law must be exercised in a fair and candid manner so that, when 
the police refused to grant a permit, they must assign reasons for 
their refusal and, if they failed to do so, the court could inquire into 
the grounds and reasons for the police action; and (c) that, while 
the law prohibits the issue of an injunction against the police, it 
does authorize the court to make a declaration of the rights of the 
applicants. The court then proceeded to hold that the applicants 
were entitled to a declaration that the police were wrong in refusing 
the permit, and that they can only refuse if such a procession is likely 
to cause a breach of the peace; and that the applicants were entitled to 
know 4n writing the grounds on which the police relied in coming 
to a decision that the marches could cause a breach of the peace. 
Hayfron-Benjamin, J, stated the nature of  the judicial function in 
this type of  situation as follows:
The powers conferred on the High Court by article 28(2) are wide in the 
extreme, but they seem to me to reflect the general intention o f the drafters 
that the courts should be the custodians and protectors o f  the liberties o f  
the individual citizens o f  Ghana. It is a duty which is at once onerous and 
honourable. In discharging these duties, the courts must tread the narrow, 
humble but firm path between the Scylla o f  over-zealousness and the 
Charybdis o f  judicial timidity. Where the liberty o f  the citizen has been 
invaded, they should by all means offer protection, but they should not 
try to find an invasion where none has occurred.26
In Attitsogbe v Hartley, 27 a libel action was brought by the plaintiff 
against the defendant in respect of a publication in the Ghanaian 
Times. The publication was at the instance of  the defendant, then 
Inspector-General o f  Police and the Vice-Chairman of the National 
Liberation Council. The defendant later became a member o f  the 
Presidential Commission. The plaintiff alleged that the publication 
was defamatory of him and also that the defendant, in causing it 
to be published, was actuated by express malice. Both the plaintiff 
and the defendant agreed that the defendant as a member of the 
National Liberation Council and the Presidential Commission, 
occupied in law the position of  the President. By article 36(8) of 
the 1969 Constitution, it was provided that it should be lawful to 
institute proceedings, whether civil or criminal in any court in Ghana, 
against the President within three years of his ceasing to hold office 
as President. The plaintiff, therefore, contended that as the defen-
2,1 Ibid, p 140.
27 (1972) 1 GLR 194.
JU D IC IA L  IN T E R P R E T A T IO N  O F T H E  C O N S T IT U T IO N
9 1
dant was thus immune from legal process, his action was not brought 
earlier. The Accra High Court held that (a) article 36(8) of the 1969 
Constitution was inapplicable to the case because no individual 
member of  the National Liberation Council or the Presidential 
Commission constituted the President, even though such a member 
could be presumed to have performed the duties of  the President;
(b) that the action was statute-barred because no action could be 
instituted against a public officer after three months from the default 
complained of, the defendant being such an officer; (c) that insofar 
as the act complained o f  did not relate to the overthrow of the 
Convention People’s Party Government, the suspension of the 1960 
Constitution, the establishment of  the National Liberation Council 
or that of the 1969 Constitution, the court had jurisdiction to entertain 
the suit, contrary to the defendant's contention; and (d) that at 
the material time when the document was published, the National 
Liberation Council was the supreme legislative body in the country, 
and the publication was therefore absolutely privileged despite the 
fact that only an abstract of the original document was published 
by the Ghanaian Times.
In M atzim bam uto and Baron v Lardner-Burke N  O & ors,2H the 
General Division of  the High Court o f  Rhodesia had ruled that 
the court should give effect'to legislative and administrative measures 
by the regime as the only effective government in the country. Lewis, 
J. based his judgment on the necessity in the interest of the society 
for the courts to continue functioning and enforcing the regime’s 
measures as a means o f  avoiding chaos and a vacuum in the law, 
while Goldin, J, based himself on the ground of public policy required 
by absolute necessity. There was an appeal to the Appellate Division. 
While the decision was pending, death sentences imposed either 
before or after Unilateral Declaration of Independence were not 
carried into effect. The Officer Administering the Government, 
however, in August 1967, confirmed the death sentences imposed 
in three cases. There was an application for a declaration that the 
confirmation in question was invalid; Lewis, J, in Ndhlamini & ors 
v Cartono & anor,29 held that it was essential that everything done 
for the proper administration of justice be recognized.
Towards the end o f  January 1968, the Appellate Division gave 
judgment in the pending appeal. The court unanimously declared 
that all the detentions effected after Unilateral Declaration of  Inde­
28(I960) RLR 756.
29(1967) (4) SA 378 (R).
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pendence were unlawful as being ultra vires the Emergency Powers 
Act; it may be observed that this finding did not pronounce upon 
the legality of the regime as such. The court held that section 4(1) 
of the Emergency Powers Act did not empower the making of a 
regulation authorizing general detentions since it was clear that 
the legislature had permitted the power of interfering with individual 
liberty to be exercised only by a particular method, but in this case 
the exercise of that power by another method was ultra vires.30
While the judges were unanimous in declaring invalid the continued 
detention orders, they expressed different views on the legal effects 
of seizure of  power. Thus MacDonald, J A, took the view that his 
authority for exercising his judicial function was derived from the 
1965 Constitution and also from the law enjoining upon all citizens, 
including judges, the duty of  allegiance to the government of the 
country for the time being. Quenet, J P, for his part, held that the 
regime had become the internal de jure government since its constitu­
tion and laws had binding force and since those who perform the 
judicial function were thereby required to give effect thereto. Two 
other judges, Fieldsend and Jarvis, A .! A, asserted that they derived 
their authority from the 1961 Constitution and that, although the 
regime was an unlawful government, they felt impelled to regard 
its legislative and administrative measures as valid in order to pro­
tect the interests of society. The basis was the doctrine of  necessity. 
Beadle, C J .  took a position that neither the 1961 Constitution, 
which he regarded as already defunct, nor the 1965 Constitution 
which was not yet in force since the regime was not yet so firmly 
established is to be regarded as a de jure government, could be re­
garded as valid. The learned Chief Justice was of the view that judges 
should declare the law in the light of a criterion deemed acceptable 
to them and that the authority of the court to function must be re­
garded as derived from the tolerance of the regime. He accordingly 
ruled that the overriding principle must be that the regime could 
do anything which a lawful government could do under the 1961 
Constitution.
I l l
Legality of Coup d’etats
In Adamolekun  v The Council o f  the University o f  Ibadan f 1 the Su-
M adzimbamuto and Baron v Lardner Burke and others NO 1968 (2) SA 284 (R A D )
pp 356-60.
SC 378/66 (unreported). Judgment delivered August 7, 1967.
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preme Court held that the provision of section 6 o f  the Constitution 
(Amendment and Modification) Decree No 1 of 1966 to the effect 
that no question as to the validity o f  any Decree or Edict is to be 
entertained by any court of law does not preclude the courts from 
enquiring into any question of  inconsistency in a Decree or Edict, 
and that section 6 merely bars the courts from questioning the validity 
of the making of a Decree or Edict on the ground that there is no 
valid legislative authority to make one.
Also in Jackson v Gowon,32 Sowemimo, J, relying on Doherty v 
Balewa,33 decided that the powers of the courts to review legislation 
have remained unimpaired and that a court could declare the pro­
visions of a Decree or Edict invalid and unconstitutional.
That the judiciary could become seriously involved in a consti­
tutional and political controversy is demonstrated in the M atzim- 
hamuto Case which, as we have seen, involved a determination of 
the legality or otherwise of  the Unilateral Declaration o f  Independence 
(UD1). The majority Rhodesian Bench had postponed the final 
decision on the question, but the majority o f  the Judicial Committee 
o f  the Privy Council had no illusion whatsoever that judges who 
were loyal to Her Majesty under the 1961 Constitution could at 
the same time concede a limited legality of a kind to the “ regime 
which had usurped powers and acquired control of that territory’’.34 
Faced with a situation in which each of the two governments was 
“ seeking to prevail over the o ther’’, the court could not sit on the 
fence. It must decide. The Privy Council had to advise on the question 
whether the detention o f  the appellant under the Emergency Powers 
(Maintenance o f  Law and Order) Regulations 1966 made by the 
usurping government’s Officer-Administering the Government was 
valid in spite of the provisions of the United Kingdom (Southern 
Rhodesia) Act, 1965 and the Constitution Order of the same year 
by which the Prime Minister and other Ministers had been dismissed 
and according to which no laws could be made or business transacted 
by the Legislative Assembly o f  Southern Rhodesia. The same Rho­
desian Appellate Division had also refused a declaration that an 
appeal lay as o f  right to the Judicial Committee under section 75(1) 
of the 1961 Constitution, since none of  the basic rights provided 
for in the Constitution had been alleged to have been contravened; 
that court also supported its refusal for the case to be submitted 
to the Privy Council with the curious argument that any decision
'2 Judgment delivered March 3, 1967, (unreported), High Court o f Lagos.
33(1961) All NLR 604.
34 (1968) 3 All ER 561, p 573.
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of the Privy Council would be ignored by the usurping government 
and accordingly be of  no value to the appellants.3 '’ The Privy Council’s 
ruling in the Dhlamini Case36 that the wife of  the detained man had 
a right o f  appeal to itself showed the Rhodesian judges’ leaning 
towards politico-legal realism and their aversion to strict legality 
even in a situation where the individual’s right to life was at stake. 
The Privy Council equally rejected the attempt of  the Rhodesian 
Court to apply Roman-Dutch law to the question of  the legal effect 
of laws passed by the United Kingdom Parliament in Southern 
Rhodesia and quoted with approval Innes, C J ’s dictum  in Union 
Government v Estate W hittaker,37 and asserted that “ the nature 
of the sovereignty o f  the Queen in the Parliament of the United 
Kingdom over a British Colony must be determined by the Consti­
tutional law of the United Kingdom” .38 Lord Reid observed that 
it was not obvious that the result would be in any way different if 
Roman-Dutch law were in fact to be deemed applicable. The Privy 
Council was of  the opinion that the constitutional convention requiring 
the United Kingdom Government to legislate only with the consent 
of the Rhodesian Parliament “ had no legal effect in limiting the legal 
power of  Parliament” . The United Kingdom (Southern Rhodesia) 
Act, 1965 accordingly had full effect in Rhodesia.
The concept of de facto  and de jure governments were very much 
prayed in aid o f  their ambivalent attitude to the problem of the Uni­
versal Declaration o f  Independence by the majority of  the Rhodesian 
judges. Their Lordships of  the Privy Council pointed out that these 
were “conceptions of international law ... quite inappropriate in 
dealing with the legal position of an usurper within the territory 
of which he had acquired control” . The Board was of the opinion 
that usurpers might become, in certain circumstances, lawful govern­
ments, and that a court must answer the question how or at what 
stage the new regime became lawful. The Judicial Committee referred 
to the recent decision of Uganda v Commissioner o f  Prisons, ex parte 
M atovuiL) (which was a Ugandan case) and The State  v D o sso f0
This opinion of the Rhodesian Appellate Division was probably based upon the 
Rhodesian Minister’s Affidavit “ that it (the Rhodesian Government) will not in any 
way recognise, enforce or give effect to any decision, judgment or order o f any other 
court... which purports to be given on an appeal from this Honourable Court” . It is 
strange that the Rhodesian judges were not disposed to consider the legality o f this threat.
" Dahlmini & Co v Carter & ors NO 1968(2) SA 464.
37(1916) SA A D  194.
38 (1968) All ER 561, p 572.
39 (1966) EA 514.
40 (1958) 2 PS CR 180.
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which was a Pakistani case. The Board pointed out that in both 
cases the new constitution o f  each country was held to be valid because, 
on the doctrine of efficacy of  the change, the pre-existing constitution 
had been annulled. The difference between the situations in Uganda 
and Pakistan on the one hand, and the situation in Rhodesia on the 
other was that, at the material date in the middle o f  1968, the “ British 
Government acting for the lawful sovereign, is taking steps to regain 
control and it is impossible to predict with certainty whether or 
not it will succeed". This particular opinion might have been respon­
sible for the subsequent change of  loyalty unequivocally declared 
by the Rhodesian judges to the sovereign. The Rhodesian judges’ 
argument for their earlier ambiguous stand had been based upon 
the so-called doctrine of necessity which, as the Board pointed out, 
had no parallel in English law, whatever might have been the position 
with regard to the United States Civil War cases. The situation 
in Rhodesia was so different from the situation in the United States 
of America that no meaningful comparison could be made. The Board 
finally rejected the doctrine of implied mandate on the ground that 
“ the fact that the judges among others have been put in a very diffi­
cult position cannot justify disregard of legislation passed or author­
ized by the United Kingdom Parliament” .
It would seem that the Southern Rhodesian judge's accepted the 
correctness of the Board’s decision as witness the attempt to explain 
away their former role in Archion Ndhlovu & ors v The Queen,41
We can now turn to an examination of the Uganda Case to which 
the Privy Council referred in the M atzimhamuto Case in order to 
see how another Commonwealth country dealt with the legality of 
a coup d ’etat in an independent sovereign state. In Uganda v Com­
missioner o f  Prisons, ex  parte M a to v u f2 there had been a change of 
government which arose when the then Prime Minister declared in 
a public statement that, in the interest of “ national stability and 
public security and tranquillity” , he had taken over all the powers 
of the Government of Uganda, abolished the pre-existing consti­
tution o f  the country and become the Executive President o f  the 
State. The High Court o f  Uganda held that it felt itself bound to 
take judicial notice of the fact that the change of government had 
been completely successful and that the new government was valid 
on the ground of efficacy, though not on the basis of  legitimacy. 
It was argued before the High Court on behalf of the new govern­
41 (1968) (4) SA 515 (R A D ).
42 (1966) EA 514.
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ment that customary international law recognizes a coup d ’etat as 
an effective and legal way of changing a government if the following 
four basic requirements are satisfied:
(a) There must have been an abrupt political change, eg a coup d'etat 
or a revolution. It does not matter whether the change had been 
effected directly by a military junta or by a civilian or group 
of civilians subverting the existing legal order, with or without 
the aid o f  the military. There can be a coup without the use of 
armed force.
(b) The change must not have been within the contemplation of 
an existing constitution; if it were, then the change would be 
merely evolutionary, ie constitutional; it would not have been 
revolutionary.
(c) The change must destroy the entire legal order except what is 
preserved. In order for the coup d ’etat to be complete, the new 
regime need not have abrogated the entire existing constitution. 
It is sufficient that what remains o f  it has been permitted by 
the revolutionary regime.
(d) The new constitution and government must be effective. There 
must not be a concurrent rival regime or authority functioning 
within or in respect o f  the same territory.
Hans Kelsen, in his General Theory o f  Law and State, t has put 
the legal situation thus:
It am ounts to this question: Under what circumstances does a national 
legal order begin or cease to be valid? The answer given by international 
law, is that a national legal order begins to be valid as soon as it has becom e 
-o n  the w h ole— efficacious, and it ceases to be valid as soon as it loses 
this efficacy ... The government brought into permanent power by a revo­
lution or coup d ’etat is, according to international law, the legitimate govern­
ment o f  the state, whose identity is not affected by these events.43
We, therefore, deduce that the abrupt change required under the 
first principle must have taken place in a politically independent 
sovereign state, and that this is the distinguishing mark between 
the Ugandan situation and an independent political entity on the 
one hand and the colony of Southern Rhodesia over which the United 
Kingdom was at the material time the political sovereign on the 
other.44 The Judicial Committee in the M atzimbamuto Case held 
that Ian Smith's regime in Southern Rhodesia was invalid on the 
following grounds:
43 (1961) Edition, pp 117ff220.
44 See Lord Reed’s dictum  in the M atzimbamuto Case (1938) 3 WLR 1129, p 1249.
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Their Lordships would not accept all the reasonings in these judgements 
but they see no reason to disagree with the results. The C hief Justice o f  
Uganda (Sir U do U dom a, C.J.) said: T h e  Governm ent o f Uganda is well 
established and has no rival.’ The court accepted the new Constitution  
and regarded itself as sitting under it. The C hief Justice o f Pakistan (Sir 
M uhammad Munir, C.J.) said: T h u s the essential condition to determine 
whether a constitution has been annulled is the efficacy o f  the change.’ It 
would be very different if there had been still two rivals contending for power. 
If the legitimate government had been driven out but was trying to regain 
control, it would be im possible to hold that the usurper who is in control is the 
lawful ruler, because that would mean that by striving to assert its lawful right, 
the ousted legitimate government was opposing the lawful ruler.
In Their Lordships’ judgment, that is the present position in Southern 
Rhodesia.45
This passage would seem to be descriptive of the regime o f  Ojukwu 
in Nigeria before the end of the rebellion or attempted secession 
in January 1970. It should be noted that, vis-a-vis the legitimate 
Federal Military Government, the territory under which Ojukwu 
declared secession on May 30, 1967, is an integral part o f  Nigeria 
and not even a colony or other dependency of  Nigeria. The attempted 
secession was clearly unconstitutional and invalid having regard to 
sections 71 and 86 of the Constitution of the Federation, 1963.
We need consider here only two or three cases in which the Nigerian 
Courts had had to pronounce upon the validity of the Federal Military 
Government of Nigeria and of its legislative measures. In Lakanmi 
& anor v The Attorney-General (W estern S ta te) & ors,46 the Western 
State Government, acting under a Decree of the Federal Govern­
ment established a Tribunal of Inquiry to investigate the assets of 
certain public officers suspected of having been corruptly acquired. 
On the basis of the report o f  the Tribunal, the assets of  those found 
guilty were forfeited. In an appeal to the Western State Court of 
Appeal, those affected challenged the validity of the Decree and of 
the legality of the Federal Military Government itself. As the Supreme 
Court had, in an earlier case of Adamolekun v The University o f  
Ibadan,4 decided that the court cannot question the vires o f  the 
Federal Military Government in making a Decree or an Edict on 
the grounds that there is no legislative authority to make one, the 
Western State Court of Appeal therefore held that the impugned 
Decree was valid, and so was the order made thereunder. Again
^  Ibid, p 1250.
46 (1968) CAW /35/68.
47(1968) NM LR 253.
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in Ogunlesi & ors v Attorney-General o f  the Federation,48 the High 
Court of Lagos State held that two Decrees of  the Federal Military 
Government under which the salaries of certain grades o f  staff of 
public corporations had been reduced, were valid as being intra vires 
the Federal Military Government whose decrees can override the 
new Constitution of  the Federation. The Lakanm i Case49 went on 
a further appeal to the Supreme Court. It is sufficient for our purpose 
to summarize the various conclusions it reached as follows:
(a)  that what took place on January 15, 1966, was not a revolution, 
but a voluntary transfer of power to the Military by the group 
o f Cabinet Ministers after the Prime Minister disappeared;
(b) that the Military regime was a constitutional interim govern­
ment to which power had been given for the limited purpose 
o f  restoring law and order and thereafter returning such power 
to the truncated ‘cabinet' that ‘transferred’ it, although there 
was no provision in the pre-existing Constitution for any such 
transfer even if the Prime Minister had been alive and had headed 
the meeting;
(c) that the Forfeiture o f  Assets, (etc) Validation Decree o f  1 9 6 8 , 
insofar as it purported to validate the orders made by the Military 
Governor of the Western State, was invalid and ultra vires the 
partly abrogated Constitution of 1963, despite the clear and 
categorical provisions o f  the Constitution (Suspension and M odi­
fication) Decree N o 1, 196 which overruled it;
(d) that, insofar as the Forfeiture of Assets (etc) Validation Decree 
o f  1968 impinged upon the sphere of  the judiciary by the express 
provisions therein, it was void as an unnecessary legislative 
intrusion by the Federal Military Government into an essentially 
judicial d o m a in ;
(e) that the Federal Military Government, as a temporary military 
regime, lacked the competence to make laws, not justified by 
the necessity o f  the State, despite the fact that the power trans­
ferred to it is to make laws for the “ peace, order and good govern­
ment o f  Nigeria on any matter whatsoever’’.
It is not surprising, therefore, that the Federal Military Govern­
ment considers these views as not only manifestly untenable, but 
also likely to lead to chaos. It accordingly promulgated The Federal
48 (1970) LD/28/69.
4 (1970) SC/58/69. See my ‘Military Decrees in Nigeria and Ghana’, Nigerian Law 
Journal, vol 5, 1971, pp 129-32; see also my ‘The Nigerian Crisis in International Law’, 
in Proceedings of the Annual Conference of the Nigerian Society o f International Law,
March 1970, pp 137-54.
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THE JU D IC IA L PROCESS IN COM M ONW EALTH AFRICA
Military Government (Supremacy and Enforcement of  Powers) 
Decree No 28 of 1970 which reaffirmed that what had taken place 
on January 15, 1966 was not the amicable transfer o f  power by a 
few civilian Ministers to the Armed Forces, but a bloody revolution 
which brought the Military regime into power. The point was clearly 
emphasized in this Decree that a Military regime is a government 
of  unlimited powers, the Decrees of  which cannot be declared invalid 
by a court which it had permitted to function under its sway.
Similarly, in Awunor-W illiams v Gbedemah,50 when the National 
Liberation Council overthrew the government of Dr N krum ah on 
February 24, 1966, it suspended the Constitution of  G hana of  1960 
and assumed the Executive, the legislative and the judicial powers of 
the State. On February 26, 1966, a proclamation published in the 
official gazette, however, permitted the courts to continue in existence 
with the same jurisdiction as before “ subject to any Decree that 
may be made by the National Liberation Council” , and this was 
later confirmed by the Courts’ Decree of  September 1966. There 
was a general election in 1969, and one o f  the two defeated candidates 
brought an action against the successful candidate, praying the court 
to declare his election null and void and his seat in the National 
Assembly vacant on the ground that the new 1969 Constitution of 
G hana expressly provided that anyone found guilty of  corruption, 
by inter alia a tribunal of inquiry, is disqualified for five years from 
standing as a candidate for a parliamentary constituency, and that 
the defendant was such a person. It happened that a tribunal presided 
over by a High Court judge and set up under the Investigation and 
Forfeiture of Assets Decree (No 72) and the Commission of Inquiry 
Act, 1964 had found the defendant guilty of  corruption in respect 
of his former office as Finance Minister in the N krum ah  government 
before he left it some six years previously. The defendant contended 
that he was entitled to retain his seat in the National Assembly to 
which he had been duly elected in a free and fair election, and that 
the National Liberation Council (Investigation and Forfeiture of 
Assets) (Amendment) Decree No 129 which took away his right 
of appeal against any finding of the Commission o f  Inquiry and the 
Investigation and Forfeiture of Assets (Further Implementation of 
Commission's Findings) Decree No 354 which provided machinery 
for realizing the confiscated assets were void because they were 
contrary to article 102 o f  the new Constitution of  1969 which vested
(1969) Court o f Appeal sitting as the Supreme Court, Const SC 1/69 dated D e c e m b e r  
8, 1969.
1 0 0
judicial powers in the Judiciary and did not vest any final judicial 
power in any organ or agency of the Executive. The defendant thus 
alleged that, by the two Decrees, the Military regime had usurped 
judicial power. Also, by the National Liberation Council (Investi­
gation and Forfeiture of Assets) Decree No 253, the courts were 
forbidden to entertain or grant any of the various prerogative orders 
to anyone against whom an adverse finding had been made by a 
commission of inquiry. The Court o f  Appeal sitting as the Supreme 
Court said obiter :
In view o f  the grave disabilities which the findings o f  a com m ission imposed  
by the Constitution which cam e into force on August 22, 1969, we think, 
in retrospect, that the passage o f  Decrees 129 and 253 did anything but 
advance the end o f  justice.
The Court thereafter proceeded to make the following observation:
... it would be accurate to say that judicial power was exercised by the Courts 
during the era o f  the N ational Liberation Council on sufferance. To say 
this is not to accuse the N ational Liberation Council even obliquely o f total­
itarianism or cast anything like a posthum ous reflection on a regime which 
was in many respects a liberal one. But we think this is the true constitutional 
position. No Decree which was passed by the N ational Liberation Council 
could have been struck down by the Courts as unconstitutional (Italics mine). 
In our opinion, therefore, not only were the two Decrees perfectly valid 
at the dates o f  their passage, but so were any acts and steps taken under 
them including, o f  course, the findings o f  the Com m issions established 
under the Decree 72 and Act 250.
Thus the Supreme Court of Ghana reached a conclusion which 
was in consonance with those reached by its Nigerian counterpart 
in earlier cases before the strange decision in the L akanm i Case in 
1970 which we have just discussed above. The G hana Supreme Court 
had in this way vindicated the legality of the military regime without 
the existence of  any specific Decree to that effect, as there was in 
Nigeria —  namely, the Constitution (Suspension and Modification) 
Decree No 1 of 1966. It is also significant that throughout the judg­
ment in Awunor- Williams v Gbedema the G hana Supreme Court 
had no occasion to make any conscious reference to the four principles 
of customary international law governing the legality of illegal regimes 
which we enunciated earlier.
In Sallah v Attorney-General o f  Ghana,5' however, the same Ghana 
Court o f  Appeal sitting as the Supreme Court had to determine
1 (1970) Const SC 8/70 delivered on April 20, 1970. See also S K Date-Bah’s ‘Juris­
prudence’s Day in Court in Ghana’, International and Comparative Law Quarterly, vol
-0. pt 2, 4th in series, April 1971, pp 315-23 .
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definitively the precise legal effect of a coup d'etat on the country’s 
legal system. The Attorney-General of G hana cited Hans Kelsen’s 
views on the subject in order to buttress his argument that the coup 
of February 24, 1966, had put an end to the pre-existing legal order 
and substituted an entirely new one, under which all existing laws, 
including enactments, must be deemed to have been re-established 
until amended or suspended by the new ones made by the National 
Liberation Council. On this view, the plaintiff in the case had been 
rightly dismissed from his post as a manager in the G hana National 
Trading Corporation established under the Statutory Trading Cor­
poration Act, 1961, when the Presidential Commission wrote him 
a letter dated February 21, 1970 to that effect on the basis of section 
9(1) o f  the Transitional Provisions of  the Constitution of  1969. The 
plaintiff contended that the Military Government was not entitled 
to terminate his appointment since he did not owe it to the National 
Liberation Council’s proclamation, but to the 1961 Act which had 
thus survived the coup and which did not come under section 9(1) 
o f  the Transitional Provisions, which contemplated only posts ‘estab­
lished’ since the coup. The Supreme Court by a majority o f  two 
to one, held that the word ‘establish’ must be given its ordinary 
meaning and that, accordingly, the plaintiff's office was not established 
by the National Liberation Council's  Proclamation of  February 26, 
1966, which rather permitted “ the continued existence to the Kelsenite 
principles advanced by the Attorney-General’’. The Court prefers 
to base its decision on a simple legislative interpretation of  the rele­
vant constitutional provision, thereby refusing to answer the question 
whether the coup o f  February 24, 1966 did destroy the entire legal 
order and not just the pre-existing legal system of Ghana. It was 
not enough for a majority o f  the Court to dismiss the arguments 
based on Kelsen as merely theoretical and foreign, or to regard 
the difference between the occurrence of  the coup on February 24, 
and the making of the Proclamation on February 26 as having created 
a hiatus in the legal order. The Proclamation should have been 
made retroactive to February 24, as it no doubt was intended to 
have been by the National Liberation Council. It was so made by 
its Nigerian equivalent in similar circumstances. Reasoned analysis 
for and against by the two judges in the majority and by the one 
judge in the minority, would have been valuable. As it was, the Court 
did not take the matter far enough.
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LECTURE FIVE
JUDICIAL PRECEDENT AND LEGAL 
DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA
It has with a good deal o f  truth been claimed by many that the Jury 
system and the Habeas Corpus procedure are the pillars of the English 
common law. Even more than either of these, however, is the Doctrine 
of Judicial Precedent as the main characteristic of the common law 
as it operates in the Commonwealth, in the United States of America 
and in certain marginal areas that have been influenced by the common 
law, such as the Sudan, Ethiopia and Liberia. The importance of the 
doctrine lies in the fact that, in contrast with the civil law systems of 
continental Europe and Latin America, it envisages a legal system 
that derives its source from a developing legal order based upon a 
series o f  judicial decisions embodying the common customs of the 
realm. This is in contradistinction to the civil law which derives its 
source from codes. In simple terms, the distinction is between case- 
law and codification as the underlying basis of the legal system.
Now, by the Doctrine of Judicial Precedent is meant the concept 
and practice whereby decisions of the highest court in the land are 
binding upon all courts subordinate to it. those of the court or courts 
immediately below the highest courts bind all courts subordinate to 
them and so on until the lowest courts are reached at the base of  the 
pyramid. Thus, in the United Kingdom, the highest appeal court for 
British Courts is the House o f  Lords, the decisions of  which bind the 
English Court of Appeal, the High Court, the Crown Courts and the 
Magistrate’s Courts in the same way as they bind the Scottish Court of 
Sessions and subordinate courts in Scotland. While decisions of  each 
of the other courts just mentioned bind the courts respectively sub­
ordinate to it, the decisions of the Court of Sessions in Scotland bind 
only Scottish Courts subordinate to it, but English and Scottish 
decisions are mutually exclusive as regards their binding character 
below the House of Lords. Her Majesty’s Judicial Committee of the 
Privy Council was, and in a number of  cases still is, the highest court 
of appeal for the British colonies (and for a few English tribunals like 
those of the legal or medical professions in matters of  discipline) and 
'ts decisions —  commonly referred to as opinions —  are binding on 
such courts and not on English courts as such.
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In its operation in Africa, the doctrine implies that, for instance, 
in Nigeria and Ghana, the decisions of the Supreme Court as the 
highest court bind the High Court, those of  the High Court bind the 
District or Magistrate’s Courts, while those of the latter bind, at least 
in theory, the Customary or Local Courts. We need not stop to 
consider how far customary or local courts do in practice observe the 
doctrine of judicial precedent, particularly having regard to decisions 
of superior courts on issues within their jurisdiction. But we must 
mention in passing that in a federation like Nigeria, while the decisions 
of  the Supreme Court bind all the State High Courts, no decision of 
one High Court or even of the Western Nigeria State Court of Appeal 
binds another State High Court. This is because all the State High 
Courts are of  co-ordinate jurisdiction. When there was the West 
African Court of Appeal, its decisions bound the Courts of  each of 
the four countries subject to its sway. Since independence, however, 
the old West African Court of Appeal decisions have only a persuasive 
authority in each West African State. If we may explain this a little, 
we should say that there is a well-established principle to the effect 
that precedents are classifiable into the two categories of authoritative 
and persuasive: that is to say, that precedents are authoritative within 
a particular hierarchy of courts under one territorial jurisdiction, as 
is the case with the Supreme Court decisions of each State vis-a-vis 
courts subordinate to it, while with respect to the Supreme Court of 
one territory, its decisions have only a persuasive authority in any 
other territory and may be followed or not at the will o f  the courts of 
the latter. In other words, such persuasive precedents are not binding. 
These considerations apply with equal force to the Court of Appeal 
for Eastern Africa which is the final court of appeal for Kenya, Uganda 
and Tanzania. Although the decisions of the East African Court of 
Appeal bind all the Supreme Courts of  the constituent States, no 
decision of the Supreme Court o f one State constitutes an authoritative 
precedent for the courts of another State.
While we are still about the distinction between authoritative and 
persuasive precedents, we may note briefly that', for much the same 
reason as we have just given, the decisions o f  the former West African 
Court of Appeal were never binding upon the Court o f  Appeal for 
Eastern Africa or. indeed, upon the defunct Central African F ed eration  
Court of Appeal. While each was free to consult the decisions of the 
other for parallels or analogies, each was not bound to follow such  
decisions. We shall return to this subject later when we come to 
consider the problems likely to arise where there was a decision o f  the 
Privy Council upon identical issues of law previously applied in cases
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before the courts of one or more of these territorial courts o f  appeal 
in Commonwealth Africa. For the present, we need say no more than 
that when the Privy Council was the court of last resort for both the 
West and the East African groups of territories, its decisions were 
binding upon both appeal courts equally. Today the Privy Council is 
no longer a court o f  appeal for both groups of States, although the 
problems of its erstwhile hegemony still remain with us and will be 
considered anon.
I
A ttitu d e  o f  A fric an  S ta te s  T o w a rd s  E ng lish  D ecisions
Because o f  the reception of  English law, including in particular the 
use o f  the so-called residual clause providing for the application of 
English law wherever a particular dispute before the court is not 
covered by customary law or a local enactment, judges—-African 
and non-African —  tended during the colonial era all too readily to 
resort to English law to fill the gaps. This was often the case when 
dealing with such sensitive areas as the application of  the doctrine of 
repugnancy or issues relating to public policy or morality, when as 
we saw in Lecture II English notions of these concepts were freely 
imported by the judges to deal with the situation. There was not 
sufficient knowledge of the sociology of our peoples or of  the ethos 
underlying our polity; so the early judges fell back on the ‘unruly horse’ 
of English public policy with which they had probably a nodding 
acquaintance in their study o f English law and political thought.
We must hasten, however, to add that there were exceptions to this 
general tendency, as when for instance even an English judge during 
the colonial period showed true judicial technique in refusing to 
apply English decisions to a local case before him involving the 
determination of trade marks. Thus, in M aclver & Co L td  v C F A O ,{ 
Weber, J, observed: “ To the trained eye of a civilised community, 
there is undoubtedly a considerable difference in the two designs set 
side by side and the one would hardly be likely to be mistaken for the 
other, but while the broad principles laid down in English cases should 
be applied, the Trade M arks laws of this country should be ad ­
ministered with due regard to local conditions.” 2 A little further on, 
the same opinion was expressed by Speed, C J, in these words: “ It 
seems clear that the learned judge in the court below was inclined to
’ (1917) 3 NLR 181.
2 Ihicl. p 19.
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refuse registration of  this mark and would have done so had he not 
felt constrained to a contrary conclusion by the decisions of  the English 
courts. These decisions are of  course binding on us but they must be 
construed having regard to the local conditions which are widely 
different from those that obtain in England.” 3 These various ob­
servations clearly show that even English judges have sometimes 
decided to depart from English precedents when they felt that local 
circumstances precluded the application of  English authorities to 
local conditions that were widely different from those in England.
Since political independence, however, a more strident note for 
judicial independence of  English decisions has been struck in various 
parts of Africa. This proclamation of the new freedom is typified by 
this observation of M r Justice Ollenu: “ Again as to the common 
law, from its English source, the courts o f  G hana  have hitherto paid 
regard to decisions o f  the courts in England; now they may pay regard 
to expositions of the com m on law by the courts o f  any country which 
exercises jurisdiction in the common law, namely, the English common 
law.” What has in fact happened at political independence has been 
that English decisions, whether of the House of Lords or o f  the Privy 
Council, now have only a persuasive authority in Commonwealth 
Africa. It follows that the decisions of other common law countries 
like the United States of  America, Canada, Australia and India, have 
at best only a persuasive authority in African courts.
This raises the general question as to how far Commonwealth 
countries follow English decisions. In Parker v R ,4 Discon, L C J, of 
Australia in a very illuminating judgment held that the controversial 
English decision in D PP  v Sm ith 5 had been wrongly decided and was, 
therefore, not to be followed in Australia. This same English decision 
fell to be considered in the East African case of The Queen v Sharmpal 
Singh ,6 where the accused had been convicted of  the murder of his 
wife by the Kenya High Court sitting with three assessors who said 
that the accused was not guilty since the wife’s death occurred in the 
process of  the husband having intercourse with her. The Court of 
Appeal for Eastern Africa substituted a verdict of manslaughter, and 
the State appealed against this judgment to the Privy Council for the 
restoration of the verdict o f  murder. The Kenya Government counsel 
cited D PP  v Smith (supra) as authority for the proposition that 
“ knowledge” within the meaning of “ malice aforethought” under the
3 Ibid, p 22.
“ (1963) CLR 569.
5 (1960) CLY 739, (1961) AC 290.
6 (1962) EA 13 (PC).
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Kenya Penal Code does not mean actual knowledge but only such 
knowledge as a reasonable man would have that death might be the 
probable consequence of his acts or omissions. It was further argued 
that the Court o f  Appeal for Eastern Africa had wrongly ignored the 
English decision in D P P v Smith  in substituting its verdict o f  m an­
slaughter only. The Privy Council refused to follow D P P v Smith 
because, in their view, the Penal Code provision of what constituted 
grievous harm was not affected by the English decision. Their Lord­
ships accordingly affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeal for 
Eastern Africa.
Another decision showing that judges — African and non-African 
are increasingly conscious of  the need to safeguard local judicial 
precedents against English decisions in certain situations is Ezeani & 
ors v Njidike.1 This was a case involving, inter alia , the tort of con­
version and the measure of damages therefor. Brett, J S C, in delivering 
the judgment of the Supreme Court of Nigeria, observed on p 98 in 
reference to the House of Lords decisions in Rookes v Barnard8 
regarding the award of  exemplary damages: “ It is not necessary in 
the present case to decide whether the Courts in Nigeria should adopt 
this decision in toto , but as a warning against the over-free award of 
exemplary damages it is o f  strong persuasive authority .” Incidentally, 
the question whether or not Rookes v Barnard was applicable in 
Kenya was considered in Orude and Nwangi v The Municipal Council 
o f  Kisumu.9 The Court o f  Appeal for Eastern Africa, relying on the 
Privy Council test in Australian Consolidated Press L td  v Uren. held 
that there was no local body of  law inconsistent with Rookes v Barnard 
which must be treated “ as authoritatively setting out the law of 
England as to exemplary damages in tort, which was applied in 
Kenya by the Judicature Act, 1967” . This decision was soon to be 
upset by Broome v Cassell & Co L td  & anor,10 in which the English 
Court o f  Appeal cast serious doubts on its validity, but the House of 
Lords has since restored Rookes v Barnard. But for this restoration 
by the House of  Lords in England, the law as to exemplary damages 
in East Africa would have remained chaotic as a result of the slavish 
application there of this English decision. It would have been wiser 
for the Court of  Appeal in Eastern Africa to have followed the example 
of the Supreme Court o f  Nigeria by regarding the English decision as 
having only a persuasive authority.
7 (1965) N M L R  95.
8 (1964) 2 WLR 269.
'Civil Appeal N o 37 o f 1970. Judgment delivered on November 27, 1970.
10 (1971) 2 All ER 187.
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In Rashid Muledina & Co (M om basa) L td  & ors v Hoima Ginners 
L td ,11 one of the arguments of counsel for the respondent was that, 
in interpreting the Arbitration Act o f  Kenya (Cap 49), the Court of 
Appeal for Eastern Africa should not consider English decisions, nor 
even the decisions of  the Court itself, since they were subject to appeal 
to the Privy Council. Sir Charles Newbold, C J, observed:
It has been urged on behalf o f  the respondent that this court is not bound 
to English decisions and that it should overrule the decision in the Sohan LaI 
C ase12 as that decision was given at a time when this court was subordinate 
to the Privy Council. It is clear that this court is not bound by any English 
decision, whether given before or after independence. Nevertheless, this 
court will pay due regard to the decision o f  any Com m onwealth Court where 
a similar system o f  law to that apertaining in East Africa exists, and will, of 
course, pay especial regard to the decision o f  the English courts, especially 
where those decisions enunciate the com m on law or equity or interpret 
statutes o f  general application or statutes which have been substantially 
copied in East Africa. As regards previous decisions o f  this court, whether 
before or after Independence, I would not wish to express an opinion as to 
the precise application o f  the doctrine o f stare decisis as the matter was not 
fully argued before us and in any event I am quite convinced that the decision 
in the Sohan Lai Case was correct and should be followed.
As regards the reservation of the learned Chief Justice in his last 
sentence, Spry, J A, explained the position further in these words:
I would, o f  course, agree that this court is not bound by English decisions but 
in the interpretation o f the Arbitration Act, much o f  which (including sections
II and 12) is clearly derived from the English Arbitration Act, 1889, respect 
should be shown to English decisions on that Act, particularly those given 
prior to the enactment o f  the Kenya statute because, in the absence o f ^ny 
indication to the contrary, it is reasonable to suppose that the legislature 
enacted the Kenya statute with knowledge o f  those decisions. As regards the 
pre-Independence decisions o f  this court, the legislature has on each o f  the 
constitutional changes, expressly maintained the existing law and therefore 
those decisions should carry just as much weight as if  there had been no 
constitutional changes.
In Ahmed & anor v R ,13 the question was whether the joinder of 
two accused persons which constituted a procedural defect under the 
Kenya Criminal Procedure Code was a mere irregularity, or whether 
it was a fundamental illegality which vitiated the whole trial. On an 
appeal from the Kenyan Supreme Court, the Court of Appeal for
" (1967) EA 645.
12 Sohan Lai v East AJrit an Builders' M erchants (1951) 18 E ACA 50.
131 Criminal Appeal N o 31 o f 1962. Judgment delivered on May 2, 1962.
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Eastern Africa first considered Mubarak v /?,14 one of its own earlier 
decisions on appeal from the High Court of Somaliland Protectorate, 
which, while involving a similar problem, really turned on the appli­
cation of a Criminal Procedure Code based on that of India. The 
Court of Appeal pointed out, however, that one o f  the differences 
between the Indian (and Somaliland) Code and the Kenya Code, was 
the omission in the Kenya Code of any provision for separate trial of 
every charge; and the court was of the opinion that, as the Kenya 
Code had been based on the English Indictment Act, 1915, and not 
on the Indian Code, the English decisions must be followed.15 The 
Court of Appeal took the view that “ it is the English law and practice 
to which it is right to turn to ascertain the effect of an irregular charge 
or information and that the Indian law and the decision made there­
under are not impugned.”
When a Privy Council decision was based on an Indian Act which 
applies in East Africa, the Court of Appeal for Eastern Africa might 
very well decide not to follow it. Thus, in Zamburakis & anor v 
Rodussakis, 16 the appellants had argued at the trial that the claim 
against them was barred by the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, which, 
with the Indian Code o f Civil Procedure, was applied in Tanganyika 
in 1920 by Order-in-Council. Mahan, J, who tried it as a preliminary 
issue in the pleadings, rejected the plea. When the matter was taken 
to the High Court, Cox, C J, upheld this ruling and ordered that the 
account should be taken. On appeal, the Court of Appeal for Eastern 
Africa affirmed Mahan. J 's  ruling for the reason that section 97 o f  the 
Code of Civil Procedure forbids appeal from a preliminary ruling on 
any appeal from the final decree. On a final appeal to the Judicial 
Committee, Their Lordships followed an earlier decision of their 
own on the interpretation of the same Act on appeal from India in 
1917 in Fricomdas Cooxerji Bhoja v Gopinath Fin Thakur.11 The 
question now is: Would such a decision of the Privy Council be 
followed in any East African court today? The issue is important in 
view of the sizable number of Indian Acts which apply there as part 
of the received law.
There may occasionally arise a case before an African court in 
respect of which there are two inconsistent decisions, one of the
14 (1959) EACA G App N o 172 o f 1959, unreported.
This decision was in accordance with the rule in Trimble v Hill (1879) 5 AC 342 
to the effect that where the local legislation was substantially the same as the English 
legislation, the English decision on such legislation should be followed. Indeed, this 
was done in Jeremiah v/?(1951) 18 EACA 218.
PC Appeal No 5 o f 1957. Judgment delivered on July 16, 1968.
17ILR 44. Cal 759.
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English House of Lords and the other of the Privy Council. As the 
Doctrine o f  Judicial Precedent operates in Africa, the better opinion 
is that Privy Council decisions prevail. Thus, in Clyde-Wiggins v 
Maba Estates L td ,18 Goldin, J, preferred to follow Baines v P ick19 
rather than Scharfeneker v Daley & Co L td ,2<) thereby affirming the 
principle that decisions of  the South African Appellate Division, given 
before the abolition of its appellate jurisdiction over the High Court 
of Southern Rhodesia, are binding on a single judge o f  the High Court 
of Southern Rhodesia. The South African Chief Justice had in the 
course of his judgment in van der Linde v Calitz2x discussed R v L 22 on 
appeal from Rhodesia, wherein the view was expressed that, despite 
statutory wording that evidence was to be admitted “ as if the matter 
were depending in the High Court of Judicature” , regard must be 
had to the fact that the Privy Council was the Court of Appeal and not 
the House of Lords. Accordingly, in the event of a conflict between 
the two. Privy Council decisions will prevail. Davies, J, in ex parte 
Boland gave a salutary reminder that, where courts are given a judi­
cial discretion, reported cases are only examples of  how past judges 
have thought fit to exercise the discretion and cannot either fetter 
or limit the discretion conferred by statute or create a binding rule 
of practice.
II
P o s t- re c e p tio n  D a te  E ng lish  D ec is io n s in A fr ica
It will be recalled that in Lecture I when we discussed the question of 
the respective dates of introduction of English law into the several 
African territories, we mentioned briefly the problem as to which 
English decisions should be regarded as part of the received law; we 
then promised to re-examine the question more fully in this lecture.
The treatment in Orude and Nwangi Case (supra) of the authority 
of Rookes v Barnard (supra) by the Court o f  Appeal for Eastern 
Africa has once again focussed attention upon the binding character 
in an African State of English decisions given after the reception date. 
Let us illustrate with an example where the reception date is January 1, 
1920. Should an English decision given in 1930 on a rule of  co m m o n  
law which extends its scope by creating new law be binding upon that
18 (1967) (1) SA 240 (R).
19 (1955) (1) SA 534 (AD).
20 (1940) SR 223.
21 (1967) (2) SA 239 (A D ), pp 250-51 , per Steyn, CJ.
22(1951) (4) SA 614 (AD). (1967) (3) SA 655 (R).
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particular State? There have been two views on this matter. The 
first view is that such a post-reception date English decision, insofar 
as it is a legitimate extension of existing common law rule, should be 
regarded as binding on the courts of that State provided that it is a 
decision of  the appropriate English court.23 The other view is that 
only those English decisions at the cut-off date will be binding.24 The 
problem will be thrown into bold relief if we take one or two concrete 
cases, one from the law of contract and the other from the law of tort. 
Consider what is known as the Rule in Chandler v Webster,25 which 
is to the effect that if I hire a room in your house along the main road 
in town in order to view a procession, and that procession is subse­
quently cancelled. I cannot recover any money paid in advance; the 
contract is frustrated, and the loss “ lies where it falls” . This was 
the English common law up to Fibrosa v Fairbarn, etc L td } 6 in which 
the House of Lords overruled Chandler v Webster and held that the 
payer of money for a consideration that has wholly failed should be 
able to recover it. On the second view, a Commonwealth African 
country would not be able to claim this logical extension of the English 
common law rule except by means of fresh legislation. Again, let us 
take in the law of tort the development of the tort o f  negligence. 
According to the decision in Winterbottom  v W right}  if A sold 
a defective chattel to B and C was injured by using it, C could not 
sue A because C was not a party to the contract between A and B. 
Then, after a series of decisions, Donoghue v Stevenson28 was decided 
by the House of Lords on a Scottish appeal to the effect that if A puts 
a deleterious manufactured substance into circulation by means of a 
sale to B and C is injured, C can sue A for negligence independently 
of the fact that C is not a party to the contract. On the second view, 
this worthwhile extension of the principle of tortious liability for 
negligence would not be available to the State concerned.
An interesting example of the inter-State use of judicial precedents 
is afforded by the G hanaian case of Wallace Johnson v R 2q which, it 
will be recalled, was to the effect that, where a provision in a code was 
intended to be exhaustive of the applicable law, it should be considered
23See my ‘Judicial Precedents in Colonial Courts’, Modern Law Review, 1955, pp 
561 -370; and Park, A W E's Sources o f  Nigerian Law , pp 20, 38 and 95.
"4See A N A llot’s ‘Essays in African Law’, pp 31flf; and Judicial Precedent in African
Revisited (1968), JAL, pp 3 -31 .
25(1904) 1 KB 493.
26 (1943) AC 32.
27 (1842) 2 M & W 519.
28 (1932) AC 562.
29 (1940) 1 All ER 241.
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free from any glosses or interpretations based upon English or Scottish 
law. In Ogbuagwu v Police,30 in which there was a charge of seditious 
libel under section 51 of the Nigerian Criminal Code, Bairamian, J, 
approved and applied Wallace Johnson’s Case in holding that a defence 
which was available under English law but which had not been ex­
pressly incorporated into the Nigerian Code, was not available in 
Nigeria, since the Nigerian Criminal Code was “ meant to be complete 
and exhaustive” . Similarly, in the Ugandan appeal of Yonasani & ors 
v /?,31 the Court of Appeal for Eastern Africa applied the dictum  of 
the Privy Council in the Wallace Johnson's Case where the question 
was whether, in a trial of accessories after the fact, the English rule 
that the principal offender must first have been prosecuted to con­
viction before the accessories after the fact could be charged was held 
applicable in Uganda. The Court of Appeal for Eastern Africa made 
the following pertinent observation:
W hat is true o f  the G old Coast Law o f  sedition is true also o f  the Uganda
Law o f  accessories after the fact, and it is unnecessary in our opinion to
engraft anything onto it from English Law.
In the Zambian case of John Chitenge v The People, 32 the trial 
judge held that, if the intent to commit a felony was proved, malice 
aforethought was conclusively established, and the Zambian Court of 
Appeal accepted this view. W hat had happened in the case itself was 
that A, after a quarrel with B at a beer party, later went at night to 
set fire to B ’s house in which C, a visitor staying with B. was asleep at 
the material time. A honestly thought that the house was empty at 
that time, but C suffered injuries from which he later died. A was 
convicted of the murder of C, who then appealed. But the Court of 
Appeal pointed out that the law of Zambia differed from the English 
law prior to the enactment of the Homicide Act, 1957. The learned 
trial judge had, in reaching his conclusion, applied Wallace Johnson’s 
Case and some other decisions of the Court of Appeal for Eastern 
Africa.33 The Zambian Court of Appeal held, however, that the law 
of Zambia was in fact the same as that of England before the Homicide
30 (1953) 20 NLR 139.
31 (1942) 9 EACA 65.
Judgment N o 15 of 1966. Criminal Appeal 14/66, unreported.
33 Eg Petero Sentali v R (1953) 20 EACA 230; Seronga Ole Gidi & ors v R (1953) 
20 EACA 241; and Abdu Rabi v R (1956) 20 EACA 555; and Handulwe v R (1962) R A 
N 47 (a decision o f the Federal Supreme Court o f the defunct Federation of Rhodesia 
and Nyasaland).
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Act of 1957, and said that the Zambian Penal Code contained a 
provision in section 4 which was different from the provision of the 
Gold Coast Code. It accordingly held that Wallace Johnson's Case 
was not applicable to Zambia.
We may cite one more illustration from Australia. In Hungier v 
Grace & anor,i4 Barwick, C J, o f  Australia cited with approval the 
Privy Council judgment in the Nigerian case of K asum uv Baba-Egbei5 
in support of his conclusion to the effect that advances made by a 
person which were not in the course of  carrying on a business of money- 
lending could not be regarded as loan within the meaning of section 
22(1) o f  the Money Lenders Act 1958 of Victoria, which is the same 
as part of section 19 of the Money Lenders Ordinance of Nigeria.36
It is possible to take the view that this example of intra- 
Commonwealth borrowings of relevant decisions has no doubt been 
induced by the fact that, in applying the Nigerian case, the Australian 
High Court was merely applying the persuasive authority of a decision 
of the Privy Council. Thus, examples of direct citation of a Supreme 
Court judgment of Nigeria or of any other African Commonwealth 
country by one of  the older members of the Commonwealth are rare 
indeed.
The attitude of  G hana courts3 has, in recent years, been largely 
influenced by the provision of  section 42(2) of  the Constitution of 
1960 which says that “ the Suprem eC ourt shall in principle be bound 
to follow its own previous decisions on questions of law” . Commenting 
on this expression, Mr Justice Ollenu sa id :
N ow , what is the proper interpretation to be given to the words ‘shall in 
principle be bound to follow  its own previous decisions on questions o f  law’? 
Are they to be interpreted in the same way as the principle o f  stare decisis as 
operates in England in the H ouse o f  Lords or the Court o f  Appeal, namely, 
that the Supreme Court has no option but to follow its previous decision even 
though it is m anifestly wrong unless it can show that that previous decision 
was given per incuriam l Our view is that the words ‘in principle’ are intended 
to create an elastic rule, to save the Supreme Court in embarrassing situations 
and to enable it to re-examine its own previous decision, to correct or differ 
from it when it finds such decision to be either m anifestly wrong, not only 
because it was given per incuriam , but because o f  inconsistency w ith1 some 
principle o f  law or custom  and is therefore a decision which for som e good  
reason or the other should not be followed. In our view the Article lays
34 (1972) 127 CLR 210.
35 (1956) AC 539, pp 546-47  and p 551.
36 Ibid, p 215.
Eg in West African Bakery v Miezah (1972) 1 GLR 78, pp 86 -88 .
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down a flexible rule intended to enable the court to m ould and develop the 
law, the com m on law no less than the customary law, to meet the needs o f  
econom ic and social changes which are taking place in our new and developed  
nation without the necessity to resort to Parliament each time to rectify an 
error in the law brought about by a wrong decision .38
The same line of reasoning may be observed in Loga v Davordzi,39 
where Azu Crabbe, J S C (as he then was), observed as follows:
Article 42(4) o f  the Constitution o f  Ghana declares that the Supreme Court 
‘shall in principle be bound to follow  its own decisions on questions o f  law’. 
To my mind, the words ‘in principle’ connotes som e flexibility in the applica­
tion o f  the doctrine o f  stare decisis by this Court, which cannot regard itself 
as absolutely bound by its own previous decisions. ... The merit o f  this less 
strict rule o f  precedent is that it enables the court to m ould the law and to 
adapt it to the changing conditions o f  society ... It follow s, therefore, that 
this Court, like the Privy Council, must feel strongly disposed to adhere to 
its previous decisions (see Fatuma Binti M oham ed Bin Salam  v. M ohamed  
Bin Salam  (1952) A.C. 1). It must only deviate from its previous decision  
when the previous decision is manifestly wrong, or in exceptional circum­
stances.
H I
A frican  In te r s ta te  U se  o f  P re c e d e n ts
The extent to which the various Commonwealth African States make 
use of precedents from one another depends upon a number of  factors. 
Among the factors that should encourage such use may be mentioned 
the common heritage of English law, the once all-pervading judicial 
opinions of the Privy Council, geographical contiguity and similarity 
of reactions of the several customary laws to the current social and 
economic stimuli. Of the various countries in Commonwealth Africa, 
Nigeria and G hana have probably the closest relationship in legal and 
judicial matters. This is because the old Lagos Settlement was formerly 
administered as the Eastern Province of the old Gold Coast Colony 
for some years between 1866 and 1874; our two legal systems derive 
their common source from the Supreme Court Ordinance No 4 of 
1876; and the intermingling of lawyers and of political leaders on such
38‘Judicial Precedent in Ghana’ (1966), 3 UGLJ, pp 160-61.
3gCourt of Appeal Judgment delivered on June 13, 1966, unreported. See a lso  
CFAO v Zacca (1972) 1 GLR 366. The flexibility referred to in the text as essential to a 
developing society would seem to be reflected in the holding that the High Court o f  G h a n a  
is not bound by its own decisions: Saarah v Asuah (1962) 1 GLR 536, p 538 (bottom).
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issues as the West African Land question and the National Congress 
of British West Africa.
In practical judicial terms, this rapprochement in legal and allied 
matters has been reflected in the judicial sphere. Thus, in Ekpendu v 
Erika ,40 the Supreme Court of Nigeria decided that the purported 
lease of a portion of family land without the consent of the family 
head was void ab initio. The court further laid down the following 
propositions of customary land tenure: (a) that a sale or lease of 
family land carried out by the family head, without the concurrence of 
the principal members of the family, is voidable, and that this had 
been so decided by the West African Court of Appeal in Esan v Faro,41 
and (b) that a sale or lease of such land by the principal members of 
the family without the concurrence of the family head is void ab initio, 
and that this had been so decided by the West African Court of Appeal 
in Agbloe v Sappor 42 The Supreme Court pointed out that it was 
immaterial that Esan v Faro relates to Lagos land while Agbloe v Sappor 
relates to Accra land, since both cases were decided by the same three 
judges o f  the West African Court of Appeal within two months of 
each other.43 In Shang v C olem an44 which we have discussed at 
length in Lecture II, a strong Court o f  Appeal o f  G hana consisting of 
Van Lare (Ag C J as he then was), Granville Sharp and Ollenu quoted 
with approval the Privy Council decision in Bamgbose v Daniel4* to 
the effect that the succession rights of persons under an intestacy must 
be governed by the lex domicili, that is, the customary law of succession 
in that case. The court observed, inter alia, that African interpretations 
should wherever possible be given to English statutes which apply in 
Africa. Sometimes, however, the courts of Nigeria may not follow a 
Ghana precedent and vice versa. Thus, in Taiwo v Dosunmu,46 where 
the issue was as to the accountability of the family head to members 
of the family, the Supreme Court of Nigeria, to which a number of 
Ghanaian cases47 had been cited by counsel, pointed out that 
“although we are content to assume that it might be judicially noticed 
in G hana that in certain areas, at least o f  the country, the junior
40 (1959) 4 FSC 79.
41 (1947) 12 W ACA 135.
42 (1947) 12 W ACA 187.
43See also N A  Ollenu’s ‘The Changing Law and Law Reform in Ghana' Journal 
of African Law , vol 15, no 2, 1971, pp 52-53  on accountability o f family head in Ghana.
44Civil Appeal N o 41/59 delivered on November 23, 1959; see also Coleman v Shang 
(1961) AC 481 where the Privy Council affirmed the Court o f Appeal o f Ghana.
45 (1955) AC 107 (PC).
46(1966) N M L R  94.
47 Eg Nelson v Nelson (1932) 1 W ACA 215.
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members of the family cannot call on the head of the family for an 
account, we do not consider that that in itself means the existence of 
such a custom in G hana can be judicially noticed by the High Court 
of Lagos” . The court would seem to be saying no more than that, 
since under Nigerian law an alleged rule of customary law has still to 
be established as a matter of evidence, this particular G hanaian custom 
which obtains only in certain places in Ghana must be proved to be 
the custom of Lagos. Quaere whether, if the alleged custom had been 
held in Ghana to be a general custom, it would have been accepted by 
the Supreme Court o f  Nigeria. It would not have been, for the reason 
that it could not be taken judicial notice of, since as foreign law, it still 
has to be proved by evidence. Finally, it will be sufficient to refer 
briefly to Awunor-W illiams v Gbedemah,48 in which, as we may recall, 
the G hana Supreme Court referred to its Nigerian counterpart’s 
decision in Lakanm i & anor v The Attorney-General ( Western State) 
& ors49 in dealing with the question of the validity of  the decrees 
issued by the military governments o f  the National Liberation 
Council. We have already set out the facts of  this case in the last 
lecture.
We may now turn to other instances of interstate uses of  precedents 
in Africa. An epoch-making judgment of  the Court o f  Appeal for 
Eastern Africa in which the fundamentals of the applicability of 
Judicial Precedents were examined and restated for that part of the 
continent is Dodhia v National and Grindlays Bank L td  & anor/ 0 The 
immediate questions for determination were:
(a) whether the Court o f  Appeal for Eastern Africa was bound by 
decisions of the Privy Council given in appeals from East Africa, 
and
(b) whether the Court of Appeal for Eastern Africa was bound by 
its own previous decisions.
Along side these was also the question of the application of the doctrine 
o f  stare decisis by the High Court and subordinate courts in Kenya. 
But before we deal with this particular case, let us look at the state of 
the law as declared by the Court of Appeal for Eastern Africa in 
Vallabhji v National and Grindlays Bank L td  & anor.51 There, it was 
held that unattested letters of  hypothecation were wholly void. When 
the matter was taken on appeal to the Privy Council, it was held that
4ti (1969) Court of Appeal sitting as the Supreme Court. Const SC 1/69 dated Decem ber  
8, 1969.
49 (1970) SC 58/69.
50 Kenya Civil Appeal N o 53 o f  1968. Judgment delivered on N o v e m b e r  21. 
1969.
51 (1964) EA 442.
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such letters were valid inter partes,52 The Vallabhji Case, which was 
the last decision delivered by the Privy Council in an East African 
appeal before the abolition of appeals to the Judicial Committee, 
raised a point o f  law identical with that involved in the instant Dodhia 
Case.
The Vallabhji Case raised the question of  the applicability and 
authority in Kenya and New Zealand decisions on New Zealand Acts 
which formed the basis o f  the Kenya Chattels Transfer Act. Newbold, 
P, after scrutinizing the terms of the applicable statute law against the 
background of the received English Common Law and Equity in order 
to discover whether there was anything in the local circumstances of 
Kenya which made these inapplicable there, held that the Court of 
Appeal for Eastern Africa was bound by the decisions of the Privy 
Council when the latter court was the final court o f  appeal; that the 
Privy Council had the necessary flexibility in following its own previous 
decisions; and that the Court of Appeal is not bound by any prior 
decision of the Privy Council, including that in the Vallabhji Case. 
The other two Justices of Appeal agreed with him. The Court was 
also unanimous in the view that “ while it would normally regard a 
previous decision of its own as binding” , it “ should be free in both 
civil and criminal cases to depart from such a previous decision when 
it appears right to do so” . The Court also “ accept that subordinate 
courts are bound by the decisions of superior courts and that a sub­
ordinate court o f  appeal should normally be bound by a previous 
decision of  its ow n” . Newbold, P. while adhering to the position he 
had taken in the Vallabhji Case, thought the majority of the judges 
of the Privy Council in that case were “ unaware of the conditions and 
needs of  the people o f  K enya” ; that the Vallabhji Case was wrongly 
decided, but that this was a comparatively minor matter of the 
construction of a section, and to change the construction of it three 
times in as many years would cause uncertainty in law for the business 
community; hence the court of appeal would not depart from the 
Privy Council view in Vallabhji. Duffus, V-P. thought that to reverse 
the Privy Council now would lead to complete uncertainty, while 
Spry, J A, considered that “ the majority judgm ent.. .  represents a 
logical and reasonable view which has formed part o f  the law of Kenya 
for the past three years” , and that “ there was no compelling reason 
for departing from that decision” . Thus, by a self-denying ordinance, 
the Court of Appeal for Eastern Africa refrained from upsetting an 
inconyenient decision o f  the Privy Council, and chose to allow it to 
remain on the ground of convenience.
52 See (1966) EA 186.
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THE JU D ICIA L PROCESS IN COM M ONW EALTH AFRICA
IV 
Precedents in the Service of Legal Development
We may now take a look in the round at the operation of  stare decisis 
as inherited by Commonwealth African States as part of the received 
English common law. There can be little doubt that, despite the 
disadvantages that inevitably attend upon the strict application of the 
doctrine of judicial precedent, it has been an agent of evolutionary 
legal development. Among its notable disadvantages are, to be sure, 
its tendency towards bulk and complexity in the growth of the common 
law; the possibility o f  having to make sometimes illogical distinctions 
between cases that are apparently similar in order to avoid having to 
follow inconvenient precedents,53 the sometimes continued application 
of old and outmoded decisions to current social and economic 
problems; and the difficulty of  determining the ratio decidendi of a 
case where different reasons were given for reaching the same con­
clusion.54 On the other hand, the advantages of the case-law system 
are reasonable certainty of  the law at any particular stage and also 
flexibility of growth of the law according to changing notions of legal 
development dictated from time to time by changing social and 
economic conditions. Such changes in the law as are considered to 
be necessary are made after the fullest possible arguments in open 
court by counsel for both sides followed by careful scrutiny and 
consideration by the bench of all the relevant factors urged in favour 
or against change. Where a change is more than the normal modifica­
tion or extension of existing legal principle so that it amounts to a 
radical departure from established notions of justice according to 
law, the judicial function is at an end and the legislative initiative 
comes into play to effect the needed change. We noticed this 
phenomenon when we considered earlier in the present lecture the 
judicial modification of the Rule in Chandler v Webster (supra) which 
held that where there was a frustration of  the adventure of a contract, 
the loss lay where it fell and the payer of  money or the renderer of 
services could not recover anything under the contract, into a new rule 
in the Fibrosa Case (supra) whereby if, under the frustrated contract, 
there was total failure of  consideration, money paid or serv ices  
rendered could be recovered or compensated for respectively. But
5 3 For a perceptive study o f these problems, see W E Geldart’s Elements o f  English 
Law , Macmillan & Co, London.
54See Goodhart’s famous essay, ‘Determining the Ratio Decidendi o f a Case. 
Essays in Jurisprudence and the Common Law , 1931, London, pp 1-32; S im p s o n s  
O xford Essays in Jurisprudence, 1961, p 148.
where the failure of consideration is only partial so that only a part 
of the payment had been made in advance but the payee has been put 
to reasonable expenses in executing the contract, there is need for 
apportionment of the rights and obligations of the parties to the 
contract. The House of Lords could not, however, do this; what it 
did, and what all courts faced with a similar situation should do, 
was to draw the attention of Parliament to the desired change. In the 
particular instance under consideration, we may note that the funda­
mental change required in the law was effected by the Law Reform 
(Frustrated Contracts) Act, 1945. The common law system thus 
recognizes the respective spheres of the judicial and the legislative 
processes in the development of  the law.
If we seem to favour the case-law approach to the problems of legal 
development, it is mainly because it is the rational and dynamic 
interpretation of a situation in each African territory in which poly­
ethnic communities abound. The advocates of codification would be 
up against great difficulties in any attempt to codify the customary 
laws of the respective communities that make up the State. How are 
we to organize the compilation of such codes? W hat types of personnel 
should be engaged in the task —  lawyers, sociologists, historians and 
other research workers? Should these work singly or as a team? 
Then, we may ask whether they should employ questionnaires, or 
should combine questionnaires with visits to the towns and villages. 
Whom should they consult — the old or the young, or both? How 
should they reconcile the data thus obtained from both? These and 
similar problems have been agitated at considerable length elsewhere 
and it would deflect us from our present course to repeat all the relevant 
arguments here. Suffice it to say that case-law is clearly preferable to 
codification as a means of legal development in Commonwealth Africa 
today. The recent efforts in the form of Restatements of African Law 
in parts o f  East Africa are useful as stop-gaps, but are hardly a sub­
stitute for case-law as a dynamic of social change in African legal 
development.
It may be pointed out that the mere proliferation of codes within a 
State is not conducive to the early emergence of a body of common 
law towards which each territory is or should be striving as a worthwhile 
goal of its legal development.55 The co-existence of  a multiplicity of 
codes within the same territorial entity might encourage tribal 
particularisms if it did not also breed ethnocentric prejudices. In this 
connection, it should be mentioned that G hana has given the first
See Elias (ed), Law & Social Change in Nigeria, ch 12, 1972, Evans Bros, London.
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and the most explicit statutory expression to the concept of a common 
law as the aim of its legal system. Here is Ollenu’s summary of  the 
G hana s itua tion :
But what is the 'com m on law", and what is the 'customary law ’, which together 
with the principles o f  equity and the statutes o f  Ghana constitute the law of 
Ghana today? They are the English com m on law as assim ilated to the 
circumstances o f  Ghana through the years that justice has been administered 
according to the English law, and the custom s that have passed the tests I 
have already described and are thus contained in the body o f  case law on the 
subject. These two laws are defined in the Interpretation Act, 1960, sections 
17 and 18. W ithout wearying you with a recital o f  these sections, their effect 
as I understand it is this: when the expression ‘com m on law’ is now used, 
it means ‘the com m on law o f  G hana’, the two different sources o f  which I 
have already described. All persons are subject to this com m on law; but 
over and above this, when a person shows that he. as a member o f  a particular 
locality or com munity, is entitled to the benefit o f  a local custom , then he will 
be given the benefit o f  that custom . Thus in Ghana today, a Local Court is 
by statute vested with full jurisdiction to administer, as part o f the law o f  the 
land, principles o f  English law and the principles o f  equity which, before, were 
foreign to it. Again the custom ary law is no longer a fact to be proved in a 
Supreme Court; consequently the provisions in the High Court (Civil Pro­
cedure) Rules requiring custom ary law to be pleaded must disappear. Hence­
forth any mist which has surrounded the custom ary law is guided by the 
principle o f  repugnancy, and by precedents, the judges will be able to set out 
authoritatively the law o f  G hana, and thus make possible the compilation  
o f  books on the com m on law o f  G hana.56
It is thus clear that the common law of Ghana, as indeed of any 
Commonwealth African country, is made up of the English common 
law, the principles of equity, applicable English statutes, local statutes 
and those rules o f  customary law which form part of the country’s 
case-law and which apply to the relevant local communities. All the 
other elements of this com m on law apply to all persons within the 
State generally, while the customary law element apply to particular 
groups. There is also the desired mechanism of legal development — 
the production of legal textbooks from time to time out of the whole 
judicial process. The method of case-law permits the possibility ot 
similar, if not uniform, development of bodies of  customary law by th e  
application of juridical technique to the moulding of the raw m a te r ia ls  
along scientific lines. “ The English common law” , as Oliver W e n d e ll  
Holmes has observed, “ has not been logic; it has been experience.'
It is the result of a slow but steady evolution, through generations, ot
56 'The Influence of Eng. Law on W. Africa', Journal o f  African Law , vol 5, 1961. p -H.
5 The Common Law, p 1.
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the once disparate Anglo-Saxon customs fashioned from the time 
of Henry II onwards by itinerant justices (often referred to as justices 
in eyre) and later by the royal courts until these customs gradually 
became for the most part the common law, that is, “ the common 
custom of the realm” . It seems reasonable to assume that, as inheri­
tors of the English common law, especially of its spirit and practice, 
the various Commonwealth African States, given the polygot nature 
of their communities and the interplay of the ever-changing eco­
nomic and social forces, would do well to maintain the method of 
case-law as the means of their developing a common law within 
their respective borders.
In each State, the judicial process will inevitably produce not only 
similarities of development as between the main bodies of customary 
law but also a measure of mutual borrowings often resulting in 
unifbrmity of rules. One would make bold to say that if the operation 
of the case-law system should lead to the adoption of a rule of one of 
the dominant bodies o f  customary law as the new law, that would 
not necessarily be a bad thing. For instance, one would not be surprised 
if a matrilineal system of succession becomes under the stress of 
prevailing economic and social circumstances gradually patrilineal, 
patrilocal and even patripotestal.58 After all, fathers are now more 
often than not expected to pay their children's school fees, the children 
are themselves expected to bear their father’s name and to inherit his 
estate on his death. The increasing individualization of holdings and 
possessions encourages the tendency towards placing greater reliance 
on the nuclear family, with the father as the head. On reflection, 
it seems better that one body of customary law should where necessary 
adopt a rule from another body of customary law and make it the 
universal rule within the State, than that, under the Rule in Cole v Cole 
or Coleman v Shang , the court should continue to apply the ancient 
and discarded Anglo-Saxon rules of succession prescribed under the 
Statute o f  Distributions 1670 and 1685, which, by the way, was done 
away with in England itself well over fifty years ago.
By the use of  judicial precedent in our system of case-law, there 
has been a significant development of our customary laws. We saw 
in our first lecture how a number of customary rules and traditional 
practices have been evolving since the advent o f  English law: it has 
been due to the courts that the concept of family land has been gradually 
analysed and clarified in such a way that the rights of the individual
s One example in which the Fante rule o f matrilineal succession has sometimes 
been confused with the Ga custom o f  patrilineal inheritance occurs in Solomon v
Botchway (1943) 9 W ACA 127.
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family members therein have been defined from case to case; that the 
chief or the family head has been shown to be a kind of trustee or 
caretaker in relation to the family land; that the characteristics of the 
customary tenancies have been defined in precise legal terms; and that 
the customary pledge of land as a perpetually redeemable interest has 
been compared and distinguished from the English mortgage. Nor 
has the judicial process neglected the problems associated with the 
customary marriage and divorce, especially in relation to marriage 
under statute or what is sometimes but erroneously called English or 
Christian marriage, a lthough some of the crucial aspects of this 
relationship have yet to be resolved by legislation in order to produce 
a rational and coherent body of  law in many Commonwealth countries. 
The customary laws of succession and inheritance have been elaborated 
by judges in a number of leading cases by the well-known methods 
o f  case-law. On the whole, it can be said that the application of the 
judicial techniques of the English common law to our customary laws 
has often resulted in the remoulding of the traditional rules and 
concepts along lines o f  rational development to suit our evolving 
economic and social characteristics. Through the use of  the doctrine 
of repugnancy, customary law has been largely shorn of its obnoxious 
aspects, while at the same time the judicious use o f  precedents in our 
superior courts has helped in the gradual build-up of bodies o f  legal 
principles and practices which have enriched our various bodies of 
customary law. Some mistakes have, no doubt, been made in the 
process, resulting sometimes in misapplication of one type o f  customary 
rule or observance to the wrong groups and sometimes in over-easy 
generalizations which might obscure real differences; but such errors, 
where they have in fact occurred, can be and have often in fact been 
corrected by legislation or through the normal operation of  the 
judicial process; they do not detract from the over-all benefit to the 
development of customary laws that accrues from the judicious use 
of judicial precedents.
If we turn to the other areas of our laws that we have examined, we 
shall find that our judges have tried within the limits of their vision 
and resources to introduce order into chaos by the rational application 
of the judicial process. Let us take for instance cases o f  the conflict 
o f  laws. The principles enunciated in a series o f  cases in which E nglish  
law has come into conflict with customary law, or in which c u sto m a r y  
law has been at variance with statute law (whether English o r  local), 
or in which one body of customary law is opposable to  a n o th e r  bod y  
of customary law, have over the years been evolved by the c o u r ts  to 
meet the peculiar needs and circumstances of our pluralistic so c ie tie s
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and the resultant profusion of laws. For one of the factors that make 
the laws of each of the Commonwealth African States so complex is 
the simultaneous application of  at least three streams of laws often 
to the same set of people. The sometimes bewildering variety of  the 
interactions between these bodies of laws reinforces the growing need 
and even desirability of fashioning a body of common law for each 
State as the prime goal of the legislative policy and the judicial process.
What we have said earlier in the present lecture concerning the 
attitude of our courts towards English judicial precedents applies with 
equal force to the judicial interpretation of the various constitutions, 
in peace time as in times of  national emergency or war. We saw in the 
last lecture how ready the courts were to follow English precedents 
that afforded clear and pertinent guide; but we also saw how the 
courts did not hesitate, on occasions, to depart from inconvenient 
precedents and, if need be, the local legislature stepped in to nullify 
a Privy Council decision considered to be inappropriate to the local 
circumstances. But perhaps it is in dealing with the constitutional 
problems arising out of coup d'etats that the judges have shown their 
most notable resilience and independence of approach to unorthodox 
legal situations. What is worthy of note, however, is the steady fidelity 
of the judges to legal techniques no less than to the basic requirements 
of the rule o f  law.
V: Conclusion
The role of  the judge in a Commonwealth African court is ex hypo- 
thesi a truly dynamic one. Unlike his counterpart in other common 
law jurisdictions in the older Commonwealth, the African judge 
is faced with tasks or series of tasks that require a good deal of 
judgment and stamina. In the first place, the law he has to apply is 
almost everywhere complex and often unsettled, in that he must make 
a choice of alternatives among the competing claims of English 
common law, equity and statutes of general application, various 
bodies of  customary law, and local statutes — all of which may apply 
to the subject-matter of the dispute before the court. In the second 
place, the judge has to consider his task in applying this complex law 
not only ratione personnae but also ratione materiae\ this is because 
he is very often required to ascertain which law to apply to which 
parties where at least one of  these is a non-African, and also to have 
regard to the subject-matter o f  the dispute as well as to take into 
account whether one or more of the parties have made a choice of 
law and whether such a choice should be permitted. In the third 
place, the judge must have an underlying philosophy that should
J U D IC IA L  PR E C E D E N T  A N D  LEG A L  D E V EL O PM EN T  IN  A FR IC A
guide his action from case to case, because it is this “ inarticulate 
major premise” , to use Oliver Wendell Holme’s expressive phrase, 
which supplies the rationale of his conclusions. Without such an 
underlying assumption the judge’s task in the judicial process becomes 
unconvincing because it loses a proper sense of  direction. Although 
trial judges are very much in need of this philosophy, it is judges of 
appeal that cannot truly discharge their functions fully without it.
Yet, the nature of the judicial process in a Commonwealth African 
court is such as to induce in the judge a disposition towards judicial 
law-making in certain areas of the law where there is either some 
uncertainty or no precedent at all. This is most noticeable in the 
sphere of the judicial treatment of certain aspects of customary law 
which we need not repeat here as we have had occasion to draw 
attention to them in Lecture II. African judges of  today sometimes 
find the evolving customary law as malleable as Chief Justice Holt 
and Lord Mansfield found the English common law of their days in 
the seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries.59 Whether as trial judges 
or as justices of appeal, they need courage and a sense of  conscious 
purpose in the moulding of  the evolving law, but above all they need 
also the resources of  intellect and of character without which the law 
they attempt to nurture and tend would be but a poor and sterile 
thing. Since judges in each Commonwealth African country have the 
additional responsibility to administer also the received English law 
as well as the locally enacted law in commerce and industry, the task of 
achieving an amalgam capable of  meeting the needs of  a developing 
society becomes all the greater because it is ever so challenging.
The ultimate aim of the judicial process is to effect a dynamic 
compromise between law and society, between the technicalities of 
legal science and the requirements o f  social justice. As the law develops 
on the basis o f  the flexible application of the doctrines of  repugnancy 
and of judicial precedents, there will emerge in due course a common 
law in each Commonwealth African country as the goal of its judicial 
process.
Bora Laskin, a-judge o f the Supreme Court o f Canada, in his lecture entitled 
‘The Institutional Character o f the Judge’, observed as follows:
A final court which is prepared to overrule its own precedents puts itself, institutionally, 
into a partnership, albeit a junior one, with the legislature. Especially in the field 
o f private law, such as contract, tort and property, where the courts themselves have 
fashioned many o f the rules, they have some responsibility for keeping the rules 
under surveillance with a view to modifying or changing them as changing conditions 
may at a particular time warrant. ... They may, hence, properly rely on the courts 
to share in the burden of law-making in those areas congenial to judicial legislation, 
as, for example, in the private law fields that 1 have already mentioned.
See also Lionel Cohen Lectures, 1972. the Hebrew University o f Jerusalem.
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